End Games? Marc Caputo for Axios: "Exclusive: Rubio's secret squeeze on Raul Castro's Cuba"

 

 

Axios has reported on the conversations between Secretary of State Marco Rubio and key elements of the Cuban military establishment--the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR). Marc Caputo, "Exclusive: Rubio's secret squeeze on Raul Castro's Cuba" Axios.

FAR, of course  is the more or less intact remnant of what had been the revolutionary government of Cuba  between 1959 and 1976 when the present political-economic model was formally instituted. It has remained autonomous enough, its relationship with the state apparatus mimicking that between the brothers Fidel and Raul Castro. The nomenklatura remains committed to the vision of Fidel Castro and the protection of the temporally stagnant purity of Caribbean Marxist-Leninism. They have been key elements in suppressing reforms within Cuba within its Marxist-Leninist parameters, including those of Raul Castro himself at the end of the first decade of the 21st century. The FAR has been Raul's bailiwick almost form the beginning. FAR tends toward a more pragmatic and transactional  approach with closer ties to their counterparts in China. But both are extremely sensitive to issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity. In that respect they follow the discursive pattern of Mexico.

The full reporting follows below, which in essence is essence--reading the signs from hints and whispers that are being dropped. . .strategically. . . including the Axios story.  

The fundamental line though is likely accurate enough. B

1. The signalling about negotiating a Venezuelan resolution to the problem posed by a Cuban State of Misery now beyond control of a nomenklatura that for internal political reasons cannot be displaced is now overwhelming.  (Backer, Cuba's Caribbean Marxism, 2018))  

2. The Cuban nomenklatura has stood in the way of reform from within for decades. And to some extent they are NOT irrevocably tied to FAR. The Cuban military revolutionary government  preceded the nomenklatura, they can serve as a bridge toward the future, the way they did in the 1960s, but this time in a more pragmatically beneficial direction for the Cuban people. Separating the two might not be perceived as a drastic shift if it under appropriate discursive cover. And it provides for internal rectification along lines that resonate with the Cubans themselves.

3. The Mexicans might play a critical role in this discussion of the future. Mexico can serve as a sort of guarantor of good faith, and perhaps a mediator for safe harboring those people whose exits might be necessary to move Cuba forward.  That may produce  benefits in two ways, first facilitating good faith and trust relationships and secondly strengthening potentially the bonds between the US and Mexico. 

4. The Venezuelan pathway underscores the need to start from the premise that no group is going to get everything they want. That is fine. But every group is going to have to value the pathways forward positively from their framework of measurement. That includes internal Cuban constituencies, the Cuban diaspora and its elites in Miami,  and the Caribbean regional actors.  That is tricky but not impossible and much of it can be postponed.The reality is that no one feasts until the kitchen is built. And everyone's rigidity has made kitchen building impossible. 

5. The focus is likely most advantageously transactional. That is natural for the Trump Administration. Ironically, and if framed correctly, aligned with the experiences and operations of FAR.  The key is to get the language right--initially that may require working with the FAR's economic enterprises and negotiating a slow and well managed opening of transactional spaces within Cuba. That builds the meta-spaces for economic activity; consumer level activity and the legal structures for its development might have to start with a reboot built up from and through the so-called informal economy. If everyone means what they say about "people-centered" forward movement than that is essential. Anything else, especially coming from above would severely undermine any pretense that there is any interest in Cuban people, in Cuba, driving changes to their transactional environment. Guidance and capacity building for the long term, of course. And the old Lineamientos projects can serve as a rationalizing structure. (e.g., Larry Catá Backer, 2011. ""Order, Discipline and Exigency": Cuba's VI Party Congress, the Lineamientos (Guidelines)and Structural Change In Education, Sport and Culture?," Annual Proceedings, The Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, vol. 21.)

6. There is already a basis for a democratic organization of the State without abandoning its "socialist" ideals and centering markets driving economics.  All you have to do is look--and look beyond the labels. See Larry Catá Backer and Flora Sapio, Popular Consultation and Referendum in the Making of
Contemporary Cuban Socialist Democracy Practice and Contemporary Cuban Socialist Democracy Practice and Constitutional Theory Constitutional Theory, 27 U. MIA. Int'l & Compar. L. Rev. 37
(2020). Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr/vol27/iss1/4

7. All the the pieces are here: (1) internal actors ready for reform; (2) the possibilities of reform without chaos and within the current structures of political organization, (3) the framework for economic organization that serves as a nuclear of reform going forward; (5) the development of an informal sector that can serve as the driver and foundation for consumer and end product indigenous economic operations, and (6) potential key regional partners who can facilitate what can be organic  movement in ways that provide a (socialist) democratic transition that may be sufficient to  end the current state of relations between the US and Cuba.

8. All that is then left is money (lots f it); and patience--and infrastructure and development--the sort of transactional positives that may, in their own way provide a space for diaspora and mainland Cubans to begin better relations, and for regional development with synergies benefiting all participants. 

Pix credit here

 

In the meantime the more than 75 year long debates continues; one can almost choke on the staleness of its cadaverous immobility. One hopes that this will not kill the possibilities of a deal.

Exclusive: Rubio's secret squeeze on Raul Castro's Cuba

• Marc Caputo

Photo illustration: Sarah Grillo/Axios. Photos: Chip Somodevilla, Yamil Lage/AFP, and Juliane Sonntag/Photothek for the German Federal Foreign Office via Getty Images

Secretary of State Marco Rubio has been holding secret talks with the grandson and caretaker of Cuba's aging de facto dictator, Raul Castro, as the U.S. puts unprecedented pressure on Havana's regime, three sources tell Axios.

Why it matters: The talks between Rubio and Raul Guillermo Rodriguez Castro are bypassing official Cuban government channels. They show that the Trump administration sees the 94-year-old revolutionary as the communist island's true decision-maker.

• "I wouldn't call these 'negotiations' as much as 'discussions' about the future," a senior Trump administration official said.

Zoom in: Rubio and his team see the 41-year-old grandson and his circle as representing younger, business-minded Cubans for whom revolutionary communism has failed — and who see value in rapprochement with the U.S.

• "Our position — the U.S. government's position — is the regime has to go," the senior official said. "But what exactly that looks like is up to [President Trump] and he has yet to decide. Rubio is still in talks with the grandson."
• Called "Raulito," the younger Castro is known in political circles by his nickname "El Cangrejo" ("The Crab") because he has a deformed finger.

Zoom out: After 67 years of U.S. sanctions and Cuban mismanagement, the totalitarian government appears closer than ever to collapse as the island teeters on the edge of a humanitarian crisis.

• The power grid is failing. Hospitals are limiting surgeries. Food and fuel are increasingly scarce. Tourism is drying up. Uncollected garbage is piling up on some street corners.

• The troubles accelerated after Trump ordered the Jan. 3 abduction and extradition of Venezuela's indicted socialist strongman Nicolas Maduro, who essentially supplied free oil to Cuba.
• On Jan. 29, Trump threatened sanctions on the island's other large oil supplier, Mexico.

Between the lines: The U.S. military's success and technical superiority in the Maduro operation shook Cuba's leadership after American forces suffered no losses and killed at least 32 Cuban intelligence and military officials who were supposed to be guarding Maduro, U.S. officials say.

• But the U.S. decision to keep Maduro's governing partners in power —notably his Vice President Delcy Rodriguez, who's now acting president — signaled to Cuban insiders that Trump and Rubio are willing to make deals with rivals.
• Before Maduro was seized, Rubio and other Trump administration officials and advisers were in contact with Venezuelan elites just as they are doing now with Cuba, sources tell Axios.
• "They're looking for the next Delcy in Cuba," a source familiar with the talks said.

Behind the scenes: Trump advisers have spoken with other influential Cubans besides the younger Castro, but he's seen as the most important figure on the island to cultivate.

• "He's the apple of his grandfather's eye," served as the dictator's bodyguard, and also has allies running the mammoth military-business conglomerate known as GAESA, said one source who described the Rubio-Castro conversations as "surprisingly" friendly.
• "There's no political diatribes about the past. It's about the future," the source said, noting their common Cuban heritage and accents that are the lingua franca of Miami and surrounding cities.
• "Raulito could be straight out of Hialeah," the source said. "This could be a conversation between regular guys on the streets of Miami."

The intrigue: As in Venezuela, analysts say, they expect Trump could leave some officials in power in Cuba and not seek a wholesale regime change because of memories of the disastrous de-Baathification after the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

• Some Castro family members, including Raul Castro, might not be forced into exile under a deal with Trump, which would outrage Cuban exiles in Miami.
• Rubio hasn't spoken with Cuba's official leader, President Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez, or other high-ranking officials.
• They're perceived by the U.S. to be communist party "apparatchiks" unable to envision and negotiate change in Cuba, said another source familiar with the Trump team's thinking.

What they're saying: Asked about the discussions between the younger Castro and Rubio, Cuba's government sent Axios a statement issued to a Mexican journalist disputing rumored talks between the U.S. and another Castro family member, Alejandro Castro Espín, a senior intelligence official.

• "There is no high-level dialogue between the government of the United States and Cuba. There is not even dialogue at an intermediate level. There have been exchanges of messages," the statement said.
• "What exists are the usual conversations that have taken place over a long period of time — or even less than that. Until a year ago, we had regular dialogues at the senior official level with the State Department. Today, that no longer exists."
• The State Department didn't dispute that Rubio has spoken with Raulito Castro, but a spokesperson declined to discuss the matter or comment.

Reality check: Converting Cuba into more of a U.S. ally will be a far harder task than Venezuela, which has an intact political opposition and more of a thriving economy when compared to Cuba's destitute command-and-control state apparatus.

• The mutual animosity between hardliners in Havana and Miami is deeply ingrained on both sides of the Straits of Florida.
• Last week, Cuban American Republicans in Congress asked Trump to indict Raul Castro in the 1996 shootdown of a plane carrying members of a U.S.-based aid group that helped Cuban rafters. The Trump administration hasn't responded.
• Rubio has said little publicly about his discussions, but in a Senate hearing last month he pointed out U.S. law aims for regime change if Cuba does not free political prisoners, allow for a free press and does not hold elections.

Trump hasn't decided on a course of action with Cuba.

• As part of his decision-making process, on display in Venezuela, Trump tasks trusted advisers such as Rubio to present options to him.
• Trump's paying more attention to settling the wars in Iran and Ukraine than handling Cuba, where Rubio is still assembling options, a source said.
• "Cuba is right now a failed nation, and they don't even have jet fuel to get for airplanes to take off," Trump told reporters Monday night on Air Force One.
• "We're talking to Cuba right now ... and they should absolutely make a deal."