Thursday, February 12, 2026

The Triumph of the Transactional and the Problem of Rationalizing the Spanish Main --The U.S. and Mexico Haggle Over Cuba's Future

 

Pix credit here


How does one reboot the now traditional discursive tropes of sovereignty and the state system, one deeply embedded in the culture of States and memorialized initially in the (failed) Montevideo Convention of 1933, and one grounded in the protection of the internal affairs by states by others, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and self-determination, where the discursive tropes of sovereignty have been dissipated by globalization--everyone, multinational enterprises (economic and societal, Apple Inc., and Amnesty Int'l), perhaps now have varying "rights" to auto-determination, if not territory--and now perhaps dispositively by the transformation of the ordering premises of the global from one foregrounding institutions, management, and bureaucratic ordering within hierarchically arranged systems, to one embedded within an ethos of transactional discourse and the values that discourse represents?

Pix credit here
That is, indeed, a longish question. It is also better understood as a challenge (for states and others) as the primary contradiction of international relations shifts from one grounded in the perfection of States, their system and their language/values (through Rule of Law infused tropes, to one in which merchants rather than bureaucrats might be more comfortable. It is made more difficult because even the old terms acquire ambiguity in the contemporary Cuban context (auto-determination including the Cuban diaspora?; for example).

That is a contradiction that Mexico faces now; one fashioned in the shadow of its always delicate and robust relations with the United States, and now one formulated within that "gift that keeps on giving crisis that is Cuba. Cuba has always loomed large in the foreign policy of the United States and of Mexico. And at times their respective actions in and around Cuba has served as an indirect way of engaging in some of the more divisive areas of their (much larger) bilateral relations. Both for the United States and Mexico Cuba is sometimes understood more as the incarnation of an ideal, of an ideological struggle, and of an experiment shaping the best and worst of the state, the state system and its peculiarities, in a context in which, ironically, in some ways reproduces the fundamental conflict between the English and Spanish Empires of the 17th-19th centuries, but now recast, modernized, and contextualized  between the United States and Mexico, representing patrimony bequeathed to the children of dead empires, of the control and contests within he Spanish Main. But Cuba is not the issue, it is the object, the use of which animates a far more important "conversation;" it is not so much Cuba that is important, but the idea of Cuba and its utility in shaping the relations between larger powers, the consequences of which will be felt all along the Spanish Main but especially within its crown jewel. 

Pix credit here (El País, "Facing Economic Collapse, a Cornered Cuba is Forced into Dialogue With the United States)
 

David Marcial Pérez nicely summed up the challenge and its traps for Mexico:

Cuba has become one of the Mexican government’s top foreign‑policy priorities. Since the increase in U.S. pressure that has pushed the island into a critical situation, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has spoken out almost daily to denounce the economic squeeze imposed under U.S. President Donald Trump and to reaffirm Mexico’s support for Havana.

Beyond the delicate balancing act with Washington, backing Cuba also resonates deeply inside Morena, Mexico’s ruling party, where it taps into a long tradition of political affinity dating back to the old governments led by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and revived under the previous administration. No other regional crisis — not even the U.S. military action against Venezuela — has prompted such a firm and persistent response from the Mexican government.

For Mexico's President Sheinbaum, probably one of the ablest political figures of the region and proving adept at mediating between old style institutionalism, Latin American regionalism (as the contemporary manifestation of the embers of Spanish Imperial dreamscapes not rebooted to suit modern tastes), it has presented a challenge that requires balancing traditional attachments to the "idea" of Cuban (or at least of Cuban revolutionary governance and what it might stand for in Mexican politics) and the realities of regional stability in the face of a new approach of the United States, one that the Americans are ow willing to operationalize, and one which, while it is indifferent to the territorial niceties of Cuban (and Venezuelan) "space"  in quite interested in overseeing the territorial spaces, the platforms within and through which both states might be open to the sort of trade and investment, and on the terms and under the rules that satisfy U.S. interests (and perhaps, to some extent, those of Mexico's enterprises as well, though not necessarily of its ancient politics). 

The issue has reached a critical point as the Americans have moved more vigorously to "reform" a Cuba that has been unwilling to reform itself despite the decades old pleas of its friends and its own elites. The tactics are ancient--siege. But siege has become more complicated in the post 1945 era--Gaza has proved to be the template (unless of course the rules of international law are unique for Jews, but that cannot be), and one that distinguishes between pressuring (and killing, extracting, or neutralizing in some other form) institutional officials and baseline treatment of the civilian population. But even that calculus is complicated in Cuba where, even unlike Gaza, the State apparatus itself appeared to be content to institutionalize the governance of a State of Misery in the pursuit of its own aims (see discussion here).  On the other hand that is a benefit to Mexico requiring almost nothing now than a show of charity to appease the conscience and undertake one's ideologically and internally politically necessary duty. In all of this, of course, Cuba itself plays a secondary role--an object of strategic intervention in a long running dialectic between Mexico and the US in which it is (and is always) a collateral object. Yet even modern day seiges can be effective. See, e.g.,  Airlines Cut Cuba Flights As U.S. Fuel Blockade Leaves Airports Without Jet FuelPanic Spreads Among Canadians Stranded in CubaRussia to repatriate citizens stranded in Cuba amid fuel crisisRolling Blackouts, Hospital Shortages: How the U.S. Oil Blockade Is Impacting Cuba

And so Mexico seeks to supply petroleum to Cuba, at least a showy amount, but at its point anything is better than nothing; the United States objects; and the Mexican's pause delivery.  But petroleum is a highly charged commodity within the political starscapes of the U.S. and that makes sense. Humanitarian aid, on the other hand is different (again, Gaza as a template--human find it possible to learn and apply that leaning from all sorts of situations, all one has to do is be willing to articulate and transpose the "learning). That both Mexico and the US can provide, though through different channels and for different effect--the former to the people, the later through the State (eg Delivering on Our Commitment: U.S. Disaster Assistance to the Cuban People; "State Department-chartered aircraft and boats to deliver assistance. And so we’ll be working with Catholic Relief Services and with Caritas to deliver that assistance on the ground" here).

Likwise, the United States wants a transactional arrangement with Cuba (whatever its form of governance but subject to the constraints of US legislation) then Mexico will serve as a mediator, a voice of reason representing the Latin side of the Americas as both consider ways in which Cuba can again fit into those borderlands of old empire that in its embers retains a certaon cachet. Recent reporting posted to Facebook (which for those outside the United States is not just a tool to keep grandparents connected) suggest the strategies, quite interesting, of President Sheinbaum in the face of these challenges:

Pix credit here
La presidenta de México, Claudia Sheinbaum, insistió este jueves 12 de febrero en que su Gobierno está dispuesto a facilitar el "diálogo" entre Estados Unidos y Cuba, en medio de las tensiones por las sanciones anunciadas por Washington a los países que suministren petróleo a la isla y la aguda crisis económica que atraviesa el país caribeño.

“Ya lo hemos hecho. Depende de los dos países. Nosotros, tanto al Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos como a través de la embajada (de Cuba) en México, hemos planteado que México pone todo de su parte para poder generar un diálogo que permita en el marco de la soberanía de Cuba”, afirmó la mandataria durante su conferencia de prensa matutina.
La gobernante mexicana subrayó que esta postura responde a los principios tradicionales de la política exterior mexicana. “Porque eso es muy importante, porque es además nuestro principio, la autodeterminación de los pueblos. Generar las condiciones para un diálogo pacífico y que además Cuba, sin que ningún país tenga la sanción, pueda recibir petróleo y sus derivados para su funcionamiento cotidiano”, sostuvo. México ha mantenido en las últimas semanas un papel activo frente a la crisis cubana, con envíos de ayuda humanitaria y posicionamientos diplomáticos ante las sanciones de Washington.

Precisamente este jueves, dos buques de la Marina mexicana arribaron a La Habana con alimentos y productos básicos en medio de la crisis energética que sufre la isla, agravada por restricciones y tensiones en torno al suministro de petróleo. Asimismo, el Gobierno mexicano ha confirmado que continuará enviando asistencia humanitaria y coordinando esfuerzos con organizaciones civiles para mitigar los efectos de los apagones y la situación económica en Cuba, que se ha deteriorado por el embargo estadounidense y la escasez de combustible.En este contexto, Sheinbaum reiteró que México busca un papel constructivo en la región. “Como lo he dicho, nosotros estamos enviando distinta ayuda, distinto apoyo, ya el día de hoy llegan los barcos. En cuanto regresen vamos a enviar más apoyo de distinto tipo”, aseveró. (Panorama's web)
Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum insisted this Thursday, February 12, that her government is willing to facilitate dialogue between the United States and Cuba, amid tensions over sanctions announced by Washington against countries that supply oil to the island and the severe economic crisis facing the Caribbean nation.

“We have already done so. It depends on both countries. We, both to the U.S. State Department and through the Cuban Embassy in Mexico, have stated that Mexico is doing everything possible to foster a dialogue that respects Cuba's sovereignty,” the president affirmed during her morning press conference.

The Mexican leader emphasized that this stance reflects the traditional principles of Mexican foreign policy. “Because that is very important, because it is also one of our principles: the self-determination of peoples. To create the conditions for peaceful dialogue so that Cuba, without any country being sanctioned, can receive oil and its derivatives for its daily operations,” she maintained. In recent weeks, Mexico has maintained an active role in the Cuban crisis, sending humanitarian aid and taking diplomatic stances against Washington's sanctions.

Just this Thursday, two Mexican Navy ships arrived in Havana with food and basic supplies amid the island's energy crisis, exacerbated by restrictions and tensions surrounding oil supplies. The Mexican government has also confirmed that it will continue sending humanitarian assistance and coordinating efforts with civil organizations to mitigate the effects of the blackouts and the economic situation in Cuba, which has deteriorated due to the US embargo and fuel shortages. In this context, Sheinbaum reiterated that Mexico seeks a constructive role in the region. "As I've said, we are sending different kinds of aid, different kinds of support. The ships are arriving today. As soon as they return, we will send more support of different types," she stated.

 

Pix credit here

The ball is in the court of the U.S. It either acts decisovely or it returns to the pattern of American half-hearted efforts punctuated by long periods of lethargy accompanied by theatircal elements to entertain its masses and the elites with no real stomach for doing much but reserve the status quo. That would be a pity. Cuba ought to be able to reform itself. Certainly its own internal elites have charted any number of ways in which that could be done, even while preserving the essence of the current political-economic model, as have Cubans in the diaspora (my thoughts on that here ("Legal-Institutional Foundations for Reconstruction in a Post-Revolutionary Cuba: A Conceptual Exercise," Remarks prepared for delivery at the 2025 Annual Conference of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, Miami, Florida, 25 October 2025)). But Soviet sclerosis may yet prove fatal to the elites who, in their own way, contonue to live in a bubble of their own making (considered more theoretically in the short essay Forbidden Cities; current situation here). But here Cuba may remainits own worst enemy--consider this little bit of dissembulaiton in light of the statements from Mexico: 

“Todo parece indicar que el Secretario de Estado le ha hecho creer al presidente Trump el cuento de las negociaciones”, dijo Gómez, quien añadió que se trataría de “una manipulación descarada” y de la fabricación de un “pretexto peligroso”. . . Las declaraciones forman parte de la narrativa oficial del régimen, que niega la existencia de negociaciones formales con Washington mientras acusa a sectores del gobierno estadounidense de promover una escalada contra la isla. (Oficialismo cubano desmiente rumores y dice que Rubio manipuló a Trump con “cuento” de negociaciones)

Regime change might come to Cuba, but at this point the cause of that is as much the elite's unwillingess to reform itself as it is the eagerness of outsiders to reform Cuba to its own liking. It appears that the only thingt hat continues to work well within the nomenklatura is its propaganda apparatus feuled by and leveraged through a global network of supporters (eg here; here). That is a pity but also a sign of the dangers that Cuba has created for itsef since it abandoned its own Marxist Leninist reform  policies after the 7th Party Congress.  At this point the choices for the Cuban leadership are uniformly unpalatable but increasing out of their control. Perhaps the least disruptive alternative would be a reboot--a return to the revolutionary government before 1976 (run by the military) with a mandate to reform and offer up a modernized governmental system--perhaps a markets oriented socialist system; perhaps a system that includes a space for leadership by the Communist Party (but certainly not in its current form), and most painful of all--an opening of its internal markets to foreigners--certainly controlled to come extent but it is too late for the more modulated system of gradual opening through expanding spacial economic zines. The big reboot, of course would also be hard--the legitimization of the informal economy and the use of those structures and rules as the basis for economic and legal reform of the consumer sector. And underlying all of this is a hard rectification of the Nomenklatura and the rules for the engagement of the diaspora in the reconstruction of the Republic without taking it over. These will be the hardest tasks of all; hopefully someone somewhere in the lands of officials have been thinking about this. . . . . . . It is in this context that perhaps between the US and Mexico the problem of Cuba can be stabilized.

No comments: