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| Pixc Credit here |
I have been considering the public facing production of analysis abut the emerging techniques of warfare. See, e.g., Handbook “Weapons of Information Warfare” 28.07.2025. While this is of particular concern to specialists, its general circulation publication reminds the rest of us that that spillover effects of these changes, whether viewed positively or not (and frankly the character of the reception is of little concern either to the technology or to the imperatives driving their development or use. . . like other tech driven innovation) will tech to upend virtually all aspects of the comfy cozy systems of premises that rationalize political, economic, and cultural orders. It is, in a sense the tech tail that will, indeed, wag what passes for the dog of social organization. This is especially important in the areas of normative premises--privacy, the character and expectations of individual autonomy, for example--and process rights. It also suggests that in the face of tech it is increasingly impossible to rest comfortably on the 18th century liberal notions that it is the political branches and their administrative organs that drive law and normative expectations. Neither crying about that, nor whining about efforts (sometimes augmented by action) to return society to some sort of (re)conceived pre-tech golden age (though it is the decrepitude of that past age that gives off the glow that appears in the rear view mirror of temporal movement as "golden"). Understanding what is occurring is a first step in breaking that cycle--though where understanding takes one is unknown other than that it will be driven within the cognitive cages within which knowledge is received and processed.
It is with that in mind that one might useful consider a most interesting publication, Jeremiah “Lumpy” Lumbaca, "Cognitive Warfare to Dominate and Redefine Adversary Realities: Implications for U.S. Special Operations Forces," Small Wars Journal ( 11 February 2026). The provided overview sets the context:
Cognitive warfare directly targets the processes of perception, judgment, and belief formation within individuals and groups. This form of conflict utilizes the intersection of cyber tools, psychological sciences, and neurosciences to achieve political or military objectives by altering enemy cognitive processes. The primary aim is the generation of cognitive effects rather than simple information dissemination. This includes the deployment of cognitive contagions, ideologically charged constructs designed to spread virally across digital networks to embed specific patterns of thinking. Over time, these operations can lead to epistemic closure. This is a state where a target population rejects new information that contradicts an engineered narrative.
Technological advancements in artificial intelligence and social media algorithms serve as the primary enablers for these operations. AI facilitates micro-targeting and the creation of hyper-realistic disinformation, such as deepfakes, while social media platforms prioritize engagement over accuracy. The report highlights that adversaries like the Chinese Communist Party and Iran already utilize these methods to erode internal cohesion and decision-making processes in contested regions. For U.S. Special Operations Forces, this environment necessitates a shift in organizational structure and training. Dr. Lumpy recommends the establishment of multi-disciplinary cognitive warfare cells at all echelons to include data scientists and behavioral psychologists. Furthermore, the piece advocates for the development of cognitive resilience programs and the use of AI-driven cognitive firewalls to preserve the mental sovereignty of personnel operating in manipulated information environments. (HERE)
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| Pix credit here (this becomes more interesting when tech permits automated actions |
By Jeremiah “Lumpy” Lumbaca, PhD
JSOU Report 25-23
September 30, 2025
DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this work are entirely those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position of the U.S. Government, Department of War,
United States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations University.
This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Part 1: Cognitive Warfare Foundations
Consider the power to dictate who is perceived as “right” or “wrong” in conflicts like the
Russia–Ukraine War or Israeli–Gazan conflict, or to reshape the outcome of a nation’s
election in the minds of its citizens. Imagine the U.S. and its allies not merely swaying
opinions but reconstructing the very reality in which adversaries like North Korea, the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Iran, or violent extremists make judgments, aligning their
perceptions with U.S. strategic objectives.
In an era of strategic competition where gray zone conflict and hybrid warfare tactics are
now commonplace, the human mind has emerged as a distinct and critical domain of
conflict. There are differing definitions of the term cognitive warfare. Bernard Claverie and
François du Cluzel define it as “an unconventional form of warfare that uses cyber tools to
alter enemy cognitive processes, exploit mental biases or reflexive thinking, provoke
thought distortions, influence decision-making and hinder actions, with negative effects,
both at the individual and collective levels.”¹ NATO’s strategic warfare development
command, known as Allied Command Transformation, notes that cognitive warfare includes
“activities conducted in synchronization with other Instruments of Power, to affect attitudes
and behaviors, by influencing, protecting, or disrupting individual, group, or population level
cognition, to gain an advantage over an adversary.”² Whole-of-society manipulation is a
new norm.³
It is necessary to differentiate cognitive warfare from established concepts such as
psychological operations (PSYOPS, sometimes referred to in defense circles as military
information support operations [MISO]), information warfare, cyber warfare, and hybrid
warfare.⁴ Claverie and du Cluzel write:
“Cognitive [w]arfare is where all the elements of information warfare—including the
operational aspects of psychology and neurosciences, based on systemics and complexity—
combine for military action. It sits at the intersection of two operational fields that hitherto
were managed separately: PSYOPS and influence operations (soft power) on the one hand,
and cyber operations (cyber defence) intended to degrade or destroy physical information
assets on the other. This intersection makes it possible to unite concepts and points of view
from different scientific, military, or intelligence communities of interest, bringing about an
interdisciplinary approach to how technologies impact humankind.”⁵ See Figure 1.
Figure 1. Differences between cognitive warfare and PSYOPS, including, in broad terms, actual psychological operations and other non-
kinetic actions such as influence operations and civil–military cooperation. Source: Author (data from Bernard Claverie and François du
Cluzel, “The Cognitive Warfare Concept,” NATO Innovation Hub for Allied Command Transformation, 2022, https://innovationhub-act.org/
wp-content/uploads/2023/12/CW-article-Claverie-du-Cluzel-final_0.pdf)
In this sense, cognitive warfare may be thought of as a strategic discipline that directly
targets the way individuals and groups think, perceive, process information, and ultimately
act. Generating cognitive effects as the primary objective distinguishes it from mere
information dissemination or information warfare.⁶ See Figure 2 for a graphic representation
of the conceptual relationships between these types of “warfare.” As Alina Bârgăoanu and
Flavia Durach explain, “this new type of warfare is waged by means of disinformation,
propaganda, influence operations, and hostile information campaigns all at the same time.
Above all, this new type of warfare is waged in a completely changed communication and
information ecosystem, where every major issue in a society can be weaponized thanks to
the very connectivity of that new ecosystem. Conceptualizing cognitive warfare as a new,
technology-driven phenomenon has implications for research and for policymaking.”⁷
Technological advancements are consistently highlighted as a key enabler and accelerant of
cognitive warfare. The pervasive influence of social media and digital platforms is a recurring
focus,⁸ illustrating how these channels facilitate the rapid and mass dissemination of
narratives, enabling precise manipulation of public opinion. Artificial intelligence (AI) is
identified as a transformative force, with discussions revolving around its use for micro-
targeting, generating hyper-realistic disinformation (e.g., deepfakes),⁹ analyzing
psychological profiles, and automating influence campaigns on an unprecedented scale.
Furthermore, the increasing integration of insights from neuroscience¹⁰ and behavioral
science is seen as allowing for more precise and effective manipulation techniques, even
leading to speculation about the theoretical implications of neuro-technologies and brain-
computer interfaces.
Cognitive warfare is often presented as offering asymmetric
advantages, allowing actors with fewer conventional military
capabilities to undermine stronger adversaries by eroding their
internal cohesion and decision-making processes.
Academic research dedicates considerable attention to cognitive warfare strategies
employed by various state and non-state actors. Case studies, particularly those involving
influence operations attributed to the CCP’s cognitive warfare against Taiwan, are
informative and provide empirical grounding for theoretical frameworks.¹¹ Cognitive warfare
is often presented as offering asymmetric advantages, allowing actors with fewer
conventional military capabilities to undermine stronger adversaries by eroding their
internal cohesion and decision-making processes.
Part 2: Unleashing Cognitive Warfare
Creating and Defending Against Alternate
Realities
Cognitive warfare penetrates the processes of perception, judgment, and belief formation.
At its most sophisticated, this could involve the deployment of cognitive contagions—
ideologically charged constructs that spread virally across digital and social networks
influencing beliefs, emotional reactions, and ultimately behavior. The ultimate result of
effective cognitive warfare may be that, after these operations take place over long periods
of time using cognitive biases, they modify the thinking habits of the target. As Claverie and
du Cluzel write, “They have lasting, even irreversible effects on the cognitive personality, i.e.,
the way in which an individual processes information.”¹²
Unlike traditional disinformation campaigns, which rely on pushing falsehoods or
misleading narratives, cognitive contagions embed particular patterns of thinking. These
may include logical fallacies, emotionally charged heuristics, and cognitive shortcuts that
allow the contagions to self-propagate within communities. Rather than transmitting
standalone messages, they act more like ideological malware, replicating and adapting to
embed themselves in the mental frameworks of individuals and groups.¹³ For example,
emotionally resonant slogans, such as those that stoke fear or indignation, can bypass
rational analysis and lodge deeply within a person’s worldview. With repetition and social
reinforcement, such beliefs can become difficult to dislodge, leading to what scholars
describe as epistemic closure,¹⁴ where new information is rejected if it contradicts the
engineered narrative.
These contagions thrive in digital environments where information overload pushes users
toward mental shortcuts¹⁵ where echo chambers¹⁶ reinforce existing views and social media
algorithms prioritize engagement over accuracy. Psychographic targeting, enabled by troves
of user data, allows these cognitive viruses to be tailored with precision¹⁷ to individual
psychological profiles.¹⁸ The result is a potent blend of personalization, repetition, and
emotional provocation that erodes critical thinking and reshapes the architecture of public
perception.
Drawing inspiration from quantum mechanics, one might consider a state of “narrative
superposition” where multiple contradictory narratives exist simultaneously. The collapse of
shared reality’s “waveform” occurs, forcing the adoption of a dominant, desired reality. This
parallels work in quantum cognition.¹⁹ Manipulating perception itself can occur through
virtual reality, augmented reality, or even targeted neuro-stimulation. While theoretical,
these “sensory override” realities could directly influence an individual’s experience and
understanding of the world.²⁰
Proactive measures include the widespread dissemination of advanced psychological
inoculation and prebunking programs.²¹ These efforts would likely leverage digital games
and interactive simulations designed to build robust mental resistance²² against cognitive
contagions, moving beyond simple fact-checking. Concurrently, deep cognitive hygiene
education²³ should be integrated into national curricula,²⁴ equipping citizens with the ability
to deconstruct complex manipulation tactics, understand their own cognitive biases, and
critically evaluate the emotional and logical underpinnings of information. To address
vulnerabilities, efforts must focus on algorithmic recalibration²⁵ and counter-amplification,²⁶
advocating for and developing technologies that incentivize social media platforms to
prioritize accuracy and diverse viewpoints over sensationalism. This could involve “white-
hat”²⁷ algorithmic interventions that subtly disrupt the virality of harmful cognitive
contagions. Finally, advanced inauthentic actor detection and disruption require public–
private partnerships, leveraging AI and machine learning to identify and neutralize botnets,
synthetic media, and coordinated inauthentic behavior. This would also involve the
deployment of “cognitive antibodies,” automated systems that intelligently detect and flag
manipulated content or suspicious narrative patterns in real time.²⁸
Strategic manipulation may not necessarily target societies broadly or groups generically,
but rather individuals specifically.²⁹ This form of warfare would rely on constructing detailed
psychographic profiles drawn from exhaustive data, online behaviors, biometric indicators,
purchase histories, sleep patterns, even vocal tonality.³⁰ These profiles would then be used
to tailor ideological messaging in ways that bypass conscious resistance, tapping into
subconscious vulnerabilities, emotional needs, and cognitive biases. See Figure 3.
Counter-Cognitive Strategies
As cognitive warfare strategies evolve to target the perceptual and psychological integrity of
individuals, new modes of defense must emerge. Beyond training modules, simulations may
offer even greater potential. These controlled manipulation environments could place users
in scenarios where they experience synthetic influence campaigns firsthand while being
guided by educational feedback. Just like military wargames build tactical proficiency, these
cognitive simulations would train individuals to recognize psychological operations in real
time and critically assess their own responses. Research in the field of serious games³¹ and
experiential learning³² indicates that such methods enhance critical thinking, emotional
regulation, and pattern recognition under stress.
As cognitive warfare strategies evolve to target the perceptual
and psychological integrity of individuals, new modes of defense
must emerge.
Rather than simply automating detection of disinformation, AI can be used to construct
cognitive firewalls that identify manipulative content patterns and intervene with user-
centered prompts that encourage reflection. For example, if a user is exposed to emotionally
manipulative headlines or ideologically extreme narratives, the system might surface
prompts like, “Would you like to see how others view this issue?” or “Here is a contrasting
viewpoint based on verified sources.” Research by Brundage et al. highlights the importance
of aligning AI with societal values and proposes mechanisms by which AI systems can
support human autonomy while countering information-based threats.³³
Such firewalls would leverage computing and sentiment analysis to determine the
emotional charge of digital content, identify polarizing or deceptive cues, and deliver subtle
interventions before belief entrenchment occurs. These mechanisms could be embedded in
browsers, content platforms, and educational tools—much like spell-checkers or ad
blockers, but for cognitive hygiene. Experimental prototypes in this domain already exist,
such as “crankiness detectors” for news headlines and predictive models of ideological
extremism based on digital activity.³⁴
These counter-cognitive systems must be designed carefully. Overly paternalistic or coercive
interventions could backfire, reinforcing paranoia or perceptions of censorship. As
philosopher Onora O’Neill emphasizes in discussions on trust and communication,
credibility must be earned through transparency, not enforced by fiat.³⁵ Therefore,
explainability, open-source design, and opt-in protocols should ideally guide the
development of cognitive defense systems.³⁶ Just as cybersecurity evolved from protecting
physical servers to protecting identities, cognitive security must evolve from guarding
against lies to preserving the mental sovereignty of individuals. This new era of defense will
require collaboration between psychologists, AI developers, educators, ethicists, and
strategic planners.
Proactive strategies could include the strategic erosion of adversary cognitive resilience,
actively identifying and exploiting weaknesses in their defense mechanisms. This could
involve saturating their information environment with rapidly evolving and novel forms of
influence that overwhelm their detection systems or introducing subtle, continuous
cognitive stressors designed to erode a target population’s capacity for critical thinking over
time. A more audacious approach would involve the gradual introduction of narratives and
“cognitive anchors” that predispose target audiences to interpretations of events favorable
to U.S. interests, even before critical events unfold. The goal here is to proactively shape
their perceptual framework.
Just as cybersecurity evolved from protecting physical servers to
protecting identities, cognitive security must evolve from
guarding against lies to preserving the mental sovereignty of
individuals. This new era of defense will require collaboration
between psychologists, AI developers, educators, ethicists, and
strategic planners.
Furthermore, the development and deployment of AI-driven bots for narrative dominance
would disrupt adversary influence operations by introducing noise, doubt, or alternative
framings. Finally, while maintaining adherence to international law, it is worth exploring how
AI can be used for algorithmic truth distortion for adversary narratives. This might involve
applying AI to identify logical inconsistencies, internal contradictions, or emotional
manipulation within adversary propaganda and then using subtle, algorithmically driven
interventions to highlight these flaws to their own populations.
Cognitive Geopolitics
As information flows, identity narratives and cognitive infrastructures become strategic
assets, and a new domain of geopolitical contestation emerges. The ability to shape global
perceptions increasingly translates into tangible geopolitical advantage. States that
dominate the information ecosystem can influence elections, shape diplomatic discourse,
and frame conflicts in ways that legitimize their actions while delegitimizing their
adversaries. Control over cognitive infrastructure—such as search engines, news
aggregators, and social media platforms—becomes a tool for soft power and, at times,
hybrid warfare. This is particularly evident in global information campaigns conducted by
state actors where disinformation is not simply about spreading falsehoods, but about
undermining shared truth and eroding democratic consensus.
These dynamics raise the specter of a “cognitive arms race,” where states begin to invest
heavily in both offensive and defensive cognitive capabilities. Just as nuclear and cyber
weapons prompted the development of deterrence doctrines and red lines, so too might we
see the emergence of doctrines around cognitive sovereignty, disinformation deterrence,
and psychological countermeasures.³⁷ In this scenario, state and non-state actors engage in
escalating contests to manipulate, protect, or destabilize the mental frameworks of target
populations, both foreign and domestic.
As AI and neurotechnology advance, it is reasonable to assume
that the tools available for manipulating perception will become
increasingly powerful.
In response, cognitive deterrence strategies may be necessary. This implies the need for
doctrines that define thresholds for retaliatory action when adversaries engage in
manipulative perception-shaping. This might include identifying unacceptable interference
in democratic discourse or national identity formation. The challenge lies in attribution:
cognitive warfare rarely leaves fingerprints. Influence campaigns are diffused, plausibly
deniable, and deeply entangled with civilian platforms and behaviors. As AI and
neurotechnology advance, it is reasonable to assume that the tools available for
manipulating perception will become increasingly powerful. The ability to simulate
convincing yet deceptive realities will increase exponentially.
The Dormio device is a wearable system developed by scientists at MIT
to interact with dreams. It is worn on the hand and uses sensors
to
track a user’s physiological signs to detect the onset of sleep then
deliver targeted audio cues to influence the content of dreams in
the hypnagogic state (Source: “Dormio: Interfacing with Dreams,” MIT Media Lab, accessed September 22, 2025, https://
www.media.mit.edu/projects/sleep-creativity/overview/). Photo by Oscar Rosello.
Proactive epistemic sovereignty safeguards are crucial and involve the implementation of
national policies and investment in domestic epistemic infrastructures, such as public
broadcasters and independent research institutions. Simultaneously, international norm
development for cognitive security will become increasingly necessary, aiming to establish
clear norms, agreements, and “red lines” for acceptable and unacceptable cognitive
influence operations, including developing shared attribution mechanisms for malign
activities.
The development of AI-driven early warning and threat assessment systems capable of real-
time, global monitoring of cognitive warfare campaigns, identifying emergent threats,
attributing sources where possible, and providing rapid threat assessment, is vital. Strategic
communications for resilience-building involve not only countering adversary narratives but
also proactively informing domestic and allied populations about the nature of cognitive
warfare—building collective awareness and resilience against manipulation.
Aggressive narrative dominance and framing will be needed to
establish and maintain control over key geopolitical issues,
proactively framing conflicts and events in ways that legitimize
U.S. actions and delegitimize adversary behavior on the global
stage.
A more aggressive strategy includes implementing cognitive colonialism/imperialism
reversal in regions where adversarial worldviews have been imposed.³⁸ This means the use
of carefully crafted, culturally resonant information campaigns that promote alternative
perspectives, empower local epistemologies, and subtly challenge the foundational
assumptions of adversary-imposed realities. Concurrently, aggressive narrative dominance
and framing will be needed to establish and maintain control over key geopolitical issues,
proactively framing conflicts and events in ways that legitimize U.S. actions and delegitimize
adversary behavior on the global stage.
The formulation and open articulation of a cognitive deterrence doctrine would clearly
outline thresholds for retaliatory cognitive actions when adversaries engage in unacceptable
perception-shaping operations against U.S. interests or allies, signaling a willingness to
engage forcefully in the cognitive domain. Finally, within legal frameworks, there is potential
for the exploitation of adversary cognitive infrastructures. This will involve identifying and
leveraging vulnerabilities within their systems, such as search engines and social media
platforms, to subtly introduce information that undermines their internal cohesion,
challenges their state narratives, or promotes dissent that serves U.S. strategic interests
through open-source intelligence and public engagement tactics.
Part 3: Implications for U.S. Special
Operations Forces
U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are currently not trained, organized, or equipped for a
future dominated by cognitive warfare. While U.S. Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM), theater special operations commands (TSOCs), and their subordinate units
have command surgeons focused on physical health, for example, they lack neuroscientists,
behavioral scientists, cognitive psychologists, or cognitive engineers who could help
understand, shape, project, and defend against operations aimed at the human mind.³⁹
Operational teams deploy with state-of-the-art satellite communications equipment to relay
battlefield information across continents, yet they do not possess the equivalent “cognitive
toolkits,” such as advanced brain-computer interfaces, intelligent psychological monitoring
systems like smart sensor bracelets that track emotional states in real time, or tools to
disrupt adversarial narratives.⁴⁰ This personal erosion of objectivity mirrors broader
vulnerabilities, where cognitive warfare exploits human biases—such as the U.S.’s
“WEIRD” (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, democratic)⁴¹ psychological profile—to
sow doubt and division, leaving forces like SOF ill-prepared to counter such threats. A small
SOF team deployed overseas might find itself unknowingly outmaneuvered by malign
narratives, deepfake videos portraying U.S. troops committing atrocities, viral rumors
discrediting local leaders aligned with the U.S., or psychological campaigns designed to
fracture trust within allied forces.
For example, in Africa, Chinese cognitive warfare campaigns have outpaced U.S. efforts, as
noted by General Michael E. Langley, former Commander of U.S. Africa Command, who
warned that Beijing’s information manipulation is subordinating African nations’ interests to
China’s, securing critical resources like rare earth minerals while eroding support for SOF
missions in the region.⁴² Similarly, Iranian botnets⁴³ have amplified anti-U.S. narratives,
framing American actions as reckless and linking them to civilian casualties in the region,
which complicates SOF coordination with Gulf allies and undermines regional stability.
Russia’s operations in Ukraine provide another anecdote using fake news and social media
to blame others for atrocities, decaying public trust in open societies and forcing allies and
partners to divert resources to counternarratives rather than kinetic operations.⁴⁴ The result
is loss of military access, economic opportunities, and partnerships, with SOF often
operating in environments where perceptions are pre-shaped against them.
U.S. SOF are positioned better than conventional forces to adjust
course and eventually employ effective offensive and defensive
cognitive warfare capabilities. SOF’s specialized mission sets,
cultural adaptability, and small-team autonomy provide a natural
advantage in a domain where agility, precision, and influence
matter.
To bridge this divide, SOF must evolve. USSOCOM Commander General Bryan P. Fenton
emphasized the need to counter China and Russia in the information domain through (1)
improved coordination and leadership in information operations across the Department of
Defense and other government agencies; (2) increased investment in information
operations to match the scale and sophistication of adversaries’ efforts; and (3) empowering
lower-level commanders with the authority to conduct timely and effective information
operations.⁴⁵
Despite these concerns, U.S. SOF are positioned better than conventional forces to adjust
course and eventually employ effective offensive and defensive cognitive warfare
capabilities. SOF’s specialized mission sets, cultural adaptability, and small-team autonomy
provide a natural advantage in a domain where agility, precision, and influence matter.
Existing strengths in PSYOPS, civil affairs (CA), and unconventional warfare (UW) provide a
solid foundation to build new capabilities on.
Defensive and offensive considerations for SOF in the cognitive warfare space are outlined
below, but a key point must be made before proceeding. The ideas presented here for SOF
are not intended to replace or alter the unique cultures and mission sets that exist
throughout the special operations community. For example, Green Berets will continue to be
the masters of UW and Navy SEALs will continue to be the go-to direct action force in the
maritime domain. With that in mind, the following recommendations are intended to outline
considerations for new tools, training, capabilities, and organization that enable those SOF
communities to do their jobs more effectively in the near future.
Recommendations
To defend against malign cognitive warfare, SOF must first secure its own personnel and
operations from manipulation. This goes beyond traditional operational security to include
cognitive resilience. “Cognitive immunotherapy” programs can build a high level of
epistemic self-awareness, enabling operators to recognize and resist manipulative tactics in
real-time, even when these tactics are designed to exploit personal biases and values. As for
equipping, SOF will require tools for monitoring and analysis. This includes AI-powered
platforms that can detect subtle changes in local information environments, identify
inauthentic actors, and flag potential cognitive contagions. At some point, personal
equipment will need to include integrated cognitive firewalls, systems that provide real-time
alerts about the emotional and logical underpinnings of information being consumed. These
will help preserve clear-headed assessments in a chaotic information space.
Regarding SOF organization, some type of “cognitive warfare cells” should be stood up at all
echelons, from TSOCs down to operational detachments. These cells would be multi-
disciplinary, including not only PSYOP and CA specialists, but also data scientists, behavioral
psychologists, and AI experts. Their primary mission would be to analyze adversarial
cognitive operations and develop tailored defensive strategies for SOF and partner forces.
Operators must learn to craft and deploy micro-narratives that
exploit cognitive biases and create narrative superposition, a
state of doubt that ultimately forces the adoption of U.S.-aligned
perspectives.
While defending against cognitive threats is crucial, SOF’s higher payoff likely lies in its
ability to conduct offensive cognitive warfare. This means using AI tools to create
psychographic profiles of target groups and individuals within an adversary’s ranks or
populace. Operators must learn to craft and deploy micro-narratives that exploit cognitive
biases and create narrative superposition, a state of doubt that ultimately forces the
adoption of U.S.-aligned perspectives.
These tools will allow operators to adapt messaging based on real-time feedback from the
target audience’s information environment. SOF has the ability in this case to subtly shape a
target area or an individual’s information environment by exploiting vulnerabilities to
amplify pro-U.S. narratives.
Conclusion
Cognitive warfare has the potential to redefine not only adversarial realities but also the
operational effectiveness of U.S. SOF. Concepts ranging from cognitive contagions and
personalized influence to counter-cognitive defenses and SOF-specific offensive
applications underscore a reality: The battlefield of the future is increasingly mental. By
integrating cognitive warfare into SOF’s training, equipping, and organizational frameworks,
the U.S. can leverage the unique capabilities of special operators to defend against malign
influence and offensively shape adversary perceptions, ensuring strategic dominance in the
cognitive domain. Admittedly, the human mind remains a “black box;” (46) and many ideas
presented here are speculative, rooted in the logical extrapolation of current technological
and cognitive trends. Some of these ideas admittedly seem far-fetched, the things of
science fiction. With that thinking, one option might be to dismiss the concepts outlined
above. By not exploring possibilities now, however, we ensure that America and its partners
remain steps behind malign actors that are already experimenting in this space. For these
reasons, America should instead take the possibilities in cognitive warfare seriously, and
experiment now. Resilience in defense and creativity in cognitive warfare offense may well
define the future relevance and dominance of America, including its most agile military
assets.
About the Author
Jeremiah “Lumpy” Lumbaca, PhD, is a retired U.S. Army Green Beret and current professor of
irregular warfare, counterterrorism, and special operations with the Department of Defense.
He can be found on X/Twitter @LumpyAsia.
Notes
1. Bernard Claverie and François du Cluzel, “The Cognitive Warfare Concept,” NATO
Innovation Hub for Allied Command Transformation, 2022, https://innovationhub-act.org/
wp-content/uploads/2023/12/CW-article-Claverie-du-Cluzel-final_0.pdf.
2. “Cognitive Warfare,” NATO Allied Command Transformation, accessed July 3, 2025,
https://www.act.nato.int/activities/cognitive-warfare/.
3. Robin Burda, “Cognitive Warfare as Part of Society: Never-Ending Battle for Minds” in
Paper Series: Information-Based Behavioural Influencing and Western Practice, eds. Arthur
Laudrain, Laura Jasper, and Michel Rademaker (The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies,
2023), https://hcss.nl/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/04-
Cognitive_Warfare_as_Part_of_Society__Never_Ending_Battle_for_Minds.pdf.
4. Johns Hopkins University and Imperial College London, “Countering Cognitive Warfare:
Awareness and Resilience,” NATO Review, May 20, 2021, https://www.nato.int/docu/
review/articles/2021/05/20/countering-cognitive-warfare-awareness-and-resilience/
index.html.
5. Claverie and du Cluzel, “The Cognitive Warfare Concept.”
6. Martin C. Libicki, What Is Information Warfare? (National Defense University, 1995),
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA367662.
7. Alina Bârgăoanu and Flavia Durach, “Cognitive Warfare: Understanding the Threat,” in
Routledge Handbook of Disinformation and National Security, eds. Rubén Arcos, Irene Chiru,
and Cristina Ivan (Routledge, 2023): 221–236, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003190363.
8. Sarah Bradshaw and Philip N. Howard, “The Global Organization of Social Media
Disinformation Campaigns,” Journal of International Affairs 71, no. 1.5 (2018): 23–32.
9. Hany Farid, “Creating, Using, Misusing, and Detecting Deep Fakes,” Journal of Online Trust
and Safety 1, no. 4 (2022): 1–33, https://doi.org/10.54501/jots.v1i4.56.
10. James Giordano, ed., Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense: Practical
Considerations, Neuroethical Concerns (CRC Press, 2014), https://doi.org/10.1201/b17454.
11. Ying-Yu Lin, “China’s Cognitive Warfare Against Taiwan and Taiwan’s Countermeasures,”
Taiwan Strategists, no. 20, 37–54, https://www.airitilibrary.com/Article/Detail?
DocID=P20220613001-N202312210022-00003; Michael J. Mazarr et al., Hostile Social
Manipulation: Present Realities and Emerging Trends (RAND Corporation, 2019), https://
www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2713.html.
12. Claverie and du Cluzel, “The Cognitive Warfare Concept.”
13. P.W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooking, LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media
(Eamon Dolan/Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018); Anton Kühberger “The Framing of
Decisions: A New Look at Old Problems,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes 62, no. 2 (1995): 230–240, https://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1995.1046.
14. Cass R. Sunstein, On Rumors: How Falsehoods Spread, Why We Believe Them, and What
Can Be Done (Princeton University Press, 2014).
15. Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011).
16. Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You (Penguin Press, 2011).
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