(Pix (c) Larry Catá Backer 2015)
The move toward a global economic order, sitting atop and within the traditional system of states, one grounded on free movement of capital and investment, and constructed through a complex web of inter-state bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements that have created a network of customary norms, has produced conflict and contradiction. The conflict arises from the polycentricity (
here,
here,
here, and
here) that is produced when multiple systems of governance are established within a single territorial unit, a domestic legal order and an internationalized order grounded in the relationships between the state (as economic actor) and foreign enterprises (investors). The contradiction arises from the same source--states, according to their traditional organizational logic, may not be coherently governed where a constitutionally based domestic legal order is not placed atop a hierarchy of law and societal norms that also produce governance effects. And yet emerging polycentric governance, represented both by the autonomy of corporate administrative structures across states, and of international legal regimes with binding effects on states and the individuals under their control, threaten not just that traditional structure of legal hierarchy, but with it the role of sovereignty (grounded in the principle of democracy, however that term is understood) as the basis of legitimate assertions of regulatory power. (For more
here).
Nowhere are these conflicts and contradictions more apparent (and more threatening) than in the context of international investment treaties and especially the systems of dispute resolution created to enforce their obligations on state and non-state parties. These treaties, now creating an effectively coherent web of global regulation with its own substantive normative structures, is grounded on principles of legal internationalization, legal stabilization, guarantees, and autonomous institutions of dispute resolution, by their very nature (and with the consent of the state parties) constrain the unimpeded authority of the state to exercise an unrestrained sovereignty, and frame the way that domestic legal orders are applied through the mechanisms of dispute resolution structures not attached to any state apparatus (usually in the form of their national judicial institutions). While states have been consenting to constraints on sovereignty for centuries through treaties, the sovereignty constraining (or directing) effects of these webs of international investment treaties appear to be a step too far for some. Or, perhaps better put, they appear threaten the enterprise of legal power hierarchies and in that way diminish states in their ability to project their national political orders beyond or through their borders.
The conflicts and contradictions attendant on the construction of legal regimes of global trade (grounded in emerging consensus norms among states and other actors participating therein) ) atop (or beside or beyond) the traditional architecture of law (and its substantive constraints grounded in democracy, rule of law, etc.) They have also have presented themselves full blown in the context if the battles over the nature, character and scope of a set of multilateral trade agreements that the United States has been seeking to establish among the largest of its trading partners (and excluding China, India, Brazil and Russia, among others, political ramifications discussed
here). These agreements, the the Trans Pacific Partnership (TTP and
here) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP and
here). These multilateral trade agreements would incorporate a form of the current approach to legal internationalization and dispute resolution through supra national mechanisms that already form part of the bi lateral trade agreements between most states (including the United States). "Such “Investor-State Dispute Settlement” accords exist already in more
than 3,000 trade agreements across the globe. The United States is party
to 51, including the North American Free Trade Agreement." (Jonathan,
Trans-Pacific Partnership Seen as Door for Foreign Suits Against U.S.,
The New York Times, March 25, 2015). The expansion of that bi lateral trade and investment model presents the United States with a set of hard choices at the heart of the contradictions of emerging global systems within the traditional parameters of state ideology. And those hard choices presented by the problem of investor state dispute resolution mechanisms are precisely that which has now generated a spirited debate within the United States.
At one end, a group of academics has released a letter through the
Alliance for Justice directed to high United States officials (
Law professors’ letter opposes potential trade agreement provisions that could allow multi-national corporations to bypass U.S. courts). The letter (available
here) seeks to convince officials negotiating these agreements to oppose the inclusion of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions in these agreements. "“It is fundamental to our democracy that our justice system treats all
equally, regardless of wealth or power,” said AFJ President Nan Aron.
“When laws and regulations protecting everyday Americans are at issue,
any challenge should take place in our courts, not before a private
tribunal.”" (
Press Release).
At the other, a
responsive letter (
An open letter about investor-state dispute settlement (April 2015)) was released shortly thereafter by another group of academics. This letter urged caution in opposition and urged officials to avoid stripping ISDS provisions from trade agreements. "The counter‐point is not provided to provide a definitive conclusion about the proper form of dispute settlement. . . . Rather, the letter is designed to frame the discussion, to offer accurate information to inform the public, and to enable policy makers to make well‐informed choices." (
Press Release). The letter noted: "Far from undermining the rule of law, investment treaty arbitration ensures that states honor their obligations, thereby reinforcing the rule of law." (
Press Release).
For one side, emerging trade global trade and investment governance regimes, though spawned through states are now advanced enough to threaten sovereignty and pose a threat to the ability of states to protect their citizens and preserve the core values of their constitutional orders. For the other, states remain intimately involved in the construction of systems of coherent norms that make it possible to enhance the free movement of goods, capital and investment between them in which the core values of the constitutional traditions of participating states are preserved.
Both letters are reproduced below.