Tuesday, July 12, 2022

Hong Kong Within One Country and Between Two Systems of Outside Normative Expectations: Mediating Human Rights Under Conditions of Economic Autonomy and in the Shadow of Global Norms

 


 

Hong Kong must operate within one country (of which it forms a part) and between two systems of outside normative expectations (within which it seeks to operate  in economic, social and cultural spaces). Hong Kong owes the highest duty to the one country of which it is part and from which it derives its autonomy. That duty is a function of the norms and expectations that are deemed at the core of the relationship between the central authorities and the SAR and by which Hong Kong is judged.  Nonetheless, Hong Kong is embedded in webs of responsibility to systems of outside expectations on which its prosperity depends, and as a function of its values and expectations the SAR is judged and consequences attach. These two foreign systems include the international community, on the one hand, and the core of leadership of the liberal democratic united front alliance on the other. The duty to one country is formal and preeminent; the responsibility to the two systems is practical and operational. The great challenge for Hong Kong involves navigating between the two when they collide, sensitive to both the superior duty it owes to One Country and the practical effects of provoking  the two outside systems on its its prosperity is to some extent still dependent. 

As a consequence, Hong Kong is always balancing. Its paramount loyalty to the state of which it forms a part must remain unquestioned, as must its willingness to accept the leadership and guidance of its vanguard (directly or expressed as policy or rules through the administrative apparatus of the central authorities). That includes accepting guidance not just on its politics, but on its macro-economic, social, and cultural objectives. It also includes ensuring the continuing triumph of the patriotic elements of Hong Kong in the governance of the SAR (学习宣传贯彻习近平主席重要讲话精神座谈会 [Symposium on Learning, Propagating and Implementing the Spirit of President Xi Jinping's Important Speech] hosted by 中央政府驻港联络办举办香港社会各界 [Liaison Office of the Central Government in Hong Kong]]). At the same time Hong Kong must adjust its operations within the parameters set out for the SAR by the Central Authorities, to conform to the expectations of the international community and to a lesser extent to the leadership core of the liberal democratic united front. This is especially important now in the context of judgments about the legalities of Hong Kong's approach to the protection of the civil and political rights of its inhabitants, residents, and investors from abroad. In that context the balancing cam be quite difficult.  On the one hand the SAR must adjust to the consequences of nudging legislation from the leadership core of the liberal democratic united front (see, e.g., Hong Kong Policy Act (S. 1731 Pub.L. 102–383; 106 Stat. 1448 (adding 22 U.S.C. §§ 5701–5732) as amended by the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, S. 1838; Pub.L. 116–76 (adding 22 U.S.C. §§ 5725–5726, and amending 22 U.S.C. § 5721) (2019)). On the other, it must harmonize the application of international fundamental human rights covenants (and specifically in this context the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights) in the SAR with the expectations of such application by international oversight bodies.  This later sometimes converges with the objectives of the liberal democratic united front (see, e.g., here: US State Dept. Country Report--Hong Kong).

Both balancing acts were very much on display this week.  

First,

The United Nations Human Rights Committee on Thursday began reviewing Hong Kong’s rights record for the first time since Beijing imposed its national security law, amid questions about whether groups making submissions to the meeting could fall foul of the legislation. . . Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Erick Tsang and several other top officials attended the meeting in Geneva via video link. In his opening speech, which lasted just under 20 minutes, Tsang said the government had done much to protect human rights in Hong Kong. . . (UN rights committee seeks assurances hearing participants from Hong Kong won’t be targeted under security law ).

The position and actions of Hong Kong were criticized by the Human Rights Committee (the body of independent experts that monitors implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by its States parties). 


 “I note, honourable secretary, your comment about the events that precipitated this law, but I must observe that it was done overnight, without consultation, and bypassing the local legislature,” the committee’s vice chair Christopher Arif Bulkan said. The Guyanese lawyer also asked Hong Kong officials whether civil society organisations (CSOs) taking part in the current review would be accused of violating the national security law (NSL). “Can you provide assurances that the CSOs who participate here today, and over the next three days, are not in danger of prosecution or victimisation under the NSL, for such engagement?” Bulkan asked. (UN rights committee seeks assurances hearing participants from Hong Kong won’t be targeted under security law ).

Erick Tsang attempted to meet these objections in his opening and closing statements.  These follow below. Both statements are models of discursive mediation between systemic expectations that are at their respe3ctive cores substantially incompatible. Hong Kong musty have a measure of both--one is at the center of its governance, the other is necessary for its economic prosperity. The discursive mediation is built on the investing of terms with double meanings--one set of meaning will resonate with the territorial sovereign; the other is meant to resonate sufficiently with HK's business elements.

Second, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China released a staff report detailing the role of prosecutors in carrying out the Hong Kong government’s hardline approach to dissent and pro-democracy views.
The report concludes that if Hong Kong’s Justice Department and prosecutors continue to expand arbitrary detention and political prosecutions, the United States and the international community should consider taking targeted actions to address the erosion of the rule of law, including through additional sanctions under the Hong Kong Autonomy Act and the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act.

The position of the United States remains unchanged from the time of the late Trump Administration.  And its thrust--that the autonomy of Hong Kong must be measured by size of the gap between the governance and governing principles of Hong Kong and of the rest of China--invariably tends to see in Hong Kong's policies a shrinking of that distance. The US measures Hong Kong autonomy, then, by reference to the gulf between the application of international human rights norms in Hong Kong and in the rest of China--its positive measure is taken by the the distance that separates Hong Kong in that respect from China, on the one hand, and the leading liberal democratic states on the other hand. The consequences are written into US statutes.  That appears to be the measuring stick of the international community as well as applied via the ICCPR. In both cases there is an implicit normative starting point that Chinese compliance with ICCPR is off center. As a consequence, Hong Kong autonomy must be measured both in human rights terms and by the distance between the application of ICCPR principles in China and in its autonomous regions--especially Hong Kong. The measuring stick is the ICCPR.  This has been the position refined by the international community in the wake of the 2019 protests (see Hong Kong Between 'One Country' and 'Two Systems'; chps.1, 10, 26).

For China, of course, the reverse is true--the measure of autonomy between Hong Kong and the rest of China is taken by reference to its economic policies rather than with respect to its application of principles of civil and political rights. Hong Kong is autonomous because it remains market driven in the sense that markets are less bent to the objectives of the state or of the Chinese vanguard. The measure of that autonomy is calculated by the distance between the role of the market in Hing Kong versus that of socialist markets in the rest of China. Autonomy grounded in human rights does not map the same way except to the extent that some measure of latitude is permitted in the forms of governance given Hong Kong's history. 

The space between these points--between the expectation of the country within which Hong Kong exists and systems of outside normative expectations; between autonomy grounded in economics versus autonomy grounded in differences in human rights-- that space maps the terrains the Hong Kong must manage in its international activities, especially as they affect economic activities (The Double Happiness (囍) of Hong Kong: 習近平在慶祝香港回歸祖國25周年大會暨香港特區第六屆政府就職典禮上的講話 [Speech by Xi Jinping at the Celebration of the 25th Anniversary of Hong Kong's Return to the Motherland and the Inauguration Ceremony of the Sixth Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region]). This s a space made more complicated still by the current state of the Russo-Ukrainian war and the lines that separate China  and its networks from the leading forces of the liberal democratic united front. 

Erick Tsang's opening and closing statements, along with the CECC Staff Report follow.  

 

Monday, July 11, 2022

Cuba on the 1st Anniversary of the 11 July 2021 Protests

 

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Today marks the anniversary of the unexpected, and unexpectedly powerful national protests that saw united workers and artist-intellectuals against the state nomenklatura ("Por Esta Libertad": From Hong Kong to Havana--Early Lessons From the Streets to the Management of Popular Protest).  That mass movement has survived at least in attenuated form if only because the protests themselves produced conditions favorable to the development of a coordinated united front with roughly similar objectives (From Hong Kong and its Five Demands to Cuba and the Development of Demands on the State--The Hong Kong Playbook Continues to be Relevant). Its echoes can still be felt (eg here).

That it was suppressed comes as no surprise (eg, here and here).  That it produced long prison sentences for those rounded up in the aftermath again out not to surprise.  "Cuban authorities have acknowledged that more than 700 people, including dozens of teenagers, are facing criminal charges for last year’s anti-government protests. . . .Of the nearly 800 people originally charged, 710 have been referred to trials with 172 already convicted, said the prosecutor’s office, which did not reveal details of the sentences against those found guilty." (Cuba acknowledges prosecuting hundreds for last year’s protests)

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And that these circumstances have accelerated the mass exodus of the most productive elements of the Cuban population. "Between October last year and May, more than 140,000 Cubans were detained at the U.S. border with Mexico, a figure that exceeds the 125,000 Cubans who left the port of Mariel, near Havana, between April and October 1980." (‘Prison or exile’: Repression in Cuba after protests fueled exodus, rights group says). That is both tragic for that nation, but also also  neither surprising nor unique to the aftermath of such eruptions, starting certainly from the 1970s (Domingo Amuchastegui «Cambiamos o nos hundimos» ["We Change or We Sink"]--The Current Central Contradiction of Cuban Society Under Current Conditions; and"Cuba in the Era of Olokun: From the 8th Congress of the Cuban Communist Party to the July 11th Protest Movement and the Future of the Cuban Political-Economic Model" Presentation at the 31st Annual Conference of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy). And the Cuban state has sought to take some measures to take the edge off of the anger:

Communist Cuba was, and still is, mired in an economic crisis and demonstrators chanted "We're hungry!" and demanded "Freedom!" The government has since tried to make amends in La Guinera, a largely Black neighborhood that is part of Havana's most populous municipality, Arroyo Naranjo, also one of the capital's poorest. Authorities have filled potholes, painted warehouses, reopened and restocked medical centers, and promised new homes to some families. It is part of a program implemented in 60 Havana neighborhoods to improve people's lives. (Impoverished Havana neighborhood reeling from protest convictions)

To mark the anniversary, the US Secretary of State moved to impose visa restrictions on a number of Cuban officials tied to the suppression of the protests. 

The action is pursuant to US Presidential Proclamation 5377 that suspends nonimmigrant entry into the United States of officers and employees of the Cuban government and Cuban Communist Party. US Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken in a statement said the 28 officials include officials “who are implicated in the repression of the peaceful July 11, 2021 protests.” Blinken said those covered include high-ranking members of the Cuban Communist Party responsible for setting national and provincial-level policies. (US imposes visa restrictions on Cuban officials)

Cuban officials continue to treat the protests as a soft coup; one that was successfully suppressed. (Una fecha celebrada por Cuba y sus amigos: La victoria contundente del pueblo cubano sobre el golpe blando que se pretendió hace un año fue celebrada por amigos de la Isla en varios países) (highlighting statement of support form around the world for the Cuban state). The official position was clear, and clearly directed against what the Cuban state characterized as US interference: 

Con el despliegue de una operación político-comunicacional de gran enver­gadura, quisieron aprovecharse de manera oportunista de los impactos combinados del pico de la pandemia de la COVID-19, de la crisis económica derivada de esta, y de las medidas que recrudecieron el bloqueo a un nivel sin precedentes.¿El más claro objetivo? Generar la idea falsa de que las carencias y dificultades materiales responden a la ineficiencia en la gestión del Gobierno revolucionario, y encubrir su causa real: el inhumano cerco económico de Estados Unidos. (Un Girón en julio (The full statement follows below.)

The Statement of the US Secretary of State takes a wholly different view. It follows below. It is a reminder that the United States is still committed to the transformation of the Cuban political system, and that the Cuban Party-State is likely equally committed to resisting change.  That continues the relationship (and its contours) that have defined US-Cuba relations for more than a generation.

 

Sunday, July 10, 2022

The Federal Executive Reponse to the Supreme Court's Dobb's Decision: Executive Action by the President

 


 

Every opposition party in the United States denounces  the use of Executive authority by the political party in power.  They devote tremendous energy, sometimes successfully top challenge such assertions of  executive authority as undemocratic, as a violation of the rule of law, and in violation of administrative practice and its regulatory constraints. In the process much administrative law has been made in the United States, and cultures of administrative operation, especially with respect to the exercise of discretion and the limits of administrative authority, have been made.  Executive authority was a battleground during the Trump Administration (e.g., Department of Commerce v. New York, No. 18–966, 588 U.S. ___ (2019) (exercise of discretion by an administrative apparatus). It is one during the Biden Administration as well (e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, No. 20–1530, 597 U.S. ___ (slip op., 30 June 2022) (extent of delegated power to administrative agencies).

 Until they become the political party in power.   

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In every case, the president at the head of the political party in power has argued both an autonomous right to interpret the constitution, and the offending opinions if any, and sought to exercise what is described as a popular mandate legitimated by victory at the polls. These are the very things that once argued by the opposition when they were in power, is viewed as disrespectful and a threat to the constitutional order of the Republic. In this way the borderlands of the division of authority between executive, legislative, and political authority, under the leadership of elected officials and unofficially guided by the sensibilities of the political parties to which most owe allegiance, can serve as the space for contests f interests that in an odd way preserve the overall stability of the Republic. That stability is thus both dynamic and a function of the meowings that sometimes passes for the political agitation of political factions organized as and within the major American political parties. 

These contests reach their zenith when one or another of the political ranches appears to disturb  even shaky truce lines in cultural, politically, socially, or religiously  important issues. Women's autonomy, reproductive rights, and the protection of the unborn lies at the core of one such very shaky truce system. It was disturbed by the aggressive judicial intervention in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, No. 19–1392 (slip op. 24 June 2022). For my prior  analysis here, and here).  And the push back from the President, representing a potent and large portion of the nation opposed to the decision and its substance, should not have been unexpected. Again the dialogue between two coordinate branches, each limited in the tools available, and the extent of their authority, now starts its next phase.  

The majority of the Supreme Court can content itself only with the law of the case in Dobbs, and the expectation that inferior courts will apply its holding in future cases.  Yet American common law traditions suggest that unpopular decisions may be quite narrowly construed--and often distinguished, until it too finds itself on the wrong end of stare decisis.  And the courts can be overwhelmed with cases suggesting exceptions.  This is beyond the likely judicial contests over state over exuberance is interpreting the4 decision to its own political ends, and the counter thrusts (already started) of individuals cloaking their rights in another conservative principle--the right of free exercise of religion to protect the aut0nomy of women in their reproductive choices. 

The President can content himself only with the power of Executive Order, one that the members of his pwn party sought to curtail significantly between 2016 and 2020 when it was being wielded against them by Mr. Trump and his party. These actions, too, may be overwhelmed by litigation and challenge. And they can reach only as far as the administrative authority under the control of the President reaches.  That, however, can be sizeable in chunks.

 The President has acted.  The Executive Order issued 8 July 2022, along with a FACT SHEET distributed by the White House follows. Especially useful are efforts to batter publicize and simplify the means for individuals to protect their (reproductive) rights in the face of state interference (see, eg here). There are a number of interesting approaches in the Executive Order.  In addition to information campaigns and compliance mandates against fraud and deceptive practices, the Executive Order along with efforts to encourage litigation and counseling  by the organized bar (Section 3--Protecting Access to Reproductive Healthcare Services). More interesting still, perhaps, is the intent to weaponize existing federal privacy authority in Section 4 (Protecting Privacy, Safety, and Security)--perhaps in this case to make it much harder for states to proceed against individuals seeking to exercise reproductive options in other states where such options may be lawfully undertaken.  These will likely be subject to countermeasures by opponents. In the process, the law and practice of federalism in this Republic will surely be significantly altered.The irony is that both political party organizations will remain adept at both defending and challenging Presidential assertions of Executive authority. While they will likely seek to distinguish good (theirs) from bad (their opponents') efforts, it is likely that the new equilibrium will both refine the art of executive authority and the rules under which it can be exercised.  In the process compliance and abuse of discretion will also be transformed as governing principles.


Friday, July 08, 2022

In Memorium--Shinzo Abe

 

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It is with great sadness that one must today consider the enormity of the assassination of former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The facts are still in development and its narrative is evolving. One hopes that those developments will bring some measure of closure or comfort to Japan and its friends worldwide. 

President Joe Biden, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, and Prime Minister Narendra Modiissued the following statement:

July 08, 2022 • Statements and Releases
We, the leaders of Australia, India, and the United States, are shocked at the tragic assassination of former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Prime Minister Abe was a transformative leader for Japan and for Japanese relations with each one of our countries. He also played a formative role in the founding of the Quad partnership, and worked tirelessly to advance a shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific. Our hearts are with the people of Japan — and Prime Minister Kishida— in this moment of grief. We will honor Prime Minister Abe’s memory by redoubling our work towards a peaceful and prosperous region.

 


The assassination occurs at a tense moment in global history, one in which change, great change, is inevitable, but its direction still unpredictable.  Mr. Abe's murder takes place as Russia pursues a hot war for the territory of Ukraine.  Around this core, what is appearing  to be shaping into a new sort of functionally differentiated multi-generational war  involving global principal states and their dependencies  has been broadening and intensifying. In that context Mr. Abe symbolized both the intensification of Japanese defense capabilities, including the development of the Quad on the Asian front of the current conflict, and also a driving force in the preservation of the forward momentum and solidarity of liberal democratic states and the socio-economic orders they advanced (Building on the Failure of the Trans Pacific Partnership--The Abe Doctrine in the Era of the Periphery Leading the Center).   

Thursday, July 07, 2022

Functional Differentiation in the Projection of Multi-Generational War Techniques--A New Front in the Russo-Ukrainian War; Russia in Nicaragua

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The Russo-Ukrainian war has evolved on several fronts. At its core is the physical conflict through which Russia seeks to realize its territorial ambitions. Its territorial peripheries extend first to front line states who seek to aid the principal territorial combatants.  On the one side China, and perhaps to a lesser extent Iran and beyond that the states that seek advantage or to honor old alliances or habits of connection. These provide Russia with a means of softening the hostile actions of those who, on the other side, seek to support Ukraine.  Principal among these are the United States ad the European Union, Japan, and Euro-Asia. Like China and its associated states, the states on the Ukrainian side seek to provide Ukraine with the means necessary for them--as the front line state--to resist Russian territorial ambitions.  At the same time. like the Chinese side, they seek to remain just shy of appearing to be an active combatant.  Thus the Russian allied states would undermine sanctions and provide material support, while the Ukrainian allied states shore up the NATO alliance, provide substantial financial and military assistance, and project defensive power against Russia by denying it access to trade, finance, and other interconnections beyond its borders.  At the outer fringes of these bands of alliances are the great trading and friendship circles--the OECD, the BRICS alliance,and the Belt & Road states. 

To that end, the United States and NATO has sought to move its defensive positions right up to the  borders with Russia. With Finland and Sweden in NATO, the ability of the liberal democratic alliance to project power right to the edges of the Russian heartland, even if defensive, becomes greater. But Russia is not without means of projecting closer to the American heartland. Cuba remains an eager, convenient and powerful instrument.   Certainly Russian operatives have a long history of operation in Cuba; and lately Chinese operatives have found a home there as well. Cuban security and other administrative organs to serve the interest of and as agents for Russian interests that may at the same time serve Cuban interest as well. Cuba can also serve as a convenient base for running advanced warfare operations detached enough so that it might not be directly connected with the principles in the conflict (especially Russia and China). 

Now Russia has augmented its ability to project power in the Western Hemisphere. It was reported that

The Daniel Ortega-Rosario Murillo regime has authorized Russian personnel, ships, and aircraft to enter Nicaragua from July 1 to December 31, 2022. The Russian troops will participate in humanitarian aid, military exercises, and operations against illicit activities on the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean, the June 7 decree in the official Gazette indicated.

“The region has reason to feel threatened. Nicaragua bought offensive as opposed to defensive armament from the Russians. The 80 tanks that it acquired are perfectly suited for armed entry into any of the capitals of Central America,” former opposition lawmaker, lawyer, and political analyst Eliseo Núñez told Diálogo. “The Russians in Nicaragua, with conventional and technological military capabilities, are a danger to the region. We already see what is happening in Costa Rica with hackers blocking the internet […], who coincidentally are from Russia.”

The decree includes the entry of 80 Russian military personnel, on a rotating basis, to participate in “experience exchanges and conduct training in humanitarian aid operations” with the Nicaraguan Army’s Special Operations Command. Moreover, 50 additional troops will take part in security training, and another 50 Russian service members will exchange experiences “in tasks to confront and combat narcotrafficking and transnational organized crime,” the decree states. (Nicaragua Authorizes Entry of Russian Troops on Its Territory )

The overture and the propaganda effect (especially its signalling objectives) of Decree 10-2022, approved by the Ortega-controlled legislature authorizing Russian military activity in and around the nation, was unmistakable.

Nicaraguan political analyst Roberto Cajina said the torrent of propaganda emanating from the Kremlin after Decree 10-2020 was passed constitutes a veiled threat to the United States. Russian state television anchor Olga Skabeeva gave extensive coverage to Ortega’s initiative and said, “It’s time for Russia to flex its muscles near some US cities.” TASS, a Russian state-owned news agency also widely disseminated news of the military agreement with Nicaragua, while Sputnik, another Russian state-owned news agency headlined a recent report: “Nicaragua: military cooperation with Russia will strengthen national security.” The Kremlin later tried to tone down the rhetoric and Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova dismissed the collaboration with Nicaragua as a “routine operation.” (Nicaragua’s Ortega strains US relations by expanding military ties with Russia)

The significs of the exercise of this power projection are potentially important.  Its discursive  importance is clear and unmistakable. This builds on the narrative of resistance to the new empire as a way of masking the imperial machinations of a more backwards looking 20th century Russian imperial project, but one that suits the 21st imperial aspirations of its much more potent partner in Asia. It also continues to feed the now ancient anti-colonial discourse that have proven to be so useful in the internal politics of  states more comfortable with the encomienda than with the realities and potentials of this century ("In the Shadow of Empires—Latin American Perceptions of Development and International Law"-- Summary of Presentation for ASIL 2019 Proceedings).  

It is unclear the extent to which the changes in Nicaragua may be used to destabilize (or appear to destabilize) the region.  The extent to which ti is designed to produce some sort of in terrorem effect on shipping in and through the Panama Canal is even less clear. A base for targeted projections of instability, though, is always useful, as is a refuge for operations.  Its potential use as a base for regional targeted special operations, then, is then likely more significant--drugs (for high demand Northern Hemisphere and European markets, money laundering, sanctions avoidance, smuggling, gun running, agitation, and assassination. These are useful and destabilizing modalities of projecting power even into the heart of an opponent within interlocking systems of global interaction.  Its potential to fuel sensitive battles within US politics on the eve of the mid term elections, then, ought not be overlooked--especially the potential to ramp up the politics of migration and its instrumentalization as a weapon of indirect war. What makes this potentially even more interesting is the changing political landscape in Central and Northern South America, with governments potentially more sympathetic to Nicaragua and Russia/China and with a long list of grievances against the United States. Nicaragua, like Cuba, can also serve as a strategic base for avoiding sanctions regimes--an extension of the "silk roads" Russia is now creating around the heartland of the liberal democratic empire (A new corridor for India-Russia trade via Iran is almost ready).  And a distracted US, like a distracted Europe, can serve the interests of those who wish to absorb Ukraine within another empire, one partition at a time.

The United States has not been oblivious--it has extended sanctions regimes against Nicaragua (US slaps more sanctions on Nicaragua, accuses it of deepening Russia ties).  But these have been anemic. Anemia may be symptomatic of a greater challenge--the need to master the newer arts of integrated spectrum conflicts with a dynamic but not uniform global dimension. The great symptom of this challenge might appear as the a manifestation on the ground of anything like a coordinated approach to the geopolitical  pieces radiating out from the conflict on the ground in Ukraine is as well understood as it ought to be, or that the way in which functionally differentiated roles for each of these radiating bands now appears to finely tune the disaggregated use of multi-generational warfare techniques assigned to different segments of interlinked friendly states and other actors. Nor is it clear that the Americans are now merely playing a defensive strategy rather than actively deploying these differentiated  operational and tactical centers toward a positive and coordinated objective, even one with many subparts. It would be a great pity if the United States and its allies deal with this piecemeal--as it has done with the BRICS states--is to underestimate the systems of alliances deploying different elements of multi-generational warfare.  A greater pity is the United States continues its usual approach to the region, studied indifference unless the US needs something or the regional actors irritate  some faction of US ruling elites. A failure to coordinate on the part of the United States and its allies may be regrettable. In the meantime, those supporting Russia may be able to take greater advantage of the opportunities provided by operations in the soft underbelly of American strategic vision. Look for ways in which American competitor states--both apex and regional powers now see to take advantage of the American inability to properly situate that underbelly within the geopolitical body of functionally differentiated and disaggregated conflict-front strategies of multi-generational warfare. One saw a hint of this in the evolving National Security Strategy of the US (see, e.g.,  Ruminations 76: From Global to Fortress America; Thoughts on "National Security Strategy of the United States" (4 Dec 2017)). Time will tell if the US is keeping up with the times.



 

 


Wednesday, July 06, 2022

Now Available: Essays on The Self-Reflexive Imaginaries of Law: Essays on Contemporary Legalization in an Age of Algorithmic Law and Platform Governance in Volume 16 Issue 2 "Emancipating the Mind in the New Era: Bulletin of the Coalition for Peace & Ethics"



 

I am delighted to announce that the essays in Volume 16(2) of Emancipating the Mind: Bulletin of the Coalition for Peace & Ethics (Winter 2021) (ISSN 2689-0283 (Print); 2689-0291 (Online); ISBN 978-1-949943-08-5 (paperback) 978-1-949943-09-2 (Digital)) are now available.

The theme of this volume is ” The Self-Reflexive Imaginaries of Law: Essays on Contemporary Legalization in an Age of Algorithmic Law and Platform Governance.” The seven essays in this issue explore the ways that this movement from the sovereign legal to plural legalities–that is from the formal, qualitative, and public expression of command, to its insinuation into the practices, habits, and expectations of collective bodies—have become deeply embedded each in the other.  One does not speak here of zero sum binaries.  One speaks here of union that produces  new forms of managing individuals and in the process reshaping the institutions developed for that purpose. In the process the legal becomes both more variegated and diffuse. The essays are organized in two parts.  The first, The Condition of Law, considers the modalities of insinuation of disciplinary legalities alongside, beneath, and within the traditional architecture of law its public institutions. This part includes three essays. The first suggests the structures of weaving between the old orthodox national legal orders and the emerging plural legalities, both qualitative and quantitative. The second considers how this weaving is manifested in the governance behaviors of the institutions of the Norwegian Pension Fund Global. The third focuses on the way that interpretation changes to suit the times and the memories of those who then apply them to interpret the norms and rules of collective organizations. The second, Algorithmic Law and Platform Governance, suggest the ways that the condition of law is further shaped by the modalities used to0 express and apply it. This part includes four essays. The first considers the way in which democracy is quantified by private actors in liberal democratic political orders. The second considers four inter-related stories: (1) the disciplining of Jack Ma; (2) the completion of the first cycle of data protection and cybersecurity laws in China; (3) the detachment of data services from Ant; (4) the glimmerings of the Western parallel developments in the contest between Australia and Facebook. The third essay considers forms of quantitative corruption by considering the way that data was corrupted in the production of World Bank reporting efforts, in the course of which data was manipulated for the benefit of certain states. The last essay considers the regulatory application of ‘wokeness’ in China by considering recent Chinese efforts to report online expression that violates community standards, and the regulation of algorithmically based recommendations systems. 

At the foundation of the essays (as in Issue 16(1)) are notions of imaginaries.

The word ‘imaginary’ as a noun is a jargon term that has been gaining currency in a number of social sciences. It grates on those who have not come across this usage before, as in ordinary language the word is mainly used as an adjective. People have, for example, ‘imaginary friends’, but they rarely have ‘imaginaries’ (Brigitte Nerlich, Imagining imaginaries, University of Nottingham Blog (23 April 2015) with a nice summary explanation of the evolution and expansion of the term within the social sciences)
Whatever its pedigree, the term is useful here. The term is connected to a number of other similar terms that seek to give meaning to the same set of practices or states of social being: for example, the German-English Weltanschauung) or perhaps “lifeworlds.” In their own ways each tries to center the way that knowledge is organized and rationalized through systems of interpreting, understanding and giving meaning to the world around us (Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection (Routledge, 1997) p. 21; Jean-Paul Sartre, The Imaginary: A Phenomenological Psychology of the Imagination (Routledge, 2010 (original 1940), pp. 57-94). It can also be understood as shared perceptions of the meaning of reality backed by massive background consensus (Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (William Rehg (trans) MIT Press, 1996); pp. 22, 322); or as biopolitics (the narratives through which social and political power may be normalized over the control and management of the bodies of the living and their relationship to physical and abstract objects and the technologies of control) (Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978-1979 (Graham Burchell (trans) Picador 2004), pp. 75-101).   

All of the essays are available free online. The entire volume may be purchased in paperback form from Amazon. LINK HERE.

The Table of Contents with links to the essays along with the Introduction by the issue editors (with abstract summaries of the essays) follow below.  I hope there is something of interest here for readers. Always welcome engagement and conversation.  The issue may also be accessed through the Emancipating the Mind Bulletin Website Volume 16(2).

Monday, July 04, 2022

Rituals of Purification and the Republic: On the 2022 Anniversary Celebrations of Independence Day in the United States

 


 

 The 4th day of July has been set aside in our Republic for the celebration of the signing of the Declaration of Independence by the members of the Second Continental Congress at that moment in rebellion against the authority of the King in Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland, whose subjects they then were. Last year I wrote about rebellion and revolution; of the power of detachment sealed with the blood of those who fought for separation and those who sought to retain union and of the shifting constitution of political solidarity (In Celebration of U.S.Independence Day 2021--Revolution and Solidarity). The Russo-Ukrainian war of 2022 serves as an application of the general principles memorialized in the document and then incarnated in the sacrifices that come with rebellion, separation, and the constitution of political solidarity.  

For this Independence Day, it might be useful to reflect on rituals of purification.  Purification rituals--the performance of acts of cleansing, of washing away the dirty, impure, wrong and the like--is an essential part of the human collective experience.  It is bound up in virtually every social system and expressed in many ways. It serves as the concrete manifestation of societal belief, its ideal, and the affirmation of the fidelity of the individual (or collective) to that ideal.  It can also signal an act of defiance--of rituals of purification in the face of decay, or impurity. Purification brings the celebrant closer to the ideal, and farther from those persons or practices which are unclean, impure, corrupting, and in the end, perhaps, not worth saving. Purification can suggest detachment in the sense that there may be such a gulf between those purified (or seeking purification) and those who do not that it becomes impossible to find any space on which solidarity may be established between them.

Purification and its rituals has acquired a peculiar cultural-political dimension in the American Republic.  The peculiarity arises from the appearance of what may be a more openly expressed sentiment that the Republic (understood as a space for solidarity among those with quite distinct approaches to purity) might be best served by its disintegration and rebirth--purified and better able to engage in those ritual practices that might produce a greater alignment with the pure ideal. The Bible suggests the appropriate imagery: "Behold, I have refined thee, but not with silver; I have chosen thee in the furnace of affliction." (Isaiah 48:10 KJV). That is the imagery that might be understood as most useful--of the furnace in which both pure and impure, heretofore amalgamated together, might be separated so that what is precious may be smelted out from the dross of that which ought to be cast aside. 

These purification movements in the Republic appear now to have acquired a double set of generalized forms.  On the one side one encounters collectives who view the rituals of destructive purification as necessary to bring the collective back to some ideal buried in time, or reflecting a vision of an awakened population to the truth of certain modes of behaviors and ways of thinking.  These look back for purification.  On the other are those collectives for which purification is a function of a set of rationalized objectives for the attainment of which it is necessary to reduce or eliminate those public spaces that must be shared with the impure--those who stand in the way of the realization of these principle-objectives. In both cases, the Republic, in its current state, is both the ideal and the impediment to the realization of purity.  And in both cases, that impurity must be exercised in the furnace of affliction.  In both cases the rituals of purification meld with the imagery of the divine furnace within which the impure, the corrupt, the worthless, may be excised. 

18 Son of man, the house of Israel is to me become dross: all they are brass, and tin, and iron, and lead, in the midst of the furnace; they are even the dross of silver. 19 Therefore thus saith the Lord GOD; Because ye are all become dross, behold, therefore I will gather you into the midst of Jerusalem. 20 As they gather silver, and brass, and iron, and lead, and tin, into the midst of the furnace, to blow the fire upon it, to melt it; so will I gather you in mine anger and in my fury, and I will leave you there, and melt you. (Ezekiel 22:18-20 KJV)

For those who increasingly hold these views, who view the Republic as corrupted by the impure which must be cast aside, it is necessary to cast the Republic itself into the furnace.

It is against these forces of purity (in its varied and incompatible, warring, forms); it is against this temptation to toss the Republic into the furnace of purification, that the commemoration of the proclamation of independence serves as a useful reminder.  It is a useful reminder that the Republic was designed for the impure.  It was made to express perfection through the solidarity of the imperfect.  Its genius was cast in a very different furnace, one in which the combination of the pure and the impure, of the past and the present, might be bound together in the way that nature (now perhaps better understood as the interconnections between all of the elements of earth, living and not) make a whole. Perfection, and purification, at least in this Republic, is better expressed as the stability of diverse systems than of a homogeneity or in hierarchies of homogeneity, that the current fashionable embrace of purity suggests. In the less abstract language of Mitt Romney's 4th of July 2022 essay:

Bolstering our natural inclination toward wishful thinking are the carefully constructed, prejudice-confirming arguments from the usual gang of sophists, grifters, and truth-deniers. Watching angry commentators on cable news, I’m reminded of H. L. Mencken’s observation: “For every complex problem, there is a solution that is clear, simple, and wrong.”

It may not be wrong in the factual sense; it is certainly wrong in the sense that purification  in this case will inevitably produce its own state of impurity. Mr. Romney argues that "But a crisis may come too late for a course correction that can prevent tragedy. The only cure for wishful thinking is leadership." But perhaps it is the Biblical furnace that is a better option--not a Shepard but a nation of shepherds, all committed to a shared vision that we do better together than apart. It is not to a President that the Republic must necessarily look to to move beyond these forces of narrow purification; perhaps it requires something else--and far broader. And that may start with the remembrance that solidarity starts from self and then mutual, and then communal, respect. Mr. Romney would have us wait for our Shepard. "While we wait, leadership must come from fathers and mothers, teachers and nurses, priests and rabbis, businessmen and businesswomen, journalists and pundits. That will require us all to rise above ourselves—above our grievances and resentments—and grasp the mantle of leadership our country so badly needs." I would be inclined to suggest that it is already in the power of the Shepard-less to constitute themselves a collective Shepard free of the crutch of a human person on to whom collective expectation requires some sort of incarnation.

On this day, then, one might celebrate the possibility that these great forces of purification might themselves all be cast back into the furnace to emerge not united but more conscious of the symbiosis that gives each their strength and that guards against their presumption.


Sunday, July 03, 2022

Bingwan Xiong and Mateja Durovic on "The Enforcement of Mandatory Rules against Illegal Contracts" (European Chinese Law Research Hub)

 


The folks over at the European Chinese Law Research Hub (with thanks to Marianne von Blomberg, Editor ECLR Hub, Research Associate, Chair for Chinese Legal Culture, University of Cologne) have posted  a discussion of a marvelous new paper by Bingwan Xiong (Associate Professor at School of Law, Renmin University of China) and Mateja Durovic (Reader in Contract and Commercial Law, The Dickson Poon School of Law, Kings) on The Enforcement of Mandatory Rules against Illegal Contracts.

In our paper, we look into the case of the regulation of the lottery tickets sales on credit. As per Article 18 of China’s Lottery Regulation, no lottery may sell lottery tickets on open account or credit. Such a deed may result in imposed suspension, confiscation plus fines, and punishment on the person in charge as per Article 39. Armed with the new jurisprudence that not all kinds of illegality shall render contracts void and null, Chinese civil courts tend to uphold the validity of lottery sales on credit. Though this saves the innocent party from the loss because of the invalidation of the contract, the problem is, without the following actions of administrative organs, justice stops at the decision in court and the mandatory rules are not equipped with administrative enforcement power.

We find that the major obstacle is information asymmetry between courts and regulatory agencies: not only would the contracting parties not expose the illegal deal in fear of punishment or losing their interest. Also, the courts fail to actively transmit such information to the responsible departments, despite the Supreme People’s Court of China formally encouraging local courts to issue judicial proposals to regulatory agencies.

I am cross posting the essay below. The original ECLRH post may be accessed HERE. And as a plug for the marvelous work at the European Chinese Law Research Hub: if you have observations, analyses or pieces of research that are not publishable as a paper but should get out there, or want to spread event information, calls for papers or job openings, or have a paper forthcoming- do not hesitate to contact Marianne von Bloomberg.

 

Saturday, July 02, 2022

学习宣传贯彻习近平主席重要讲话精神座谈会 [Symposium on Learning, Propagating and Implementing the Spirit of President Xi Jinping's Important Speech] hosted by 中央政府驻港联络办举办香港社会各界 [Liaison Office of the Central Government in Hong Kong]]

 

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I have written about Xi Jinping's remarks made in Hong Kong to celebrate the 25th Anniversary of the repatriation of Hong Kong and the installation of its 6th government (The Double Happiness (囍) of Hong Kong: 習近平在慶祝香港回歸祖國25周年大會暨香港特區第六屆政府就職典禮上的講話 [Speech by Xi Jinping at the Celebration of the 25th Anniversary of Hong Kong's Return to the Motherland and the Inauguration Ceremony of the Sixth Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region]).  The remarks and the event were important enough for the Hong Kong SAR to publicize it widely, including full page ads in strategically chosen important Western press outlets like the Wall Street Journal.  These foreign language memorials of the event and the speech emphasized Hong Kong's new era of stability and prosperity with a heavy focus on economic and cultural activity for investors and visitors. The foreign projections served as a signalling device for the emergence of a new era Hong Kong, its vision, and its trajectory as a bridge between the Chinese mainland and foreigners. 

The remarks, however, were also important enough to merit a substantial effort at inward projection into Hing Kong. To that end, on the day after Mr. Xi's remarks, the Liaison Office of the Central Government in Hong Kong [中央政府驻港联络办举办香港社会各界] hosted a Symposium on Learning, Propagating and Implementing the Spirit of President Xi Jinping's Important Speech [学习宣传贯彻习近平主席重要讲话精神座谈会]. Its object was to emphasize efforts to learn the original text, comprehend it accurately, guide practice, and put its guidance into action [强调在学好原文、准确领悟、指导实践、见诸行动上下功夫] . The symposium was attended by the representatives of the leading collective forces in Hing Kong; with the expectation that these mass organizations would then carry with them the responsibility for disseminating, teaching and implementing the eight point guidance in the remarks (expressed as sets of 4 core principles and four points of hope).  

Leading the Symposium was Luo Huining (骆惠宁; 1954), Director of the Liaison Office of the Central People's Government in Hong Kong. 

At the symposium, 17 representatives from all walks of life in Hong Kong talked about their learning, understanding and experience in light of their industry and sector. [座谈会上,来自香港社会各界的17名代表人士,结合所在行业、所在界别的情况,畅谈学习认识和体会。大家表达了对习近平主席的由衷爱戴,对习近平主席重要讲话的一致拥护。]

Those in attendance included Tan Huizhu, deputy director of the Hong Kong Basic Law Committee of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Li Huiqiong, chairman of the Democratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong, Shi Kuanyun, chairman of the Hong Kong Buddhist Federation, Cai Guanshen, member of the Standing Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Fok Qigang, executive vice chairman of the Hong Kong Federation of Literary and Art Circles, Gong Junlong, Chairman of the Federation of Hong Kong Guangdong Associations, Ye Yuru, Hong Kong Academician of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Ou Guansheng, Chief Executive Officer of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and Chen Zeming, President of the Law Society of Hong Kong, Huang Jinliang, chairman of the Hong Kong Federation of Education Associations, and Xu Li, chairman of the Kowloon Federation of Associations. Each committed to do their part through their leadership positions to fulfill the intent and guidance of Mr. Xi's remarks as appropriate for the mass organizations they each lead. 

 The signalling was clear. In the language of the Symposium summary:

 All sectors of society should seize the strategic opportunity, concentrate on development, and work together to overcome difficulties, so that the spirit of President Xi Jinping's important speech can take root in Hong Kong, and lead and gather the majestic positive energy that promotes the realization of Hong Kong from governance to prosperity. [社会各界应把握战略机遇,聚精会神谋发展,共同破难而进,让习近平主席重要讲话精神在香港落地生根,引领和汇聚起推动香港实现由治及兴的磅礴正能量。].

New Era whole process democracy has come to Hong Kong (theory discussed here). It will be applied differently than on the Mainland.  But it will be applied.  That, at any rate, was the essence of Luo Huining's remarks and the beginning of the performance, Hong Kong style, of HKSAR whole process democracy through the ritual of the symposium. It starts with the gathering of all mass organizations  for consultation and guidance that starts with its political-theoretical conception, and then opens up for the representatives of the people to consult on its operationalization  in the specific context of Hong Kong. What is still missing is a proper structuring of a Political Consultative Conference (政协) but with  regional characteristics, that is as a key mechanism for multi-party cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) (e.g.,  Roles and functions of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference). The further question for the future will involve the restructuring of the administrative organs of government (starting with this 6th administration) in its relationship to these political organs under CPC leadership. It would also deepen the structure of Hong Kong engagement in the National CPPCC (中国人民政治协商会议全国委员会). Hong Kong delegates have been included on National CPPCC lists (eg here for 2018). But what may be needed is the reconsideration of constitution of a more more regional CPPCC structure and an institutional connection to national organs. That, certainly appears to be the invitation left unstated but quite apparent in Mr. Xi's remarks.

However that is resolved, the question now for Hong Kong's elites, now constituted as a comprehensive SAR Consultative Conference, is how they will implement the four points of hope specifically described in Mr. Xi's 1 July 2022 remarks [学习宣传贯彻习近平主席重要讲话精神座谈会], and how they will come to understand the way that the four core principles guide those discretionary decisions.  

The reporting of the Symposium follows in the original Chinese along with a crude English translation.

Friday, July 01, 2022

The Double Happiness (囍) of Hong Kong: 習近平在慶祝香港回歸祖國25周年大會暨香港特區第六屆政府就職典禮上的講話 [Speech by Xi Jinping at the Celebration of the 25th Anniversary of Hong Kong's Return to the Motherland and the Inauguration Ceremony of the Sixth Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region]

 

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习近平走上主席台监誓。李家超首先宣誓就职,他面对中华人民共和国国旗、国徽和香港特别行政区区旗,举起右手,依照香港特别行政区基本法的规定庄严宣誓。 . . . 接着,由习近平监誓,香港特别行政区第六届政府主要官员在李家超带领下宣誓就职。 [Xi Jinping stepped onto the rostrum to take the oath. Li Jiachao took the oath of office first. Facing the national flag of the People's Republic of China, the national emblem and the regional flag of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, he raised his right hand and solemnly took the oath in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. . . . Then, under the supervision of Xi Jinping, the main officials of the sixth government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region were sworn in under the leadership of Li Jiachao.] (庆祝香港回归祖国25周年大会暨香港特别行政区第六届政府就职典礼隆重举行 习近平出席并发表重要讲话 2022-07-01 14:41:25 [The Celebration of the 25th Anniversary of Hong Kong's Return to the Motherland and the Inauguration Ceremony of the Sixth Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region was held. Xi Jinping attended and delivered an important speech])
Ritual is a necessary spectacle for the visualization, and the reinforcement, of the dense systems of principles around which social collectives are organized and operate.  They are especially potent when they are performed at the close of a period of intense transformation, even one, as in the case of the Hong Kong SAR, the trajectories of which were obvious for a long time. (see essays in  for a discussion of the development of the evolution of the principles of autonomy of Hong Kong within China during the apex period of turbulence from 2019-2020 in Hong Kong Between 'One Country' and 'Two Systems' (2021))

Ritual requires, as well an invocation--an authoritative "voice over" (cf. here) of the performance of acts of allegiance and of fealty to a governing orders and their human representatives. This also is all the more important at the (and as the) close of a period of turbulence leading to the distilling of a new era of political sensibilities around the organization of a region that is both autonomous and yet closely tied to the sovereign heartland.

In this case and quite propitiously, there was an amalgamation of two ritual events of the highest importance for the Hong Kong SAR.  The first was a commemoration of the passage of a quarter century since the formal end of U.K. control of a portion of Chinese territory and the ceding of sovereignty of another portion of territory that together constitutes the contemporary Hong Kong SAR. That is of immense importance as part of the narrative of Chinese reconstitution and of its return to its proper role within itself and in the world. That commemoration was all the more important because it m,arks  more definitively the return of Hing Kong to Chinese sovereignty in now more tangible ways; way in which the rituals of fealty and hierarchy serve to underscore. 

The second was the installation of a new cadre of leaders, as a concrete manifestation of the victory of the patriotic front front in Hong Kong and of the deepening of the concept, first nicely articulated by Deng Xiaoping in 1984, respecting the administration of Hong Kong within China.

Some requirements or qualifications should be established with regard to the administration of Hong Kong affairs by the people of Hong Kong. It must be required that patriots form the main body of administrators, that is, of the future government of the Hong Kong special region. Of course it should include other Chinese, too, as well as foreigners invited to serve as advisers. What is a patriot? A patriot is one who respects the Chinese nation, sincerely supports the motherland’s resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong and wishes not to impair Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability. Those who meet these requirements are patriots, whether they believe in capitalism or feudalism or even slavery. We don’t demand that they be in favour of China’s socialist system; we only ask them to love the motherland and Hong Kong.(Deng Xiaoping, "One Country, Two Systems"; Summation of separate talks with members of a Hong Kong industrial and commercial delegation and with Sze-yuen Chung and other prominent Hong Kong figures 22-23 June 1984; Vol 3 Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping).

The core premise of autonomy remains constant; the application of that concept as a set of operational principles touching on economic, social, political. and cultural norms, though, has now changed with the times. The first principle of autonomy also remains constant--reflecting the policy choice to preserve the so-called capitalist (e.g., a private sector individualized markets driven system) operations of the SAR while so-called socialist operations (e.g., public sector and vanguard guided collective markets sensitive systems) continue to develop in the rest of the nation--though both tracks are realized under the leadership of the vanguard and its parameters also change with the times (now most recently entering its joint new era). As Deng Xiaoping put it: "We are pursuing a policy of “one country, two systems”. More specifically, this means that within the People’s Republic of China, the mainland with its one billion people will maintain the socialist system, while Hong Kong and Taiwan continue under the capitalist system. . .  " (Deng, supra). That autonomy, so characterized, is then meant to produce the paving stones with which a sturdy bridge can be built between the so-called capitalist and the so-called socialist world political-economic orders, and only on which (expanded through the structures of the Belt & Road Initiative) appropriate interactions may be facilitated. 

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It is with this in mind that one can better appreciate and understand the remarks, delivered by Xi Jinping, at this double ceremonial event, a speech marking a time of double happiness (囍; shuāngxǐ) in the political and ideological sense (習近平在慶祝香港回歸祖國25周年大會暨香港特區第六屆政府就職典禮上的講話 [Speech by Xi Jinping at the Celebration of the 25th Anniversary of Hong Kong's Return to the Motherland and the Inauguration Ceremony of the Sixth Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region]). And, indeed, the semiotics of marriage, of union,  and of a unification of not quite opposites but certainly of yinyang (阴阳) principles, may be intimated just beneath the surface of the text. Here that 囍 (double happiness) is compounded by the joint commemoration of a historical event and its incarnation in the peopling of core administrative-supervisory organs. 

The remarks are worth a careful reading for the way in which it memorializes the framework and expectations of Hong Kong autonomy in the New Era. It is important as well for the way in which it frames the approaches of officials in projecting the narrative of Hong Kong as reflected in Mr. Xi's remarks to a wider foreign audience in English (a discussion of which follows below). 

The remarks resonate the theme of double happiness in its construction.  It pairs four principles of 'One Country, Two Systems' in the New Era with four points of hope (expectations). Together these yinyang (阴阳) principles and points produce an auspicious eight guiding pillars of Hong Kong autonomy within the One Country Two Systems Framework in the new era.

The four guiding principles neatly summarize the ideological development of One Country Two Systems in its contemporary forms:

First, the principle of "one country, two systems" must be fully and accurately implemented. The "One Country, Two Systems" policy is a complete system. Safeguarding national sovereignty, security and development interests is the highest principle of the "one country, two systems" policy. [第一,着力提高治理水平。完善治理體系、提高治理能力、增強治理效能,是把香港特別行政區建設好、發展好的迫切需要。行政長官和特別行政區政府是香港的當家人,也是治理香港的第一責任人。]

Second, we must adhere to the unity of the central government's overall governance power and the guarantee of a high degree of autonomy for the special administrative regions. . . The implementation of the central government's overall governance power and the protection of the special administrative region's high degree of autonomy are unified and linked, and only by doing this can the special administrative region be managed well.  [第二,不斷增強發展動能。. . . 落實中央全面管治權和保障特別行政區高度自治權是統一銜接的,也只有做到這一點,才能夠把特別行政區治理好。]

Third, "patriots ruling Hong Kong" must be implemented. The political power must be in the hands of the patriots, this is the general political law in the world. . . Safeguarding the right to govern means safeguarding the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and safeguarding the vital interests of the more than seven million Hong Kong residents. [第三,切實排解民生憂難。. . . 守護好管治權,就是守護香港繁榮穩定,守護七百多萬香港居民的切身利益。]

Fourth, Hong Kong's unique position and advantages must be maintained. . . Backed by the motherland and connected to the world, this is Hong Kong's unique and significant advantage. [第四,共同維護和諧穩定。. . . 背靠祖國、聯通世界,這是香港得天獨厚的顯著優勢,]

From these it is possible to develop more refined leadership expectations which are summarized as the points of hope:

4 points of hope. . . . First, focus on improving the level of governance. . . Second, continue to enhance the momentum of development. . . . Third, effectively solve the problems of people's livelihood. . . . Fourth, jointly maintain harmony and stability.

The first points to strengthening the patriotic and core and administrative capacities of the state apparatus in the SAR and of further modifying that apparatus to make this possible. As Mr. Xi suggested in his remarks: "要按照德才兼備的標準選賢任能,廣泛吸納愛國愛港立場堅定、管治能力突出、熱心服務公眾的優秀人才進入政府。要提升國家觀念和國際視野,從大局和長遠需要出發積極謀劃香港發展。("It is necessary to select talents and appoint them according to the standard of having both political integrity and ability, and widely attract outstanding talents who have a firm stand of patriotism and love for Hong Kong, have outstanding governance capabilities, and are enthusiastic about serving the public to join the government."). 

The second touches on the regional development of Hong Kong as a bridge to the outside but equally importantly as a critical part of the regional integration of the Greater Pearl River Delta region. Mr. Xi noted: "中央全力支持香港同世界各地展開更廣泛、更緊密的交流合作,吸引滿懷夢想的創業者來此施展抱負。" ("The Central Government fully supports Hong Kong to carry out wider and closer exchanges and cooperation with other parts of the world, attracting entrepreneurs full of dreams to come here to display their ambitions. ").

 The third seeks to embed the principal contradiction of the Chinese New Era into the governance objectives of Hong Kong. As Mr. Xi stated in his remarks: "人民對美好生活的嚮往,就是我們的奮鬥目標。 . . . 讓每位市民都堅信,只要辛勤工作,就完全能夠改變自己和家人的生活。" ("As I said, the people's yearning for a better life is our goal. . . . More and fairer benefits for all citizens, so that every citizen believes that as long as they work hard, they can completely change their lives and their families."). 

The fourth embeds a form of people's democratic dictatorship into the internal operations of Hong Kong (democracy for patriots and dictatorship for opponents) grounded on the principle of stability and prosperity. Mr. Xi expressed it this way: "香港居民,不管從事什麼職業、信奉什麼理念,只要真心擁護「一國兩制」方針,只要熱愛香港這個家園,只要遵守基本法和特別行政區法律,都是建設香港的積極力量,都可以出一份力" ("Hong Kong residents, no matter what occupation or belief they believe in, as long as they sincerely support the "one country, two systems" policy, as long as they love Hong Kong as their homeland, and as long as they abide by the Basic Law and the laws of the Special Administrative Region, they are all positive forces for the construction of Hong Kong, and they can all contribute to the development of Hong Kong."). This last point is worth emphasizing for both the people of Hing Kong and the foreigners seeking economic opportunity in the SAR.

These points were underscored in a full page paid advertisement that appeared in the national print edition of the Wall Street Journal on 1 July: "Hong Kong: A New Era--Stability, Prosperity, Opportunity (Wall Street Journal 1 July 2022; p. A8. The paid advertisement was placed by the Government of the Hong Kong SAR. It quite effectively distilled Mr. Xi's remarks in a way that is thought to be useful for foreigners seeking to take up the invitation to invest in New Era Hong Kong. The name is quite important as descriptive--this is a notice that the Hong Kong of the 1990s-2019 is gone, and that while Hong Kong is again open for business, that opening is now subject to quite important terms, terms that align with the premises of the central authorities respecting Chinese sovereignty, domestic interference, and the strict boundaries of foreign engagement within its territories, even autonomous ones. That aligns with the 25th anniversary theme which also served as the title of the advertisement--a new era of stability, prosperity and opportunity. "The past three years have been particularly tough--our society and our economy were shaken by  social unrest in 2019. . . As our economy gradually recovers from the impact of the pandemic, and with stability restored, Hong Kong is looking ahead to a bright new era." (Advertisement, supra). 

What follows is a transliteration of the main points of Mr. Xi's speech distilled for a business audience.  The first section--"Back on Track Under  'One Country, Two Systems'--ties the the policy of stability as a "keystone for Hong Kong's development" to the implementation of the National Security Law and the reform of the elections law.  In effect it takes what in the West has been developed into a narrative of the negative effects of these measures and ties them to the positive of inbound investment free of the worries of a restive (and unpatriotic in the language of official pronouncements) population. But then it ties the NSL to the protections afforded under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. That might suggest the residual element of the Sino-UK Joint Declaration, but it is also important to understand that those instruments will be applied consonant with the Chinese constitutional order and its premises. And of course it might be borne in mind that though China has signed the ICCPR in 1998, it has not ratified that instrument.  Yet in that regard it might also be noted that though President Jimmy Carter signed the ICESCR in 1977 it has yet to be ratified by the US. 

The next section--"a new era of opportunities"--then nudges the narrative from legal/constitutional framing  to an integrated development.  Mirroring Mr. Xi's remarks (supra, as Point 3 of his four points of hope), it notes both the National 14 Five-Year Plan and the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area (GBA)plan as the policy context in which inbound investment will be aligned. That aligns with the thrust of the following section--"Gateway to the Greater Bay Area." The Advertisement explains: "Being in the most open and internationally-connected city ion the GBA, Hong Kong will make full use of its 'One Country, Two Systems"' advantages to become a world class destination for people to live, work, invest, network, and enjoy a high quality of life." And, indeed, it is the allure of lifestyle that is then emphasized in the section entitled "An Alluring Lifestyle." That section accounts for the largest proportion of text in the Advertisement. It emphasizes a high quality of life in a place that is secure and safe.  

All of this in the service of the core narrative of the transformations after 2020: to cement Hong Kong's "position as an international financial centre and a conduit for flows of capital, investment and trade between China  and the rest of the world." (Advertisement, supra). This is the message of Mr. Xi's 25th Anniversary speech, but now translated and projected in English to audiences abroad.  And yet to read it more richly, and to understand its nuances, it is useful to have the text of Mr. Xi's remarks firmly in mind. For all of that, the narrative will likely be a hard sell in the U.S. (see, e.g., here).

The text of Mr. Xi's remarks follow along with a crude English translation.