Hong Kong must operate within one country (of which it forms a part) and between two systems of outside normative expectations (within which it seeks to operate in economic, social and cultural spaces). Hong Kong owes the highest duty to the one country of which it is part and from which it derives its autonomy. That duty is a function of the norms and expectations that are deemed at the core of the relationship between the central authorities and the SAR and by which Hong Kong is judged. Nonetheless, Hong Kong is embedded in webs of responsibility to systems of outside expectations on which its prosperity depends, and as a function of its values and expectations the SAR is judged and consequences attach. These two foreign systems include the international community, on the one hand, and the core of leadership of the liberal democratic united front alliance on the other. The duty to one country is formal and preeminent; the responsibility to the two systems is practical and operational. The great challenge for Hong Kong involves navigating between the two when they collide, sensitive to both the superior duty it owes to One Country and the practical effects of provoking the two outside systems on its its prosperity is to some extent still dependent.
As a consequence, Hong Kong is always balancing. Its paramount loyalty to the state of which it forms a part must remain unquestioned, as must its willingness to accept the leadership and guidance of its vanguard (directly or expressed as policy or rules through the administrative apparatus of the central authorities). That includes accepting guidance not just on its politics, but on its macro-economic, social, and cultural objectives. It also includes ensuring the continuing triumph of the patriotic elements of Hong Kong in the governance of the SAR (学习宣传贯彻习近平主席重要讲话精神座谈会
[Symposium on Learning, Propagating and Implementing the Spirit of
President Xi Jinping's Important Speech] hosted by 中央政府驻港联络办举办香港社会各界
[Liaison Office of the Central Government in Hong Kong]]). At the same time Hong Kong must adjust its operations within the parameters set out for the SAR by the Central Authorities, to conform to the expectations of the international community and to a lesser extent to the leadership core of the liberal democratic united front. This is especially important now in the context of judgments about the legalities of Hong Kong's approach to the protection of the civil and political rights of its inhabitants, residents, and investors from abroad. In that context the balancing cam be quite difficult. On the one hand the SAR must adjust to the consequences of nudging legislation from the leadership core of the liberal democratic united front (see, e.g., Hong Kong Policy Act (S. 1731 Pub.L. 102–383; 106 Stat. 1448 (adding 22 U.S.C. §§ 5701–5732) as amended by the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, S. 1838; Pub.L. 116–76 (adding 22 U.S.C. §§ 5725–5726, and amending 22 U.S.C. § 5721) (2019)). On the other, it must harmonize the application of international fundamental human rights covenants (and specifically in this context the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights) in the SAR with the expectations of such application by international oversight bodies. This later sometimes converges with the objectives of the liberal democratic united front (see, e.g., here: US State Dept. Country Report--Hong Kong).
Both balancing acts were very much on display this week.
First,
The United Nations Human Rights Committee on Thursday began reviewing Hong Kong’s rights record for the first time since Beijing imposed its national security law, amid questions about whether groups making submissions to the meeting could fall foul of the legislation. . . Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Erick Tsang and several other top officials attended the meeting in Geneva via video link. In his opening speech, which lasted just under 20 minutes, Tsang said the government had done much to protect human rights in Hong Kong. . . (UN rights committee seeks assurances hearing participants from Hong Kong won’t be targeted under security law ).
The position and actions of Hong Kong were criticized by the Human Rights Committee (the body of independent experts that monitors implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by its States parties).
“I note, honourable secretary, your comment about the events that precipitated this law, but I must observe that it was done overnight, without consultation, and bypassing the local legislature,” the committee’s vice chair Christopher Arif Bulkan said. The Guyanese lawyer also asked Hong Kong officials whether civil society organisations (CSOs) taking part in the current review would be accused of violating the national security law (NSL). “Can you provide assurances that the CSOs who participate here today, and over the next three days, are not in danger of prosecution or victimisation under the NSL, for such engagement?” Bulkan asked. (UN rights committee seeks assurances hearing participants from Hong Kong won’t be targeted under security law ).
Erick Tsang attempted to meet these objections in his opening and closing statements. These follow below. Both statements are models of discursive mediation between systemic expectations that are at their respe3ctive cores substantially incompatible. Hong Kong musty have a measure of both--one is at the center of its governance, the other is necessary for its economic prosperity. The discursive mediation is built on the investing of terms with double meanings--one set of meaning will resonate with the territorial sovereign; the other is meant to resonate sufficiently with HK's business elements.
The report concludes that if Hong Kong’s Justice Department and prosecutors continue to expand arbitrary detention and political prosecutions, the United States and the international community should consider taking targeted actions to address the erosion of the rule of law, including through additional sanctions under the Hong Kong Autonomy Act and the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act.The position of the United States remains unchanged from the time of the late Trump Administration. And its thrust--that the autonomy of Hong Kong must be measured by size of the gap between the governance and governing principles of Hong Kong and of the rest of China--invariably tends to see in Hong Kong's policies a shrinking of that distance. The US measures Hong Kong autonomy, then, by reference to the gulf between the application of international human rights norms in Hong Kong and in the rest of China--its positive measure is taken by the the distance that separates Hong Kong in that respect from China, on the one hand, and the leading liberal democratic states on the other hand. The consequences are written into US statutes. That appears to be the measuring stick of the international community as well as applied via the ICCPR. In both cases there is an implicit normative starting point that Chinese compliance with ICCPR is off center. As a consequence, Hong Kong autonomy must be measured both in human rights terms and by the distance between the application of ICCPR principles in China and in its autonomous regions--especially Hong Kong. The measuring stick is the ICCPR. This has been the position refined by the international community in the wake of the 2019 protests (see Hong Kong Between 'One Country' and 'Two Systems'; chps.1, 10, 26).
For China, of course, the reverse is true--the measure of autonomy between Hong Kong and the rest of China is taken by reference to its economic policies rather than with respect to its application of principles of civil and political rights. Hong Kong is autonomous because it remains market driven in the sense that markets are less bent to the objectives of the state or of the Chinese vanguard. The measure of that autonomy is calculated by the distance between the role of the market in Hing Kong versus that of socialist markets in the rest of China. Autonomy grounded in human rights does not map the same way except to the extent that some measure of latitude is permitted in the forms of governance given Hong Kong's history.
The space between these points--between the expectation of the country within which Hong Kong exists and systems of outside normative expectations; between autonomy grounded in economics versus autonomy grounded in differences in human rights-- that space maps the terrains the Hong Kong must manage in its international activities, especially as they affect economic activities (The
Double Happiness (囍) of Hong Kong: 習近平在慶祝香港回歸祖國25周年大會暨香港特區第六屆政府就職典禮上的講話
[Speech by Xi Jinping at the Celebration of the 25th Anniversary of
Hong Kong's Return to the Motherland and the Inauguration Ceremony of
the Sixth Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region]). This s a space made more complicated still by the current state of the Russo-Ukrainian war and the lines that separate China and its networks from the leading forces of the liberal democratic united front.
Erick Tsang's opening and closing statements, along with the CECC Staff Report follow.



















