Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) 2023 Annual Report

 

 

  The Congressional-Executive Commission on China was created by the U.S. Congress in 2000 "with the legislative mandate to monitor human rights and the development of the rule of law in China, and to submit an annual report to the President and the Congress. The Commission consists of nine Senators, nine Members of the House of Representatives, and five senior Administration officials appointed by the President." (CECC About). The CECC FAQs provide useful information about the CECC. See CECC Frequently Asked Questions. They have developed positions on a number of issues.

CECC tends to serve as an excellent barometer of the thinking of political and academic elites in the United States about issues touching on China and the official American line developed in connection with those issues. As such it is an important source of information about the way official and academic sectors think about China. As one can imagine many of the positions of the CECC are critical of current Chinese policies and institutions (for some analysis see CECC). 

CECC publishes annual reports. For those who missed it, the last report, for 2023, was published 10 May 2024.  Its objectives and scope are well summarized by the Statement From the Chairs the Introduced the Report:

STATEMENT FROM THE CHAIRS

 

 This reporting year was marked by Communist Party leader Xi Jinping securing his third term as General Secretary, breaking from post-Mao “reform era” precedent, and by a continued high level of state repression, particularly in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and areas of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) inhabited by Tibetans and other ethnic minority groups.
 

In spite of this—or perhaps because of it—the past year also saw the most public demonstrations directed at Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership since 1989’s reform protests that ended in the Tiananmen Square Massacre. As elaborated more fully in the overview below and in the chapters of the Annual Report, this combination of factors pushing toward and pulling away from the PRC’s centralizing governance system forces us to question assumptions about the durability of the repressive status quo.

Consistent with our statutory mandate to chronicle the PRC’s human rights record via our comprehensive Annual Report, maintenance of a representative political prisoner database, and critical hearings examining expert testimony, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC, or the Commission) has sought to highlight abuses by the CCP and PRC authorities on a range of subjects, including worsening persecution of religious minorities—including Muslims, Christians, Falun Gong practitioners, Tibetan Buddhists and those whose faith practices are deemed unorthodox or “evil cults” (xiejiao) by the Communist Party—and the use of forced labor, particularly of oppressed groups such as Uyghurs and North Koreans in the PRC.

The Commission has expanded its focus on the PRC’s transnational repression, directed primarily at diaspora communities in the United States and elsewhere, in particular targeting Hong Kongers, Uyghurs, and other political dissidents.

The Commission also exposed the increasing use of technology as a tool of repression, from ubiquitous surveillance cameras to the digital tools used to surveil and suppress online religious expression.

Reflecting a desire by policymakers to expand the range of tools available to promote accountability for human rights violations, an increasing focus of the Commission has been to address complicity by U.S. and foreign corporations with regard to CCP oppression. The Commission questioned Thermo Fisher Scientific over use of its DNA sequencers by police in the XUAR and Tibet, as well as the National Basketball Association’s squelching of free expression of its players—including Enes Kanter Freedom—for speech that could be seen to offend the political leadership of the PRC, such as with regard to speaking out about atrocities in the XUAR or the shrinking political space in Hong Kong.

The Commission has overseen the implementation of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA), perhaps the most significant China-focused legislation to have come out of Congress in recent decades. The UFLPA, by creating a rebuttable presumption that goods originating in the XUAR are tainted by forced labor, has put American businesses on notice about complicity in human rights abuse in the PRC and requires them to either clean up their supply chains or have their goods banned from importation. This is having a demonstrable impact on corporate behavior.

There is more that can be done to change how corporations view the risks of doing business in the PRC. As we look forward, this could be accomplished by linking access to capital markets to human rights records and directing the Securities and Exchange Commission to compel publicly traded corporations to disclose activities that intersect with human rights violations in the PRC such as forced labor, forced organ harvesting, or compliance with Hong Kong’s National Security Law.

Finally, it is critical to note the unity of the Co-Chairs and Commissioners in viewing the leadership of the PRC as systematically and systemically seeking to redefine the rules of the post–World War II international order, including and in particular with regard to human rights norms.* * * 

The CECC 2023 Annual Report table of contents and executive summary follow below.The 2023 Report and the Executive Summary (about 48 pages) may be accessed HERE:

2023 CECC Annual Report.pdf  (1.3 MB)

2023CECC Executive Summary FINAL_5124_0.pdf  (965.76 KB)

Earlier Annual Reports may be accessed from the CECC Website HERE.

"To Serve Man": 杨晓光, 陈凯华: 国家安全视角下的人工智能风险与治理 [Yang Xiaoguang and Chan Kaihua: Risks and Governance of Artificial Intelligence from the Perspective of National Security]

 

 It seems everyone must have an AI Law. Europe's AI Law appears at the vanguard, though in a way t is merely a local expression of what appears to be a developing consensus among globally interconnected leaders in the field all of whom appear to share, in broad outline, a singular vision for  taming, exploiting, and controlling AI, and for suppressing manifestations that do not conform to the orthodox vision. On the European version, see The Control of the Self and the Autonomous Virtual Collective Self: EU Parliament Approves Artificial Intelligence Act (With Links to High Level Summary); Useful Resources from the Future of Life Institute (FLI): "The AI Act Explorer". The Americans are sure to follow in one (piecemeal) way or another.  The emerging consensus represents one way of approaching the "problem" of AI (The making of an Artificial Intelligence Law Q&A with the creators of China’s expert draft AI law [人 工 智 能 示 范 法 2 . 0] (European Chinese Law Research Hub) ).

"The environment as we perceive it is our invention." (Heinz von Foerster, "On Constructing a Reality," in  Observing Systems (Seaside, CA: Intersystems pub, 1981) , p. 288).

 AI regulatory governance has always been a function of risk (eg here).  The core issue, however, has been what sort of risk would serve as the basis around which governance could be built. That, in turn, is constructed from out of choices respecting the understanding of what AI is (and isn't) and the relationship between AI and humans (my discussion here). Ethics is one perspective; human rights another; development of national productive forces is yet another (eg here). Most efforts at regulation are built on a deep foundation of risk managing structures, and these, in turn, are dependent on the identified risk and their order of importance. Among them are risk of bad data, risk to data sources (both human and institutional), risk of bad analytics, risk of misalignment between institutional objectives and analytics, and the risk of corruption, broadly understood. With generative systems comes the risk of autonomy--a risk that mimics, in part, the threat of un-managed individual autonomy within collective social systems, irrespective of the ideology of individual autonomy created for the political economic system to which it is applied.  

Tightly aligned with the notion of risk as the basic building block of governance are the parameters around which risk value are constructed. Principle among these in the West has been the hierarchically arranged regulatory trilogy of prevent-mitigate and remedy--in that order of importance.  In other places hierarchies of risk  may be different.  The identification and measurement of risk is also highly contextual and may be a function of the value systems built into governing ideologies. 

Lastly, the relationship of the State to the productive forces (including social, economic, cultural, religious and other forces) serves as the third leg of the tripod n which AI regulatory governance is built. For some the State and its apparatus must be central as a directing, coordinating and overseeing force.  For other the opposite is true, the State provides the platform and its rules but leave it to producers and consumers to drive development and use (eg here; here).  In a third variation, the State and the institutions of its productive forces develop a state supervised system of interpenetrated techno-bureaucracies that oversee the development and consumption of AI with the object of ensuring that institutionalized productive forces express and further State objectives and policies, though providing a space for them to engage in markets based realizations of permitted forms and effects of activity.

All of these trajectories are driven to a large extent by an instrumental view of the object of regulation.  The assumption appears to be that AI is an instrument, like a hammer. And like a hammer it can only be created by a human hand, and only a human hand can choose to use it to build a house or kill another human. More importantly, the human hand can be directed NOT to make the hammer, or not to use it in particular ways; the hammer has no volition, it exists only as and when it is picked up by the human hand or forged through human agency.  A very nice and comforting narrative for those in the business of managing human power relationships. And one that has driven its regulatory trajectories for the last decade. But AI can be animated--not so much Frankenstein (though that is the story that certain techno/intellectuals might like to use to scare the children into delegating authority to them) but more like a horse or a dog that has trained volition--that training--that programming--is also directed "to serve man." But who or what is bring served? And to whom? Indeed, "the emergence of algorithmic  cultures is also accompanied by the blurring of clearly defined flows, creating an atmosphere of uncertainty about the identity of interactional partners" (Jonathan Roberge and Robert Seyfert, "What are algorithmic cultures" in   Algorithmic Cultures (Routledge 2016), 1, 19)) and about the interactions themselves. 

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That last reference  is to that famous episode of the Twilight Zone Television Series (Season 3 Episode 24, 1962, based on a short story by Damon Knight (1950)); one that exposes the semiotic conundrums of the convergence of current approaches that share one thing passionately in common--the unalterable belief that humanity's relation to tech must be understood on humanity's terms--and no more. In the short story and the TV episode, a race of benevolent aliens come to Earth at a time of great need and offer them advanced technology which is translated as "To Serve Man." That suggests sincerity and eventually humans volunteer to travel to the alien home world. By the time the protagonist boards his friend reveals that the translation was literally correct but that its meaning was misunderstood--it was a cookbook.  Nothing had changed, of course; but the fundamental understanding of the tool and its use shifts as the interpretive baseline shifts. The aliens are indeed serving man, but humanity is also serving them. Each uses the other as an instrument and both understand humanity as the object, in one case to better its collective life, in the other to develop eat people. None of this, of course, disturbs the sleep of those in the business of concocting the narratives and eventually the legalities of regulatory governance and whatever manner of human oriented state supervision that now effectively defines the scope of approaches to the "regulation" of AI. And yet this is no "Twilight Zone"--and the world is not coming to an end. Rather, a sensitivity to the foundations of meaning and the power of perspective can expose its consequential effects. In this case, for example, the conundrum can be understood in a macro sense (the nightmare--AI will consume humanity), or in the micro sense (the way that humanity is centered changes the character of mutual consumption and also alters the character of what is created).

 That brings us back to the human centered perspectives that drive analysis and frame the issue and challenges of AI. While the trajectories of the framing of AI risk through regulatory governance as driven by European and American intellectuals, state officials , and the techno-administrators in both public and private organs worry about the ethics of AI, and its relationships to the rights of individuals and the overarching prerogatives of the state eg here), Chinese theorists appear to have been more robustly considering its implications for State security as the grounding perspective for an otherwise similar approach to the management of AI from an instrumentalist perspective (eg here). Both are comprehensive systems that are given their distinctive character through the application of this instrumental lens. And both illustrate the scope of approaches to the effort to the structural construction of systems of human self control in their engagement with tools they believe that they control utterly and entirely. Both are based on the presumption that like a light bulb, it only shines when the electrical circuit is switched on, and then only if it is appropriately "lamped."  (eg here).

A quite useful essay on the Chinese comprehensive security driven approach was recently published in 《国家治理》2024年第13期 ("National Governance" 2024 Issue 13):  杨晓光, 陈凯华: 国家安全视角下的人工智能风险与治理 [Yang Xiaoguang and Chan Kaihua: Risks and Governance of Artificial Intelligence from the Perspective of National Security]. It is well worth reading as a quite good analysis of the regulatory governance context for Chinese AI. In the end, however, all  States may eventually flip to a security oriented lens--contextually manifested (here, and here).  

Following the current of the times, the authors develop their analysis as a function of risk, risks that cannot be underestimated (不容小觑的风险) . They group risk into the following categories: (1) 国家竞争力风险。 (risk of national competitiveness); (2 ) 技术安全风险。 (technical and security risks); (3) 网络安全风险。(cybersecurity risks); (4) 经济社会风险。(economic and social risks); (5) 意识形态风险。(ideological risks). For these risks the authors offer structures of governance (人工智能风险的治理策略).

The only real question is the lens through which risk is understood, analyzed and aligned with objectives. Governance is the means, of course, but the lens gives it shape, purpose and structure. These are distilled at the end of the essay, through the lens of security: 

一是技术与制度双向赋能治理机制设计。面对飞速更迭的人工智能技术与复杂多样的国家治理应用场景，需加强技术应用与制度创新的协同治理，依靠制度设计引导技术方向的同时，通过技术发展帮助完善制度设计从而提升治理能力。二是加强人工智能意识形态风险的治理，大力开展人工智能内容识别民众素质教育，培养民众对人工智能获取的信息自觉进行多源验证；开发人工智能生成式内容溯源技术，高概率辨识可疑内容的来源；建立生成式人工智能信息失真检查和披露平台，把正确信息及时公示于社会。三是积极推动人工智能治理国际平台建设，参与国际规则制定。积极与国际社会合作，建立人工智能技术联盟，防范算法世界政治霸权和数据跨境安全风险；建立广泛、权威的国际对话机制，依托共建“一带一路”倡议、金砖国家、上合组织、东盟等具有国际影响力的多边机制，合理助力后发国家进步，促进人工智能全球治理成果的普惠共享；总结国内人工智能治理经验并强化国际交流，在促进互信共识的过程中，推动多方、多边主体间形成公开报告、同行评议等协同机制的标杆示范，切实推动人工智能治理原则落地。

First, the design of governance mechanisms that enable both technology and institutions. Faced with the rapidly changing artificial intelligence technology and complex and diverse national governance application scenarios, it is necessary to strengthen the coordinated governance of technology application and institutional innovation, rely on institutional design to guide the direction of technology, and help improve institutional design through technological development to enhance governance capabilities. Second, strengthen the governance of ideological risks of artificial intelligence, vigorously carry out quality education for the public on artificial intelligence content recognition, and cultivate the public's conscious multi-source verification of information obtained by artificial intelligence; develop artificial intelligence-generated content tracing technology to identify the source of suspicious content with a high probability; establish a generative artificial intelligence information distortion inspection and disclosure platform to promptly publicize correct information to the society. Third, actively promote the construction of an international platform for artificial intelligence governance and participate in the formulation of international rules. Actively cooperate with the international community to establish an artificial intelligence technology alliance to prevent algorithmic world political hegemony and cross-border data security risks; establish a broad and authoritative international dialogue mechanism, relying on the joint construction of the "Belt and Road" initiative, BRICS, SCO, ASEAN and other multilateral mechanisms with international influence, reasonably assist the progress of developing countries, and promote the universal sharing of global artificial intelligence governance results; summarize domestic artificial intelligence governance experience and strengthen international exchanges, and in the process of promoting mutual trust and consensus, promote the formation of benchmark demonstrations of collaborative mechanisms such as public reporting and peer review among multiple and multilateral entities, and effectively promote the implementation of artificial intelligence governance principles. ( 杨晓光, 陈凯华: 国家安全视角下的人工智能风险与治理 [Yang Xiaoguang and Chan Kaihua: Risks and Governance of Artificial Intelligence from the Perspective of National Security]).

For all of that, the instrumental character of AI remains consistent. The issues are only around what the hammer will look like and how it is to be wielded.  Those issues, in turn, reduce themselves to one--what are the structures of self control that collectives can impose on themselves with respect to AI. The instrumentalist presumption is useful in that respect, certainly, but it is a fiction--quite useful like all legal ideological fictions--and true enough when a collective believes profoundly in its "truth". The question is only when and how this will be transposed to the US and EU systems. Time will tell. 

The essay follows below in the original Chinese and in a crude English translation.

 

CfP 2024 Telos Paul Piccone Institute Annual Conference--China Keywords / 中国关键词

 

 

I am delighted to pass along the Call for Paper for the 2025 Telos-Paul Piccone Institute Annual Conference. The conference theme this year, China Keywords / 中国关键词, is part of the Telos-Paul Piccone Institute’s China Initiative. 

Our 2025 conference will cap the first year of this initiative, during which we launched our webinar series "China Keywords." Taking broad inspiration from Raymond Williams's Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (1976), each webinar critically explores a single concept essential for understanding contemporary Chinese social and political theory, illuminating these concepts with an eye toward non-specialists in the West, while also addressing deep contestations of interest to experts in the field. Our conference takes the name of this webinar series and seeks to build on its themes. We expect the conference to result in a special issue of Telos.

We seek proposals for individual papers and full panels focused on, or that take as their starting point, a single keyword important for critically understanding the political-theoretical dynamics of contemporary China, which include its ideologies of global order and Chinese mission. These keywords may change meaning based on where one is standing—and they are, therefore, key points of contention. Some examples include: tianxia (天下); wangdao (王道); Wealth and power (富强); The party-state; Socialism with Chinese characteristics (中国特色社会主义); Cultural Self-Confidence (文化自信); New Confucianism (新儒家); Mr. Democracy (德先生); Reform and Opening-Up (改革开放); River Elegy (河殤); Sinocentrism (中国中心主义); Neo-imperialism (新帝國主義); The China Model (中国模式); Community of Common Destiny (人类命运共同体); The New Era (新时代).

More information follows below or may be accessed from the CfP HERE.  For a PDF version of this call for papers, click here.  Also below more information on the Telos-Paul Piccone Institute China Initiative.

Pix credit here; Oracle bone from the Bīn 賓 group of diviners from period I, corresponding to the reign of King Wu Ding (late Shang dynasty)

On the Narratives of Development and Chinese Style New Quality Development--向新向优，向未来！ ——发展新质生产力大调研 [Towards Innovation, Excellence, and the Future! ——Big Survey on the Development of New Quality Productivity]

 

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("The power to fight disasters is strong to quicker raise the levels of production and life"

抗灾力强更快的提高生产和生活水平

)

新质生产力 (New quality production/productive forces) has become a critical lens through which Chinese Marxist-Leninism has developed the concept of socialist modernization for its New Era (for my consideration of the evolution of the concept and its contemporary application see eg (New Quality Development Theory: Snippets From Speeches and Writings of the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party: 习近平：开创我国高质量发展新局面 (Xi Jinping: Create a new situation for high-quality development in China)). It represents a cluster of objectives, expectations, premises, and principles around which the notion of development has itself been developed to meet the contemporary challenges of the current stage of Chinese historical development. 

新质生产力 (New quality production/productive forces) is not merely a uniquely Chinese engagement with the development of productive forces.  Rather, it it part of a much larger conversation about development that sprang in part from the post colonial movements of the 1960s, and ultimately found a more generalized expression in international instruments, among the most important instruments of which might well have been the UN Declaration on the Right to Development (04 December 1986; General Assembly resolution 41/128). Indeed, the concept and application of  新质生产力 (New quality production/productive forces) serves as a quite direct application of the UN Development Declaration's recognition that:

development is a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting therefrom (UN Declaration on the Right to Development (Preamble clause 2)

Socialist modernization, then, can be understood as an expression of this fundamental recognition, applied in conformity with the basic premises and objectives of a Marxist-Leninist ideological framework. Indeed, the Preambular clause appears to both recognize what is expressed as the general contradiction (theoretical foundations here) as well as the premise that the development of productive forces includes economic from social, cultural or political development (my comment here). All of this may bear examination through a wider lens (Robert Cover and International Law—Narrative Nudges and Nomadic Nomos).

And it has been developed to serve as a development model for other states, especially among China's Belt & Road Initiative Partners. (CPE Working Group on Empire: Part 1--Observations on Xi Jinping, Speech Delivered at the G20 Leaders' Summit on the World Economic Situation and Trade Issues--"Work Together to Create a High Quality World Economy" [习近平在二十国集团领导人峰会上关于世界经济形势和贸易问题的讲话（全文）携手共进，合力打造高质量世界经济]). As such it represents an additional voice, one quite distinctive, within the general conversations around development that have been an element of discussion in multi-lateral circles around a the work of a Special Rapporteur on the right to development (see also Special Rapporteur on the Right to Development - An introduction to the mandate).

As a critical conceptual lens for socialist modernization development of productive forces, broadly understood, was given a substantial space in the Resolution/decision of the 3rd Plenum (see here for English and Chinese versions; authoritative gloss here). Its importance has been emphasized by the efforts devoted to study aids distributed to inculcate the principles and objectives of new quality development within socialist modernization among the masses. One study aid may merit some close reading is the quite detailed study aid--entitled 【大调研，我们在行动】向新向优，向未来！——发展新质生产力大调研 (""), and published on Page 1 of 《光明日报》(the Guangming Daily"),  a news organ of the CPC, authored by the news media's research team.   

The "editor's note" gives a sense of the breadth of its coverage, its focus, and the importance of mass outreach for this project: 

 编者按   新时代，我国经济已由高速增长阶段转向高质量发展阶段。大力发展新质生产力，势在必行！  “发展新质生产力是推动高质量发展的内在要求和重要着力点”。2023年7月以来，习近平总书记多次提出发展新质生产力，并进行系统论述。  今年的《政府工作报告》，“加快发展新质生产力”被列为十大任务之首；党的二十届三中全会《决定》提出，健全因地制宜发展新质生产力体制机制。  “创新”“质优”“先进生产力”如何落实？“高科技、高效能、高质量”如何彰显？“先立后破、因地制宜、分类指导”如何践行？探索实践过程中各行各业又遇到哪些难题、积累了哪些经验？  本报调研组从新春开始就踏上了征程，历时4个月，奔赴沿海内地、岭南塞北，去感受那豪迈奋进的激情，去倾听那坚毅笃行的足音！ 

Editor's Note In the new era, China's economy has shifted from a high-speed growth stage to a high-quality development stage. It is imperative to vigorously develop new quality productivity! "Developing new quality productivity is an inherent requirement and an important focus for promoting high-quality development." Since July 2023, General Secretary Xi Jinping has repeatedly proposed the development of new quality productivity and made systematic expositions. In this year's "Government Work Report", "accelerating the development of new quality productivity" was listed as the first of the ten major tasks; the "Decision" of the Third Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee proposed to improve the system and mechanism for developing new quality productivity in accordance with local conditions. How to implement "innovation", "quality" and "advanced productivity"? How to demonstrate "high technology, high efficiency and high quality"? How to practice "establish first, then break, adapt to local conditions and provide classified guidance"? What difficulties did all walks of life encounter and what experiences did they accumulate during the exploration and practice? Our research team embarked on a journey since the Spring Festival. It took 4 months to travel to the coastal inland areas, Lingnan and the northern part of the country to feel the passion of heroic progress and listen to the footsteps of perseverance!

These are the questions, generalized, that might also impact the international conversation around development, at least within the post-colonial camp. Principal among them is the connection between development and progress. That alignment, usually taken for granted, is in need of interrogation. And yet, it is clear that "development" and "progress" are not the same thing.  Both imply direction or at least movement, to be sure, but the context  can vary significantly. One speaks to progress as an individual journey, but also that of collectives. Development can be understood as an expression of change in a specific direction or with respect to particular subjects--technology, but also culture and social organization. Development can suggest an interior journey as well, for individuals as well as collectives. Progress suggests the way that journey is assessed or understood.  Development is movement; progress is the meaning that is given to that movement.   Journeys may have a specific objective, but they need not.  And journey's ed can be quite different depending on the ideological-cultural lens through which it is understood.  In a more radical re-thinking, it may be useful to consider the merit to the aliment of development and progress and its meaning beyond notions of technological innovation that has seemed to drive the manifestation of the alignment over the last several centuries.

The Study Guide is divided in a number of sections:

引 言 (Introduction)

我们需要什么样的新质生产力 (What kind of new quality productivity do we need): 

1.实践中的答卷 ( Answers in practice): （1）新质生产力“新”在哪儿？ ; （2）“质优”体现在哪儿？ ; （3）先进生产力“先进”在何处？ ((1) What is the “new” in new quality productivity? (2) Where is the “high quality” reflected? (3) What is the “advanced” in advanced productivity?)

2.哪些误区要破除 (What misunderstandings must be eliminated); （1）新质生产力不能只是穿“新衣” ; （2）发展新质生产力不是谁的“专属”; （3）发展新质生产力不要一拥而上 ((1) New quality productivity cannot just be “new clothes” (2) Developing new quality productivity is not “exclusive” to anyone (3) Don’t rush to develop new quality productivity)

怎样发展好新质生产力 (How to well develop new quality productivity): 

1.源头之力如何蓄 (Profiting from core concepts): （1）“策源”之“源”，何以源源不断？ ; （2）从0到1，“质”变何以催生？ ; （3）1+1>2，创新合力何以形成？ ((1) How can the “source” of “strategy” be continuous? (2) From 0 to 1, how can “qualitative” change be born? (3) 1+1>2, how can innovative synergy be formed?)

2.发展之钥如何寻 (Finding the key to development): （1）从1到N，“聚变”如何实现？ ; （2）先天不足，后天怎么补？ ; （3）“旧”产业，如何焕新机？ ((1) From 1 to N, how to achieve “fusion”? (2) How to make up for congenital deficiencies? (3) How to revitalize “old” industries?)

向改革要新质生产力 (Demand reform for new quality productivity)

1.科技体制改革增活力 (Increase the vitality of science and technology systems through reform); ●减负、松绑、赋权 ; ●稳定支持、少干扰 ; ●协同、共享、优化 (●Reducing burden, loosening, empowering ●Stable support, less interference ●Collaboration, sharing, optimization)

2.产业升级跃迁强动能 (create a strong momentum for industrial leap forward); ●实验线连通生产线 ;  ●高端化、智能化、绿色化 ; ●政策呵护、着眼长远 (●Experimental lines connect production lines ●High-end, intelligent, green ●Policy protection, long-term perspective)

3.先进生产要素多集聚 (Aggregate advanced production factors): ●有为政府“有形之手” ;  ●投早、投小、投长期、投硬科技 ; ●强技能、补缺口 (●The "visible hand" of the government ●Invest early, invest small, invest long-term, invest in hard technology ●Strengthen skills, fill gaps)

结 语 (Conclusion) 

Whether or not this produces effective operational level guidance remains to be seen. Yet as a contribution to the global discussion of development, especially of development with Chinese characteristics, the study guide opens a quite useful window on intent, principles, premises and direction. The Study guide follows below. 

The Study Gide follows below in the original Chinese and in a crude English translation.

为全球人工智能治理提供中国方案 [Providing a Chinese solution for global AI governance] (1 August 2024) 中国社会科学网 (China Social Science Network) Policy Papers

 

 

 当前，全球人工智能技术快速发展，对经济社会发展和人类文明进步产生深远影响，给世界带来巨大机遇。与此同时，人工智能技术也带来难以预知的各种风险和复杂挑战。人工智能治理攸关全人类命运，是世界各国面临的共同课题。2023年10月18日，习近平主席在第三届“一带一路”国际合作高峰论坛开幕式主旨演讲中提出了“全球人工智能治理倡议“，系统回答了为什么要加强、如何加强人工智能全球治理的重大时代课题，提出了中国方案，贡献了中国智慧，为凝聚国际社会共识、推进全球共享共治发挥了积极作用。[At present, the rapid development of global artificial intelligence technology has a profound impact on economic and social development and the progress of human civilization, bringing huge opportunities to the world. At the same time, artificial intelligence technology also brings various unpredictable risks and complex challenges. Artificial intelligence governance is related to the fate of all mankind and is a common issue faced by countries around the world. On October 18, 2023, President Xi Jinping proposed the "Global Artificial Intelligence Governance Initiative" in his keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the third "Belt and Road" International Cooperation Summit Forum. He systematically answered the major contemporary issue of why and how to strengthen the global governance of artificial intelligence, proposed a Chinese solution, contributed Chinese wisdom, and played a positive role in building consensus in the international community and promoting global sharing and co-governance.] (中国社会科学网 (China Social Science Network): 为全球人工智能治理提供中国方案 [Providing a Chinese solution for global AI governance])

Every major power will have its AI law, and more generally its core premises around which AI legalities may be woven. The European Union has given itself both (EU AI Act here; Ethics guidelines for trustworthy AI here). The United States has developed its premises and remains committed to markets based guided legalities (Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights here; also here, here and here). China continues to develop its own normative framework and legalities, now in the form of a "Global Artificial Intelligence Governance Initiative" [“全球人工智能治理倡议“]. These are meant not merely to discipline the use and development of AI within a State but also to produce the normative narrative framework against which all global efforts will be undertaken. As such, each reflects the political-economic models of their origins and the structures for their application elsewhere.

As such, all three seek to project their frameworks, normative narratives, and their underlying structures of control outward. In this sense one can understand AI law and norms as effectively the framing of platforms through which  AI related operations can be coordinated and undertaken, while at the same time serving as a border/barrier that protects the integrity of one AI normative platform from others.  A system of multi-platform platform autopoiesis emerges. The object remains the same across platforms:我们重申，各国应在人工智能治理中加强信息交流和技术合作，共同做好风险防范，形成具有广泛共识的人工智能治理框架和标准规范，不断提升人工智能技术的安全性、可靠性、可控性、公平性。[We reiterate that all countries should strengthen information exchange and technical cooperation in AI governance, jointly prevent risks, form an AI governance framework and standard specifications with broad consensus, and continuously improve the security, reliability, controllability and fairness of AI technology. ]. But like the others, these systems are meant to produce the illusion of control and instrumentalization of AI when in fact they reflect  an exteriorized manifestation of efforts at self control even as the human becomes the instrument of AI based systemicities (for my extended analysis see 'The Soulful Machine, the Virtual Person, and the “Human” Condition').

To these ends China has devoted resources to the development of an A regulatory narrative with Chinese characteristics.  These are reflected in five highlighted essays:

1. 防范风险是全球人工智能治理的主要日标; 郎平; 中国社会科学院世界经济与政治研究所研究员 (Preventing risk is the main goal of global AI governance, Lang Ping, Researcher at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

2. 人工智能治理在于平衡安全与发展; 李艳; 中国现代国际关系研究院科技与网络安全研究所执行所长、研究员 (AI governance is about balancing security and development; Li Yan, Executive Director and Researcher of the Institute of Science, Technology and Cybersecurity, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations)

3. 《全球人工智能治理倡议》中的中国智慧鲁传颖; 上海国际问题研究院研究员、网络空间国际治理研究中心秘书长 (Chinese Wisdom in the Global AI Governance Initiative; Lu Chuanying; Researcher at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, Secretary-General of the Center for International Cyberspace Governance Research)

4. 《全球人工智能治理倡议》为数子公平贡献中国方案; 全燕; 广东外语外贸大学新闻与传播学院教授 ("Global AI Governance Initiative" contributes Chinese solutions to digital equity; Quan Yan; Professor of the School of Journalism and Communication, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies)

5. 全球人工智能治理倡议的世界意义; 费艳颖, 大连理工大学公共管理学院教授; 赵凯, 大连理工大学马克思主义学院博士研究生 (The global significance of the global artificial intelligence governance initiative; Fei Yanying, Professor of the School of Public Administration, Dalian University of Technology; Zhao Kai, PhD candidate of the School of Marxism, Dalian University of Technology)

Each provides useful insights into the development of the "Global Artificial Intelligence Governance Initiative" [“全球人工智能治理倡议“], which follows below in the original Chinese and in a crude English translation along with the text of the five essays identified above.

Adhere to the Party's Cultural Leadership: 《红旗文稿》2024年第14期 [Red Flag Manuscripts, Issue 14 July 2024]; Table of Contents (with Links)

 

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 文化关乎国本、国运。中国共产党历来高度重视运用文化引领前进方向、凝聚奋斗力量，团结带领全国各族人民不断以思想文化新觉醒、理论创造新成果、文化建设新成就推动党和人民的事业向前发展。[Culture is related to the foundation and destiny of a country. The Communist Party of China has always attached great importance to using culture to guide the direction of progress and to gather strength for struggle. It has united and led the people of all ethnic groups in the country to continuously promote the cause of the Party and the people with new ideological and cultural awakenings, new theoretical achievements, and new cultural construction achievements.] (　坚守党的文化领导权和中华民族的文化主体性/宋月红 [Adhere to the Party's cultural leadership and the cultural subjectivity of the Chinese nation/Song Yuehong])

《红旗文稿》“Hóngqí wéngǎo” (Red Flag Manuscripts) has published its Issue 14 (July 2024). Much of it anticipated the work product of the 3rd Plenum and its focus on a  reinvigorated socialist modernization for the New Era (here, here, here, here, and here).  The essays are useful and they suggest that even before the 3rd Plenum the notion of socialist modernization as the principal lens through which vanguard policy could be approached was already flowering. 

The Table of Contents with links (in the original Chinese) along with an English translation follow below. 

Two noteworthy essays are also included in the original and in a crude English translation. The first situates the issue essays and recommends highlighted essays (本期重点推荐 [Key recommendations of this issue]). The second includes an essay that was not on the recommended list but important nonetheless: 宋月红, 中国社会科学院当代中国研究所副所长、研究员 (Song Yuehong, Deputy Director and Researcher of the Institute of Contemporary China, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), 坚守党的文化领导权和中华民族的文化主体性 [Adhere to the Party's cultural leadership and the cultural subjectivity of the Chinese nation]. The quoted language at the start of this post gives an indication of the nature and scope of its argument. This essay is well worth reading.  It suggests the that culture, like any other productive force is both a commodity which can be projected outward into the world and inward into and as the national narrative around which and shaping all socialist productivity in traditional areas.  Its power as a productive force is significant; but so is its subjectivity. That subjectivity is understood both in its ordinary sense of focusing on the subject of production, but also in its semiotic sense of dialectical and iterative self-expression that, like other forms of production, is guided.  The essence of cultural production is then guidance--its interpretation and application of cultural objects that are signified (draw their significance form the contexts from which they emerged from out of popular expectation manifested in action)and collectively interpreted in a dialogue with and against the normative vocabulary of the guiding collective. In liberal democracy that is embedded in and reflects  the aggregation of multiple interpenetrating autonomous actions guided through market power. Chinese Leninism understands that process as a State asset the guidance of which must be embedded within the vanguard forces of the nation, in this case organized as its Communist Party.   Socialist phenomenology, that starts with the collective, then, produces and interesting pathway the course of which may be distinguished from the aggregating pathways of phenomenology that starts with the individual.

 

The Socialist Modernization of Demorcracy--李鸿忠 健全全过程人民民主制度体系（学习贯彻党的二十届三中全会精神）[Li Hongzhong, Improve the system of people's democracy throughout the whole process (Study and implement the spirit of the Third Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee)

 

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 I have been considering the advances and changes that were crystalized and made available to the masses (and Party cadres) in the aftermath of the 3rd CPC Plenum (here, here, here, and here).  With the distribution of the 3rd Plenum documents it became critical to appropriately gloss its program as well as to tease out its connection to a developing New Era theory in which Chinese Marxist-Leninism has been situated during the contemporary era of Chinese historical development (The 3rd Plenum Official Gloss--习近平：关于《中共中央关于进一步全面深化改革、推进中国式现代化的决定》的说明 [Xi Jinping: Explanation on the "Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Further Comprehensively Deepening Reforms and Promoting Chinese-style Modernization"].

The central theme of the 3rd Plenum Resolution/Decision was centered on the further development of New Era principles and understandings of socialist modernization. Its substantial evolution from the Era of Reform and Opening Up  required clarificaiton, as well as a plan for applying the contemporary expression of theory to meet the challenge of the contemporary general contradiction--unequal development and distribution of the benefits of modernization.  

To those ends it was necessary to bring into the current situaiton the idea and theory of socialist modernization, and with it, the principles and premises on which it is based.  Foremost among them has been a transformation in the explicit understanding of the scope of the productive forces that are the basic building blocks of socialist modernization, and with it the understanding of the way that State Assets and State direction of other objects of productive force might be better coordinated to meet the unified objectives described by the vanguard and enveloped in the broad notion of the Chinese Dream. To those ends, it may be emerging that productive forces, and the breadth of socialist modernization includes every aspect and function of the social, economic, cultural and political  productivity of the nation. That may include, for example,  the Communist arty itself (The Party as a State Asset and “新质生产力” (New Quality Productivity):《中国共产党纪律处分条例》 ["Regulations on Disciplinary Actions of the Communist Party of China"]. 

In a recent publication, 李鸿忠 健全全过程人民民主制度体系（学习贯彻党的二十届三中全会精神) [Li Hongzhong, Improve the system of people's democracy throughout the whole process (Study and implement the spirit of the Third Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee)], Li Hongzhong (李鸿忠) reminds us,in one of the many study aids that have been circulating since the end of the 3rd Plenum, that the political system itself is a critical element of socialist modernization, and that its asset value in contributing toward forward movement along the Socialist Path toward the realization of the objectives set out in the 3rd Plenum Resolution/Direction. (八、健全全过程人民民主制度体系 [VIII. Improve the system of whole process people's democracy]). 

After a brief introduction, the essay is divided into the following sections: (1) 一、深刻认识全过程人民民主的重大理论和实践意义 [I. Deeply understand the great theoretical and practical significance of people's democracy throughout the whole process]; (2) 二、坚持以制度体系保障和发展全过程人民民主 [II. Adhere to the system to guarantee and develop the whole process of people's democracy]; and (3) 三、充分发挥人民代表大会制度在实现我国全过程人民民主中的重要制度载体作用 [III. Give full play to the important role of the people's congress system in realizing the whole process of people's democracy in our country]. 

The third section is itself divided into five major points: (1) 一要支持和保证人民通过人民代表大会行使国家权力 [First, we must support and guarantee the people's exercise of state power through the people's congress.]; (2) 二要完善以宪法为核心的中国特色社会主义法律体系 [Second, we must improve the socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics with the Constitution as the core. ]; (3)三要健全人大对行政机关、监察机关、审判机关、检察机关监督制度。完善监督法及其实施机制，强化人大预算决算审查监督和国有资产管理监督、政府债务管理监督 [Third, we must improve the supervision system of the National People's Congress over administrative organs, supervisory organs, judicial organs and procuratorial organs. Improve the supervision law and its implementation mechanism, strengthen the review and supervision of the budget and final accounts by the National People's Congress, and the supervision of state-owned assets management and government debt management]; (4) 四要健全吸纳民意、汇集民智工作机制。总结新时代人民代表大会制度实践的成果和经验，健全人大议事规则和论证、评估、评议、听证制度，不断提高议事质量和效率 [Fourth, we must improve the working mechanism for absorbing public opinion and gathering public wisdom. Summarize the achievements and experience of the practice of the people's congress system in the new era, improve the people's congress's rules of procedure and the system of argumentation, evaluation, review and hearing, and continuously improve the quality and efficiency of deliberation]; and (5) 五要加强人大及其常委会自身建设 [Fifth, we must strengthen the self-construction of the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee].

The discussion of the NCP as an asset of socialist modernization is quite interesting and useful.  Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the essay was its focus on the NCP system. True enough, the NCP system, at both the national and provincial levels plays a critical role in the application of the leadership and guidance of the Community Party within the administrative apparatus of state and subject to its rules and practices embedded in the State Constitution. It is in this sense, certainly that theessay provides a valuable study guide for the 3rd Plenum's democracy project within the larger objectives of socialist modernization. It is a useful means of understanding the administrative role of the State andits apparatus as a core and fundamental asset and productive force the proper utilization of which is critical to the fulfillment of the objectives of the 3rd Plenum Resolution.

Nonetheless, the principles of democracy--and especially people's consultative democracy, may also lie elsewhere in ways that are not part of the essay's focus. I have suggested elsewhere that the consultative process serves as a critical space for the political realization of democracy even as the NCP system fulfills its administrative realization (see eg, “Whole Process People’s Democracy” (全过程人民民主) as Applied Constitutionalism: Linking People to Governing Institutions through Socialist Constitutional Democracy and Leninist Political Parties; also “The Flower of Democracy Blooms Brilliantly in China [中国的民主之花绚丽绽放]”:The Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Constitutional Order). It would follow that it is the process of mass consultation, and the role of the mass organizations that serve as its core, constitute both central State assets and a key element of the productive force of socialist modernization. 

The essay 李鸿忠 健全全过程人民民主制度体系（学习贯彻党的二十届三中全会精神) [Li Hongzhong, Improve the system of people's democracy throughout the whole process (Study and implement the spirit of the Third Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee)],follows below in both the original Chinese and a crude English translation.

 

Part 11 (Part II, Chapter 10: UNGP-- The State Duty to Protect Human Rights: Operational Principles—Supporting Business Respect for Human Rights in Conflict-Affected Areas (UNGP Principle ¶ 7))--Vetting the Discussion Draft: "The United Nations Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights: A Commentary

Conflict situations are one of the most difficult circumstances for human rights. ( John G. Ruggie, Business and human rights in conflict-affected regions: challenges and options towards State responses A/HRC/17/32 (27 May 2011); ¶ 4)

I have been working on the production of a comprehensive commentary of the United Nations Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights.  This is a humbling task. It follows the production of both an official commentary, written in tandem with the UNGP itself, and a collective commentary of the UNGP undertaken by some of the most distinguished students of other fields of human rights, business, and its related fields of academic  study ( The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: A Commentary (Barnali Choudhury (ed); Edward Elgar, 2023).  

I am at a point where I can start vetting portions of the draft. I hope to share those discussion drafts with a wider audience in hopes of getting feedback. In these posts I provide a short summary of the draft chapter and a link t access a 'pdf' version.  All draft chapters may be found on my Coalition for Peace & Ethics Website website at UNGP Commentary Page HERE.

Part I (On the Making of the UNGP), organized in five chapters, introduced the reader to the background, context, and sources that contributed to the drafting and eventual endorsement of the UNGP. Parts II through V then consider in detail the text and interpretation of the substantive provisions of the UNGP. Part II considered the UNGP's General Principles; Part III examines the State duty to protect human rights (UNGP Principles 1-10); Part IV then addresses commentary to the corporate responsibility to respect human rights (UNGP Principles 11-24); and Part V considers the remedial principles (UNGP Principles 25-31). 

 

The UNGP divides the principles for each of these Pillars into "foundational" and "operational" principles.  The former reflects the conceptual framework for each of the Pillars developed through the focus on the principled part of principled pragmatism exploration of the SRSG's initial mandate and culminating in the SRSG's 2008 Reports; the latter reflects the second mandate's direction to operationalize the conceptual framework, which focused on the pragmatism part of principled pragmatism that drove the SRSG's work throughout the mandates. The operational principles are then subdivided into a number of different categories of focus. 

 This Post continues the exploration of the State duty to protect human rights.  In a prior post the two foundational principles (UNGP Principles 1 and 2) were examined (see here). In this post we start consideration of the the first of the four sets of functionally differentiated operational principles into which the operational principles of the State duty to protect is divided. These include “General State Regulatory and Policy Functions,” (UNGP Principle 3); “The State-Business Nexus;” (UNGP Principles 4-6); “Supporting Respect for Human Rights in Conflict-Affected Areas,” (UNGP Principle 7); and “Ensuring Policy Coherence,” (UNGP Principles 8-10). 

 

 Chapter 10's focus is on UNGP Principle 7, Supporting Business Respect for Human Rights in Conflict-Affected Areas. The challenge is straightforward:

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But what happens when one of the fundamental ordering premises of that perception universe disappears? That, in effect, is the challenge that serves as the central core and the purpose of UNGP Principle 7—what happens when the State disappears from the context in which the State is the central element in the articulation and application of the State duty within a territory? This Chapter 10, and with respect to UNGP Principle 7, one speaks more specifically to the semiotics of perception—the constitution of key objects (states, business entities, humans), their significance (as a junction of duty, responsibility of actors), and collective meaning (human rights). And one speaks more specifically still to the way in which the UNGP may be required to operate where the State disappears.

*       *       *

The UNGP are founded on the core premises of a smoothly operating set of institutions in the public and the private spheres. In the public sphere order is manifested by the thick institutionalization of the State (as concept, norm and action). These are tasked with the duty of maintaining order within normative guardrails within their territories and jurisdictions, and to arrange their affairs with other like constituted States for the efficient functioning of all States. For every territory there is a State, and every State sis expected to operate in broadly similar ways—at least with respect to the good order of the spaces over which they are entitled to exercise authority. In the private sector, business enterprises are meant to operate along similar lines. Each is expected to maintain the good order of their internal operations consistent with the normative rules under which they are expected to ac They comply with law, of course, but also develop thick systems of expectations that order their operations and relations with other stakeholders (labor, consumer, and the like) in ways that make it possible to retain the good order of constant iterations of single transactions that in the aggregate constitute markets and that rationalize the development and deployment of a State’s productive forces (however that is understood).

Within these premises it is possible to develop the UNGP. The core expectation around which they are built—and which is built into the UNGP General Principles—is that Sates will undertake certain duties and business certain responsibilities. Together, duty and responsibility of appropriately functioning States and enterprises will flesh out the entirety of the space within which it is possible to order the relationships of economic production and human rights, and divide those duties and responsibilities among States and enterprises. Where the fundamental assumption of well functioning States is removed—where States disappear, in whole or in part—from the territories over which they exercise authority, then the UNGP system is itself threatened. The disappearance of States—their absence from the places in which they undertake a critical role, then, becomes a fundamental threat to the good order of the UNGP.

UNGP Principle 7 seeks to plug the hole in the system when the State disappears. However, it is a task only partially undertaken. The Principle does not confront the issue of the disappearance of the State except in the context of conflict affected areas—a term that is both highly ambiguous and narrow, The Principle does not consider the broad range of human rights abuse but only the heightened risk of gross huma rights abuse. The principle of severity thus brought to bear does not so much order the timing of responses as much as it creates a cut off of sorts—in conflict affected areas heightened risks of gross human rights violations trigger substantial additional expectations from States that may have some connection with conflicts affected areas or with the activities undertaken in them. For everything else—nothing additional. The Principle does not impose mandatory measures, but only expectations, irrespective of the international human rights legal obligations that may be implicated. Many of the terms and conditions, and most of the more specifically detailed expectations contain substantial points of ambiguity. And the connection between positive and negative measures, in a Principle that is at best discretionary, leaves questions unanswered.

Nonetheless, as a statement of a minimum baseline set of expectations imposed on home and neighboring States, as well as on host States to the extent they have not entirely disappeared from conflicts affected areas, marks a substantial effort to protect the integrity of the UNGP system as a whole. And it serves as a well-constructed foundation on which States may order their own interventions in situations, in accordance with their own values and capacity, subject of course to their international legal obligations, and build on them together to develop the insights and expectations set out in the Principle. UNGP Principle 7 represents an able application of the SRSG’s principled pragmatism approach,[1] and one that was meticulously detailed in the 2011 Report on Conflict Regions that was distributed at the time of the endorsement of the UNGP.[2] UNGP Principle 7, then, reflects the underlying challenge for the self-management of the State system itself on the good operation of which the UNGP itself relies. In the absence of that there is only pragmatism in the service of principle: as the SRSG noted in that 2011 Report on Conflict Regions, “Participating States were not expected to reach a consensus or endorse any position, but to contribute to a policy discussion that the Special Representative could draw upon in making his own recommendations contained in the present report.”

The Chapter 10 discussion draft may be accessed directly HERE (where revisions earlier chapters may also be accessed). The text of the draft of Chapter 10 as of the time of this posting also follows below along with its table of contents.

 

 

10.1 Text of the General Principles

10.2 The Signification of the State Duty to protect human rights in the absence of the State

10.3. General Principles: Commentary on Text

                  10.3.1.The “Operational” Clause

                  10.3.2. The “Engaging” Clause

                  10.3.3.The “Providing” Clause

10.3.4 The “Denying” Clause

10.3.5 The “Ensuring” Clause

10.4 Official Commentary

10.5 UNGP Principle 7: Other Authoritative Interpretation/Commentary

                  10.5.1 The Travaux Préparatoire and the 2010 Draft UNGP

                  10.5.2 The Pre-Mandate Texts and the Signification of the UNGP  Through its General Principles

10.6 Conclusion

 

Brief Reflections on the Release of the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, "2024 Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment"

 

 The U.S. Army War College, through its Strategic Studies Institute, publishes an annual estimate of the strategic security environment in which the U.S. finds itself.  Ordinarily I don't bother passing these along--the usual crowd of those with a use for this ordinarily know when and how to get their copy. This, though, is an interesting year. Trajectories of actions and the ending point of contradictions and end points all point to the substantial possibility that all sorts of people and the institutions they control may, for a variety of reasons, believe that now may be the time to take action because, in their calculus--however wrongheaded--the risk reward ratios are at their apex, and in their favor. When multiple people/institutions believe this it is likely that perhaps up to half will get it very wrong.  But these people/institutions tend to be risk controllers; the are not risk bearers.  The polity is.

It is for that reason that the Army War College Strategic Studies Institute's 2024 Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment, published 24 July 2024 may be of particular interest to many who don't ordinarily have little interest in the security environment of which many may be oblivious as they go about their lives. As in past years, its primary objective is internal--it is "designed to guide the collective defense community to research and write about critical national security challenges." (Introduction). 

Its description lays out the framework of analysis through the lens of the role of the Army within the broader strategic objectives:

Description

The 2024 Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment sets the foundation for cutting-edge research to understand the ever-evolving security environment domestically and internationally. Competition with the People’s Republic of China continues to dominate the strategic narrative, with global implications for US national interests. The Russia-Ukraine War and the deteriorating situation in the Middle East, however, present immediate and political challenges that will undoubtedly influence US military efforts abroad. At the same time, the United States faces domestic challenges in navigating civil-military relations, and the Army is working diligently to overcome institutional hurdles. The United States published its first National Defense Industry Strategy in January 2024, focusing on resilient supply chains, workforce readiness, flexible acquisition, and economic deterrence. Additionally, the Army released the 2024 white paper “Army Force Structure Transformation,” which lays the groundwork for creating new capabilities, initiates new recruitment modernization efforts, and justifies challenging personnel reductions across the force. Finally, the prevalence of competition in new and maturing arenas (such as space and the polar regions) may impact a delicate balance among the great powers. This balance, and the potential relative advantage the United States maintains over its adversaries, is further challenged by emerging technologies, many of which have yet to realize their impact on defense operations.

A mobile-friendly version of the Annual Estimate can be found here.

 That, in turn, may  reflect a service-specific application of relevant overall themes and thematic structures from the National Security Strategy (NDS) (October 2022) (on NSS, its legal basis, and prior iterations see here), and with it, its talk about "inflection points." (NSS, J. Biden, Intro, p. 1).

So, the United States will continue to defend democracy around the world, even as we continue to do the work at home to better live up to the idea of America enshrined in our founding documents. . . This is a 360-degree strategy grounded in the world as it is today, laying out the future we seek, and providing a roadmap for how we will achieve it. None of this will be easy or without setbacks. But I am more confident than ever that the United States has everything we need to win the competition for the 21st century. We emerge stronger from every crisis. There is nothing beyond our capacity. We can do this—for our future and for the world. (Ibid., p. 2).

 Also relevant is strategy document: The National Defense Industrial Strategy (NDIS): Enabling a Modernized Defense Industrial Ecosystem (2023; released January 2024) It "offers a strategic vision to coordinate and prioritize actions to build a modernized defense industrial ecosystem that is fully aligned with the NDS. It also calls for sustained collaboration and cooperation between the entire U.S. government, private industry, and our Allies and partners abroad." (Fact Sheet: National Defense Industrial Strategy). These are organized into four "strategic priorities": (1) resilient supply chains; (2) workforce readiness; (3) flexible acquisition; and (4) economic deterrence. The strategy is grounded on a core premise: "A robust and resilient industrial base provides the enduring foundation for military advantage." (NDIS, supra, p. 7). To that end it is necessary to rethink the old suspicion about the military-industrial complex expressed by President Eisenhower in his 1961 Farewell Address, and replace it with a compliance and accountability based system of mutual interpenetration. 

The NDS showed that building enduring industrial advantages through a resilient defense
ecosystem is imperative, to include supporting our allies and partners with key capabilities to
strengthen integrated deterrence. * * * Achieving our priorities depends on the numerous stakeholders in national security and the defense industry – executive branch departments and agencies, government owned facilities, traditional defense contractors, non-traditional companies, and our global Allies and partners—to effectively collaborate in surmounting the complex known and unknown technical, manufacturing, and logistical challenges. (NDIS, ¶¶ 1.1.1; 1.1.2).

This ordering premise is picked up in important ways in the the 2024 Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment. "Modern war will increasingly demand the integration of civilian and military capabilities—from artificial intelligence (AI) to cyber operations to space to a re-invigoration of the defense industrial base." (2024 Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment; p. 36). To these ends a robust system of interlocking public and private techno-bureaucracies will be necessary. These mirror those already being constructed to oversee the relationship between the deployment of productive forces and human rights based state management. (See here, here, here, and here).  

And, indeed, these strategic documents begin to reveal just what lies on the other side of the inflection point to which President Biden pointed in the 2022 National Security Strategy, though it is unlikely that the process was organic and responsive rather than active and guided. In any case here the United States finds itself: in a world in which the premises of the "military-industrial complex" has given way, decisively, to one grounded in the necessity of both inter-penetration and solidity between military and industrial complexes. The question for the emerging age also changes, as do the challenges: how does one build a guiding framework of compliance and accountability that permits an effective engagement with the emerging forms and practices of combat/competition/conflict (or whatever other linguistic trope will be invented to describe whatever it is that is to be undertaken by naming it appropriately while preserving the values and practices for which these technologies, relationships, and undertakings are "activated"--that is a hard task, made more interesting within liberal democratic regimes precisely because, as the 2024 Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment reminds its readers (p. 21): "The hardening of ideological positions in the United States has led to deep political and cultural divides that the election will likely not heal, presenting a danger as significant as any external threat."  Both remain a challenge:

“Today, senior military leaders struggle to articulate the ways in which the military can integrate AI, machine learning techniques, and other algorithms into war waging. As a result, senior military leaders depend upon actors in private industry to develop both strategies and solutions—yet private-industry actors are not steeped in professional ethics and norms as military officers are over the course of their careers. (Ibid, pp.36-37).

The Introduction follows below along with the Fact Sheet: National Defense Industrial Strategy, and a reminder of the deeper challenges for the new civilian military order reflected in the warnings of an age of historical development that is quickly receding into history--that portion of President Eisenhower's Address on the military-industrial complex.

The inflection point noted by President Biden in the 2022 NDS appears to have come and gone. One must deal with the new realities; and these are strikingly dissimilar from the foundations of the organization of national defense that were at the core of U.S. policy in the now rapidly receding so-called Post War Era. A significant  challenge for the military  in its role of protecting the American people from foreign threats (whether they are manifested within or beyond the territories and jurisdiction of the United States), then may be in the way in which it can (1) develop an appropriate conception of the normative framework, the institutional structural system, and the compliance-assessment-accountability structures of the emerging civilian-military interpenetrated techno-bureaucracies, increasingly assisted by technology (and eventually autonomously generative tech) (eg here on the Chinese normative basis HERE);  (2) attempt to develop multi-level systems for objectives based quality control, international transparency, coordination, assessment, and accountability (eg HERE); (3) re-imagine accountability itself must be understood as a multi-vector project including the accountability of accountability measures (HERE; HERE) .