Monday, January 26, 2026

Informational Program: "Student Loans: How to Pay Off Your Student Debt"


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I am delighted to pass along this announcement from my former student and colleague James Korman.

On Tuesday, February 3, 2026, from 4:00-5:00 PM ET, I am co-hosting an engaging webinar titled "Student Loans: How to Pay Off Your Student Debt." This session is designed specifically for students, faculty, staff, and administrators alike that are navigating the critical challenge of student loan management.

Why This Webinar Matters
Student debt affects nearly 43 million Americans, yet many individuals receive limited guidance on repayment strategies. This webinar fills that gap by providing actionable, practical guidance on understanding, prioritizing, and accelerating student loan repayment.

What We'll Cover
Understanding different student loan types and repayment options
Proven strategies for prioritizing and accelerating repayment
Common pitfalls that derail progress—and how to avoid them
Balancing student loan repayment with other financial goals

 About the Presenters

James Korman, Ph.D. | Financial Advisor, Prudential Advisors
PhD from University of Delaware in Political Science & International Relations
Adjunct Professor of Comparative Politics (Lafayette College, Fall 2025–Spring 2026) | Teaching/Leadership Experience across 4 Different Universities
5+ years of experience mentoring students on career development and translating academic knowledge into real-world applications
Passionate about empowering students, administrators, faculty, and academic staff to make informed financial decisions

David Montemurro, ChFC®, CLU® | Financial Advisor, Prudential Advisors
Chartered Financial Consultant with over 30+ years’ experience in the Financial Services Industry
Robust knowledge on comprehensive financial planning
Regional Director and proven industry leaderInvitation
I'd like to invite your students and colleagues to attend this free, educational session.

Registration details: Student Loans: How to Pay Off Your Student Debt | Meeting-Join | Microsoft Teams (Click on the hyperlink to register)




Sunday, January 25, 2026

Davos Part 5: Reflections on Palabras del Presidente de la Nación Javier Milei en el Foro Económico de Davos 2026 [Argentine President Javier Milei's Remarks at Davos 2026]]

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Por lo tanto, esto implicará que - si queremos salir de nuestro oscuro presente - debemos volver a inspirarnos en la filosofía griega, abrazar el derecho romano y retornar a los valores judeocristianos, los cuales nos permitirán salvar a Occidente. Gran parte de los conflictos humanos surgen de una fallida interrelación entre el derecho natural y el derecho positivo. Así, el derecho natural es la ley que debe regir al ser humano porque se adecua a su naturaleza, y, por lo tanto, es justo en sentido universal. Es una ley común para todos los hombres porque es intrínseca a su esencia y, por lo tanto, inmodificable e inmutable. [Therefore, this implies that—if we want to escape our dark present—we must once again draw inspiration from Greek philosophy, embrace Roman law, and return to Judeo-Christian values, which will allow us to save the West. Much of human conflict arises from a flawed interplay between natural law and positive law. Natural law is the law that should govern human beings because it conforms to their nature and is therefore just in a universal sense. It is a law common to all people because it is intrinsic to their essence and, therefore, unchangeable and immutable.]

Por otra parte, el derecho positivo es el que redactan los hombres para seguir a su conveniencia. De este modo, cuando la ley positiva está en consonancia con la ley natural habrá justicia. En su defecto, será legal, pero no será legítima. En función de ello se reconocen dos derechos fundamentales: los derechos a la vida y a la libertad. El hombre nace vivo y nace libre y tiene derecho a conservar estos atributos de la naturaleza. Además, tiene derecho a que sus semejantes se lo respeten, en orden de buscar su propia felicidad, que es el fin al que tiende todo hombre. [On the other hand, positive law is the law that people create to suit their own convenience. Thus, when positive law is in harmony with natural law, there will be justice. Otherwise, it will be legal, but not legitimate. Based on this, two fundamental rights are recognized: the rights to life and liberty. Human beings are born alive and free, and they have the right to preserve these attributes of nature. Furthermore, they have the right to have these rights respected by their fellow human beings, in order to pursue their own happiness, which is the ultimate goal of every person.] (President Javier Milei, Palabras del Presidente Javier Milei en el Foro Económico de Davos 2026).



In many ways the geography of the America's mirrors its semiotic terrains. That is, territorial and physical geography aligns with the geographies of meaning and understanding the significance of the spaces they occupy. Argentina and Canada serve as the territorial bookends of the Americas--geographically and now semiotically (in terms of the cages from within which they can look out and order the world around them. At Davos in 2026, Argentina and Canada provided a glimpse of the cognitive spaces that separate the two ends of the Americas by almost as much of a distance as the physical terrains that separate them. Their cognitive and territorial separation on opposite side of the North-South borderlands of the Americas appeared at Davos to serve as the bookends of the signification of the fracture, no longer hidden behind the disapprobation and rhortical sidestepping of that portion of the global elites heavily invested in the old post 1945 global order as refashioned in their own image after 1989, of the emerging post-global ordering in the old liberal democratic and liberal democratic post-colonial world, at least as it has been manifested in the Americas. While  Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney provided the theoretical face, for middle powers, of the political line that is emerging as a European choice set described by EU President Ursula von der Leyen, Argentine President Javier Milei, long aligned with the conceptual underpinnings of the American fundamental political line, provided the other side of that theoretical and operational in his Davos remarks--Palabras del Presidente Javier Milei en el Foro Económico de Davos 2026 [Remarks by President Javier Milei at the Davos Economic Forum 2026]. 

 In many ways, and like the remarks of the Canadian Prime Minister, the remarks are both warning, lecture, assessment, analysis, and the pathways that are open contingent on the choices that are now available. Where the Canadian Prime Minister speaks the language of geo-politics and socio-economics, the Argentine President goes back to the old foundations of late Imperial Roman law/norm--to the conceptual cage that, too late for them. summed up the cognitive cages and structures that, by some miracle survived  into modernity. President Milei gives us the Institutes, not of John Calvin of Geneva but of the Roman-Byzantine Emperor Justinian, he draws on the old knowledge of the Greeks, and the normative values received from the progeny of the Children of Abraham, now scattered all about. These are deployed both to unmask, as he would see it, the fundamental contradictions of the ancient cognitive cages of the West (as he calls it) when they are refashioned within the structures and that last of the globe's Abrahamic religions--Marxism expressed through the Pauline structures of Lenin's variations on the forms of magisterium divided, like the estate of Isaac, Abraham's son (putting the patrimony of Ishmael aside for the moment), between a Soviet Esau and its degenerated (distilled?) forms of modernity in the West, and an Asian Jacob climbing the ladder of socialist modernization and wrestling with the Angel of the Lord manifested as contradiction. All of this is nicely encapsulayed in that discursive high point of President Milei's remarks quoted above. 

Thoughthe remarks touch on and draw far back into the wells of knowledge and debate in the West in what has came to be understood as a sort of knowledge zoo divided by epistemological taxonomies that say more about us than about the immunatbility of these classifications, it is driven foreard by analogy and metaphor:  

Por último, quiero dejarles una reflexión sobre la Parashá de esta semana. La Parashá Bo escribe, ese momento en que Moisés se enfrenta al faraón, símbolo del poder opresor del Estado, para advertirle que si no liberaba el pueblo hebreo caerían sobre Egipto las últimas tres plagas. Ante la negativa del faraón llegó la plaga de las langostas, la cual significa la hambruna. Luego, llegó la plaga de la oscuridad, la cual significa la pérdida de claridad para la toma de decisiones. Por último, la plaga de la muerte de los primogénitos, lo cual deja de manifiesto el destino de una sociedad que niega la libertad; la analogía con lo que ocurre hoy en Occidente es tremendamente clara. [Finally, I want to leave you with a reflection on this week's Torah portion. The Parashah Bo describes the moment when Moses confronts Pharaoh, a symbol of the oppressive power of the state, to warn him that if he did not free the Hebrew people, the last three plagues would fall upon Egypt. Upon Pharaoh's refusal, the plague of locusts arrived, signifying famine. Then came the plague of darkness, representing the loss of clarity in decision-making. Finally, the plague of the death of the firstborn, which reveals the fate of a society that denies freedom; the analogy with what is happening in the West today is tremendously clear. ] (Palabras del Presidente Javier Milei en el Foro Económico de Davos 2026 )

But then, in quite another fashion, were the remarks of the Canadian Prime Minister. Like Canada and Argentina, these become remarks take on the character of signified objects, the territory, the territories of rationality, the framing of reality and the human in it, that, as these remarks suggest, point to a very long conversation that  is perhaps more notable for its periodic rupturing than for any sort of seamless and steady movement (progress) from some where to another. Either way one fall back to the operatic; perhaps best summed up in the staging, action and text of the end of the first Act of Don Giovanni when Don Giovanni welcomes Donna Anna, Donna Elvira and Don Ottavio to a party in which he plans to seduce Zerlina and which they plan to prevent: È aperto a tutti quanti, Viva la libertà! [(Everyone is welcome [to our party]; long live freedom [liberty]] (Mozart Don Giovanni Finale Act 1; libretto here). The text and its context, written at the very precipice from off of which the ancien regime was about to be thrown, captures text sub-and con-text that drives the current situaiton. 

The point here is not to choose a side and argue for it or against the other, it is rather to expose the contours and stances, the textual, visual, and oral manifestations of that choice as presented for a wider public consumption for an analytics of the pathways that those with the power to do so are asserting tremendous effort to shift out from under the masses the fundamental premises on the basis of which the world is ordered, facts are identified and valued, and conditions and actions may be assessed as against the ideal world that those basic premises suggest. The global community will have its orthodoxies; the structures of stability and the protection against chaos will be built and sometimes ruthlessly enforced. What changes is the way each of these word concepts are understood, and thus understood manifested in the stream of activity that then constitutes authoritative and legitimate societal relations--at least for those with the power to enforce them, who believe in them, who have internalized them, and who can by the power of their ability to create a simulacra of the ideal society and its mores, project these down to those willing to embrace them.   

 President Milei's remarks in the original Spanish and in an English translation, follow below.  The original as published on the website of the President of Argentina, may be accessed here: Palabras del Presidente Javier Milei en el Foro Económico de Davos 2026.

 

Pix credit here Mozart Don Giovanni Finale Act 1; libretto here

The Davos speeches considered for 2026 include the following:

1. Davos 2026 Part 1--Remarks of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney

2. Davos 2026 Part 2--Remarks of U.S. President Donald Trump

3. Davos 2026 Part 3--Remarks of  China's Vice Premier He Lifeng

4. Davos 2026 Part 4-- Remarks of EU President Ursula von der Leyen

5. Davos 2026 Part 5-- Remarks of Argentina President Javier Milei

6. Davos 2026 Part 6--Address by the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy



 

Saturday, January 24, 2026

Davos 2026 Part 4: Reflections on the Address of President Ursula von der Leyen


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But the truth is also that we will only be able to capitalise on this opportunity if
we recognise that this change is permanent. Of course, nostalgia is part of our human story. But
nostalgia will not bring back the old order. And playing for time – and hoping for things to revert soon
– will not fix the structural dependencies we have. So my point is: If this change is permanent, then
Europe must change permanently too. It is time to seize this opportunity and build a new independent
Europe. (Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum
Davos, 20 January 2026)

Ursula von der Leyen is no stranger to the WEF; nor has she been reluctant to strongly describe a vision for Europe and European leadership that leverages both its culture and practices as they have emerged after 1945. In 2024, von der Leyen offered trust in a techno-bureaucracy guiding a rationalized process embedding normatively infused values. This techno-bureaucracy interlinked with apparatus of political, social and economic collectives within an accountability based system of oversight and compliance grounded in the objective of realizing public policy (President von der Leyen establishes fourteen Project Groups to deliver on political priorities). In 2025 President von der Leyen offered both a defense of the European project and a rationale for its critical importance for the global community. t is this project--the European vision for ordering itself and at least that potion of the world (or its pathways to production)--which werechallenged internally by key stakeholders, and externally by a trio of threats. The first is that of the United States which has embarked far more aggressively on a different path toward the management of economic and social relations. The second is that of the Chinese whose own Marxist-Leninist world view threatens the breadth of the influence of Europe and its normative projects both on the European periphery and along its production chains. And the third is  the threat that Russia poses to and as Europe (Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum).

In 20206, President von der Leyen  shifts gears entirely (Special Address by President von der Leyen). 2026 has proven to be especially challenging for Europe, or better, for the idea of Europe in the world and as a driving force, a vanguard element, of the progress of social relations within the community of nations and in globalization. And like Canada's Prime Minister, President von der Leyen looks at the state of the global community, at its fracture; like the Canadian Prime Minister President von der Leyen now seeks not accommodation, not a defense of its structures. She seeks independence for Europe. There are significant parallels between the remarks of President von der Leyen and that of Canadian Prime Minister Carney. But where the Canadian Prime Minister spoke to the role of middle powers in fashioning a sort of rump miltilateral rules based ordering in a world that is permanently fractures in order to jump start a post-global Bandung Conference ordering, President von der Leyen speaks with the ambition of a higher level party, and one with aspirations to ascend further in the post-global pecking order. 

To those ends President von der Leyen would protect the territorial integrity of Europe--at least that part of Europe that is not currently subject to Russian territorial claims (with respect to which the response is more nuanced). "First principle: full solidarity with Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark. The sovereignty and integrity of their territory is non-negotiable. Second, we are working on a massive European investment surge in Greenland." (Special Address by President von der Leyen). But that is bound up in the "new" security multilateralism that President von der Leyen advances, but now wrapped within the emerging dominant discourse of sovereignty: "I believe Europe needs to adjust to the new security architecture and realities that we are now facing. This is why Europe is preparing its own security strategy, which we plan to publish later this year. As part of this, we are upgrading our Arctic strategy too. And at the heart of this will be the fundamental principle: It is for sovereign people to decide their own future." (Ibid.). Within this context, and mirroring the much freer language of President Trump in his address, President von der Leyen emphasizes that Europe considers "the people of the United States not just our allies, but our friends." (Ibid.), and by implication, not its leaders. ("Engaging in dialogue with our friends and partners, also with adversaries if necessary. The point is that the world has changed permanently. And we need to change with it").  And as for Russia, challenges both to the Russians and the United States:

 Above all, it reaffirms Europe's unwavering commitment to the security, defence, and European future of Ukraine. In parallel, we decided to permanently immobilise the Russian assets and that we reserve the right to make use of them. This should serve as a stark reminder to Russia. And a message to the world: Europe will always stand with Ukraine. Until there is a just and lasting peace. (Special Address by President von der Leyen)

Whether this is possible remains to be seen, but a stance is the first step, and funding that stance the second.  

Beyond that President von der Leyen speaks to independence "On partnerships. On prosperity. And
security." (Ibid). She would also protect and enhance the economic independence of Europe--and here from the two hungry predators at Europe's door--the United States and China. President von der Leyen also describes an ambitious plan to carve out its own advantaged trading areas in Latin America, South Asia and Africa. "This agreement sends a powerful message to the world. That we are choosing fair trade over tariffs. Partnership over isolation. Sustainability over exploitation. And that we are serious about de-risking our economies and diversifying our supply chains." (Special Address by President von der Leyen). 

President von der Leyen describes the reconstruction of the administration of Europe, especially with respect to its economic life; these include the deepening of EU wide markets for enterprise organization, investment and capital. "Focal point number one is to create a conducive and predictable regulatory environment." (Ibid.). That involves creating a singular production platform across Europe.

Ultimately, we need a system where companies can do business and raise financing seamlessly across Europe – just as easily as in uniform markets like the US or China. If we get this right – and if we move fast enough – this will not only help EU companies grow. But it will attract investment from across the world. (Special Address by President von der Leyen). 

Related to this initiative is the second focus for a renewed and more productive Europe.  This second focus targets investment and capital. "We are now building the Savings and Investment Union. We need a large-scale, deep and liquid capital market that attracts a wide range of investors. This will allow businesses to find the funding they need – including equity – at lower cost here in Europe." (Ibid.). 

President von der Leyen then suggests the third focus--cheap and sustainable energy. "Third priority: building an interconnected and affordable energy market – a true energy union. Energy is a chokepoint – for both companies and households.  "This is our Affordable Energy Action Plan. For example, we are investing massively in our energy security and independence, with interconnectors and grids – this is for the homegrown energies that we are trying to promote as much as possible, nuclear and renewables. To bring down prices and cut dependencies" (Ibid.).

Europe, it seems, like the United States, is looking forward to a period of national rejuvenation in ways that may it more attractive to economic activity that tends to shy away, and perhaps, in the process retain its capacity for competitive innovation. Lastly, President von der Leyen notes, Europe must move from a focus on sustainable to sustainable and affordable energy. That is a tall order indeed and one that will require a bit of introspection among the elites that drive regulatory approaches in the Member States and within the EU bureaucracy.  

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 The Davos speeches considered for 2026 include the following:

1. Davos 2026 Part 1--Remarks of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney

2. Davos 2026 Part 2--Remarks of U.S. President Donald Trump

3. Davos 2026 Part 3--Remarks of  China's Vice Premier He Lifeng

4. Davos 2026 Part 4-- Remarks of EU President Ursula von der Leyen

5. Davos 2026 Part 5-- Remarks of Argentina President Javier Milei

6. Davos 2026 Part 6--Address by the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy



Fleshing Out the America First Framework as Peace Through Strength Projections: Brief Reflections on the 2026 National Defense Strategy (US Department of War January 2026)

 


 

On 23 January 2026, the Department of War released its 2026 National Defense Strategy document, subtitled "Restoring Peace Through Strength for a New Golden Age of America." It is the public face of what is likely to be (hopefully anyway) a far more detailed elaboration of the Republic's fundamental political line with respect to military matters, one that embeds the core premises of the Republic's New Era principal objectives--moving forward along the American Path toward the realization of a new golden age by ensuring that the Republic  realizes its strategy of peace through strength. .

Together with the  National Security Strategy of the United States for 2025 (November 2025) (discussed here: America First as the Essence of National Security and the American Post-Colonial 'Howl': Reflections on the 2025 National Security Strategy of the United States (2025)) and the U.S. Department of State Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2026-2030 (January 2026)  discussed here: Reflections on the Normative-Institutional Architecture of America First: U.S. State Department "Agency Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2026-2030, the 2026 National Defense Strategy rounds out the elaboration of the America First basic political line of the Republic when it comes to the role and focus of the Republic's external relations with its (re) focus on the general contradiction of the Republic in its "new era of historical development" from the now foundational orienting lens of the protection and elaboration of a transactional ordering framework--the fundamental need of ensuring peace (the territorial space of a transactional universe projected outward and directed inward) for the appropriate forward movement along the path to the realization of the Republic's rebirth in its new golden age. 

Pix credit here,Cauldrons (Ding), Eastern Zhou to Han dynasty (770-221 BCE) first two years of the Qin dynasty, but by that point ding were already established symbols of the power bestowed to rulers by the mandate of heaven. Only the emperor could use nine ding together in ritual offerings. Lords were allowed seven, and so on down to low-ranking officials who could only use one ding for offerings. The greater importance placed by Zhou emperors on food rather than wine further increased the importance of ding, which were already the preeminent bronze ritual vessel for food. Around the middle of the Zhou, a system was developed to use ding to identify noble classes. These objects became canvases for epigraphs which tell modern researchers a great deal about Zhou dynastic life. In many cases high ranking officials used ding to record special occasions by casting Chinese characters directly onto the bronze vessels.

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The cauldron of Zhou dynasty China served as the essential incarnation of the State, its organization, and the space into which productive forces were gathered symbolically and on the face of which the basic or fundamental political line as then understood could be etched, engraved, read, and undertaken . Modern society has done away with traditional means of ritual invocations of authority and with it the semiotic power of the imaginaries of the cauldron (鼎 Ding). The idea remains current, and in traditions like West African Ifa it serves as the core metaphor for understanding the way structures within which all of the human is ordered and contained (eg., Odu Òfúnmeji "everything is contained within the calabash" (Ninu igbá naa ni)). The images and signification of these ritual objects assume modern form in the documents that are meant to contain "everything"--in this case the State and the state of its societal relations. The concepts are particularly apt when describing the three documents-- National Security Strategy of the United States for 2025 (November 2025) , Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2026-2030 (January 2026), and the 2026 National Defense Strategy are the three essential legs of the cauldron of state, of the calabash, that together elaborates and signified the America First initiative, and from them, the conceptual structures that then bind together the core domestic policies of the American new era " (the great national renewal that will usher in a new golden age") and its external projection (peace through strength). 

As analyzed by the US Naval Institute staff in its own consideration of the 2026 National Defense Strategy with reference to their own mission, the core normative elements of the 2026 NDS can be divided into three parts: (1) defend the U.S. homeland first; (2) Indio-Pacific  peace through strength rather than confrontation and focused on access not territory; (3) burden sharing among the Republic's allies; and (4) align national defense with national reindustrialization (traditional industries) and innovative production (tech and AI based development) (2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy, U.S. Naval Institute Staff (January 24, 2026 9:28 AM)). All of this is intimately tied to the America First superstructure and its national security narrative/normative overlay. They also interweave the core of domestic policy with its expression as national security on the one hand, and international relations on the other. These serve as the core 4 lines of effort that serve as the normative heart of the National Defense Strategy (2026 NDS, pp. 15-23). 

    • Defend the U.S. Homeland. We will secure America’s borders and maritime approaches, and we will defend our nation’s skies through Golden Dome for America and a renewed focus on countering unmanned aerial threats. We will maintain a robust and modern nuclear deterrent capable of addressing the strategic threats to our country, raise and sustain formidable cyber defenses, and hunt and neutralize Islamic terrorists who have the ability and intent to strike our Homeland. At the same time, we will actively and fearlessly defend America’s interests throughout the Western Hemisphere. We will guarantee U.S. military and commercial access to key terrain, especially the Panama Canal, Gulf of America, and Greenland. We will provide President Trump with credible military options to use against narco-terrorists wherever they may be. We will engage in good faith with our neighbors, from Canada to our partners in Central and South America, but we will ensure that they respect and do their part to defend our shared interests. And where they do not, we will stand ready to take focused, decisive action that concretely advances U.S. interests. This is the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, and America’s military stands ready to enforce it with speed, power, and precision, as the world saw in Operation ABSOLUTE RESOLVE.
    • Deter China in the Indo-Pacific Through Strength, Not Confrontation. President Trump seeks a stable peace, fair trade, and respectful relations with China, and he has shown that he is willing to engage President Xi Jinping directly to achieve those goals. But President Trump has also shown how important it is to negotiate from a position of strength—and he has tasked DoW accordingly. Consistent with the President’s approach, DoW will therefore seek and open a wider range of military-to-military communications with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with a focus on supporting strategic stability with Beijing as well as deconfliction and de-escalation, more generally. But we will also be clear-eyed and realistic about the speed, scale, and quality of China’s historic military buildup. Our goal in doing so is not to dominate China; nor is it to strangle or humiliate them. Rather, our goal is simple: To prevent anyone, including China, from being able to dominate us or our allies—in essence, to set the military conditions required to achieve the NSS goal of a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific that allows all of us to enjoy a decent peace. To that end, as the NSS directs, we will erect a strong denial defense along the First Island Chain (FIC). We will also urge and enable key regional allies and partners to do more for our collective defense. In doing so, we will reinforce deterrence by denial so that all nations recognize that their interests are best served through peace and restraint. This is how we will establish a position of military strength from which President Trump can negotiate favorable terms for our nation. We will be strong but not unnecessarily confrontational. This is how we will help to turn President Trump’s vision for peace through strength into reality in the vital Indo-Pacific.
    • Increase Burden-Sharing with U.S. Allies and Partners. Ours is not a strategy of isolation. As the NSS directs, it is one of focused engagement abroad with a clear eye toward advancing the concrete, practical interests of Americans. Through this America First, commonsense lens, America’s alliances and partners have an essential role to play—but not as the dependencies of the last generation. Rather, as the Department rightly prioritizes Homeland defense and deterring China, other threats will persist, and our allies will be essential to dealing with all of them. Our allies will do so not as a favor to us, but out of their own interests. In the Indo-Pacific, where our allies share our desire for a free and open regional order, allies and partners’ contributions will be vital to deterring and balancing China. In Europe and other theaters, allies will take the lead against threats that are less severe for us but more so for them, with critical but more limited support from the United States.In all cases, we will be honest but clear about the urgent need for them to do their part and that it is in their own interests to do so without delay. We will incentivize and enable them to step up. This requires a change in tone and style from the past, but that is necessary not only for Americans but also for our allies and partners. For too long, allies and partners have been content to let us subsidize their defense. Our political establishment reaped the credit while regular Americans paid the bill. With President Trump, a new approach is in effect. Already, President Trump has set a new global standard for defense spending at NATO’s Hague Summit—3.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) on core military spending and an additional 1.5% on security-related spending, for a total of 5% of GDP. We will advocate that our allies and partners meet this standard around the world, not just in Europe. As our allies do so, together with the United States, they will be able to field the forces required to deter or defeat potential adversaries in every key region of the world, even in the face of simultaneous aggression. This is how we will set conditions for lasting peace through strength around the world.
    • Supercharge the U.S. Defense Industrial Base. President Trump is leading a once-in-a century revival of American industry, re-shoring strategic industries to the United States and revitalizing the industries previous generations had shipped overseas. We will harness this historic initiative to rebuild our nation’s defense industry, which underpins our defense and that of our allies and partners. We must return to being the world’s premier arsenal, one that can produce not only for ourselves but also for our allies and partners at scale, rapidly, and at the highest levels of quality. To achieve this, we will reinvest in U.S. defense production, building out capacity; empowering innovators; adopting new advances in technology, like artificial intelligence (AI); and clearing away outdated policies, practices, regulations, and other obstacles to the type and scale of production that the Joint Force requires for the priorities before us. We will simultaneously leverage allied and partner production not just to meet our own requirements but also to incentivize them to increase defense spending and help them field additional forces as quickly as possible. In the process, we will not only ensure our own defense industrial advantage but also put our alliances on stronger footing so that they can do their part to maintain peace through strength on a strong, equitable, and enduring basis.


 What, then, is the nature of war in the Republic's "new era"? The 2026 NDS nicely summarizes it in their own words:

In doing so—as President Trump has so memorably emphasized—our purpose will not be aggression or perpetual war. Rather, our goal is peace. Peace is the highest good. But not a peace that sacrifices our people’s security, freedoms, and prosperity. Rather, a peace that Americans deserve—a noble and proud peace. Fortunately, this peace is compatible with the interests of our potential opponents, if they keep their demands reasonable and cabined. We do not demand their humiliation or submission. Rather, we demand only that they respect our reasonably conceived interests and those of our allies and partners who stand stoutly with us. If we all can acknowledge this, we can achieve a flexible and sustainable balance of power among us, and peace.
But we at the Department of War will be ready if our gracious offer is spurned. We know that wishing for a decent peace is not the same thing as bringing it about. Thus, if our potential opponents are unwise enough to reject our peaceful overtures and choose conflict instead, America’s armed forces will stand ready to fight and win the nation’s wars in ways that make sense for Americans. To ensure that is the case, this Strategy will ensure that we see things and the choices we need to make clearly. We will prioritize addressing the most consequential and grave threats to Americans’ interests. We will revamp our network of allies and partners to meet the threats we face. And we will be ready, always carrying the sharpest and most formidable sword but prepared to offer the olive branch. (2026 NDS, p. 24). 

None of this makes sense except as a functionally differentiated piece of the larger puzzle that is America First, and that acquires its normative depth not from the Department of War--they themselves have reconstituted their apparatus as an instrument of peace through the perpetual threat of projections of force to neutralize threats to peace--from from the architecture of the America First. That architecture, in turn, blends the essential elements of "new era" domestic policy (re-industrialization in a guided markets driven environment) to augur in the renewal of the Republic that will be manifested in a golden age of the Republic's social relations (articulated in the form of its customs and traditions) repurposed for the contemporary age. It is shaped, in turn, with the cautions of national security (protection against domestic and external threat) of the 2025 NSS, and the structures for the outward projection of the Republic's domestic policy (transactions in economic, social, and cultural objects) that are in turn extensions of the manifestation of domestic fundamental objectives (DoS Agency Strategic Plan). 

And thus the theory (whether one agrees with it or not I leave to the reader); and its calabash; its cauldron.

And with it an effort to repurpose violence projected outward (and inward) in the service of the State and against its enemies and unpatriotic elements. Within the cognitive cages of America First what emerges is their conviction that they will eliminate war --at least war as understood in 19th and 20th century terms, wars for territory, wars for elimination of other states, etc., ("No longer will we squander  Americans’ will, resources, and even lives in foolish and grandiose adventures abroad." 2026 NDS, p. 24). The Republic, or rather its citizens will certainly bleed, and the national treasury will be used, extensively, to finance capability. What appears to be the idea, though, aligns with the fundamental transactional conceptual baseline of the Republic in its new era--that such blood and booty sacrifices will be undertaken strictly for quantitatively justifiable (or perhaps discursively positive)) domestic ends--either to protect the heartland (at the heartland's borders or within its essential near peripheries). What the documents struggle with, then, is an effort to abandon the old conceptual starting points for understanding and perhaps  also for creating the legal-managerial structures for war, by reframing violence, as they mean to use it, as force projections in the service of peace (redefined as the absence of war, eg here or managed ceasefire), a condition of social relations understood, in turn, as the apex space (platform--eg it need not be physical but may be virtual as well) for social, cultural, economic, etc. transactions and with transactions value added ("this Strategy is defined by a realistic, practical approach to clearly understanding the threats Americans face and how realistically and pragmatically those threats can be addressed in
ways consistent with American interests." 2026 NDS p. 8).

For Europe (and NATO), the model is Israel ("Israel has long demonstrated that it is both willing and able to defend itself with critical but limited support from the United States. " 2026 NDS, p. 12). It generalized expression was elaborated in the NDS's discussion of "burden sharing. ("our allies and partners must
shoulder their fair share of the burden of our collective defense. This is the right thing for them to
do, especially after decades of the United States subsidizing their defense. But it is also vital from a strategic perspective—both for us and for them." 2026 NDS, pp. 13).  The measure is a function of negative impact on the Republic's interests calculated from their perspective, and an interdiction of substitution effects of U.S. contributions to joint projects of defense (or transactions) (Ibid., pp. 13-14).  

That value added and value threatening framework is nicely captured in the 2026NDS approach to China, not as such, but as a threat to the ability of the Republic to do business when and as it likes: "The American people’s security, freedom, and prosperity are therefore directly linked to our ability to trade and engage from a position of strength in the Indo-Pacific. Were China—or anyone else, for that matter—to dominate this broad and crucial region, it would be able to effectively veto Americans’ access to the world’s economic center of gravity, with enduring implications for our nation’s economic prospects, including our ability to reindustrialize." (2026 NDS, p. 10). Russia, on the other hand, is a second order threat and potential a first order platform for the realization of transactional value added. It is a threat to the extent it threatens the value added of old alliances along NATO's Eastern flank. But it is a secondary threat in the sense that the expectation now arises that the Republic will no longer finance the containment of Russian first order threats, even against its dearest allies (2026 NDS p. 10-11). There will be room to bargain, certainly--markets for defense and alliance are in essence no different than markets for "widgets", but it is clear that violence projections  against second order threats will have to be made worthwhile. A repudiation of the post 1945 order as it had come to evolve itself  after 1989; most likely. Yet in the minds of the architects of this approach it represents not a repudiation but a classic rectification. That then explains the approach to Iran as well--one that recharacterizes the Iranian leadership as a much more potent variant on the Venezuelan model--operating to thwart the Republic's interests and  heading both a state and a criminal apparatus which makes it fair game for force projections in defense of the Republic's win-win transactions platforms (2026 NDS, p. 11-12). And so on.  

That, at any rate, is one way one might read these documents, and with it, the way in which their authors understand and apply America First in its domestic, international, defense, security and institutional policy manifestations--all now as a unified whole that is both self-referencing (a series of looping conceptual constructs) and interconnected with the greater public and private organizational frameworks of the Republic. And all of this requires a substantial rectification both the policies of the Republic and of the thinking and conduct (the working style) of its own cadres and patriots as well as those of its allies (if they wish to remain so). That, in the discursive style of Herodotus, was the essence of President Trump's remarks at Davos, coded,, in a style infuriating or easily dismissed by his enemies (who in vanguardist terms would be understood and thus flushed out as unpatriotic or reactionary forces). Whether or not this is a good idea, whether it is attainable, or whether it will survive the current administration (the last point appears to be generally accepted if one takes the Canadian Prime Minister's speech ar Davos seriously), I leave for another day and others more invested in projecting their own value universes in the public domain (politics).     

The Introduction to the 2026 NDS follows below

 

Friday, January 23, 2026

Event Announcement: Council on Foreign Relations' China Strategy Initiative Washington China Forum: China and Congress—Is There Still a Bipartisan Consensus?


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Happy to pass along this announcement from Rush Doshi, Director of the China Strategy Initiative and C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia Studies, Council on Foreign Relations

On behalf of Council on Foreign Relations' China Strategy Initiative, I'm excited to invite you to join the first session of the second annual Washington China Forum, this coming Tuesday, January 27 from 8:30 a.m. to 9:15 a.m. (EST).

U.S. Senators Christopher Coons and Pete Ricketts will engage in a bipartisan discussion on the role of Congress—relative to the executive branch—in formulating, resourcing, and creating the institutional basis of China policy. CFR President Mike Froman will give introductions, former National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley will deliver welcoming remarks, and I will moderate the conversation.

This event is co-organized by the Council on Foreign Relations’ China Strategy Initiative and the 21st Century China Center at UC San Diego’s School of Global Policy and Strategy, as part of the annual Washington China Forum.

I hope that you will join us for what promises to be a fascinating event.

Please register for the virtual event by clicking the following link: https://link.cfr.org/join/66n/washington-china-forum-2026-jan.


More information below.

Davos 2026 Part 3: Brief Reflections on the Remarks of China's Vice Premier He Lifeng

 

A person in a suit at a podium

AI-generated content may be incorrect.

 

I have been considering the discursive trajectories of remarks by significant stakeholders delivered at the 2025 meeting of the World Economic Forum at Davos. For me, the remarks  tend to serve as a barometer of the narrative tropes encasing within relevant narratives (which, in turn, encase fundamental and critical cognitive cages) whatever objectives these stakeholders will attempt to further during the course of the year. Indeed, China has been a significant participant in this ritual for a number of years. The Davos Forum provides China with a space to  elaborate its count5ervision to the approaches of the United States (especially) and to some extent Europe. 

In 2024, Chinese Premier Li Qiang offered trust in a vanguard state representing global leading forces dedicated to the realization of normatively identifiable objectives. In 2025, Vice-Premier Ding Xuexiang offered a more intense and summary glimpse of the Chinese Socialist path toward the perfection of the global system. That, too, is based on trust, but more specifically on the New Era approach to the ordering of States, collectives, and the community of nations within a values structure that aligns with developments in China contextualized to the spaces in which it might find a home. In that respect it is a set of remarks that looks back and consolidates a vision for the world order. 

In 2026, Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng used his remarks to underscore the positive contribution of the long arc of the development of the Chinese framework for multilateral rules based order with Chinese characteristics, one that will save the global order from instability and chaos. "Over nine years, guided by President Xi’s important remarks, China has consistently acted on the vision of a community with a shared future for humanity and remained steadfast in supporting multilateralism and free trade. Today, President Xi’s insights continue to resonate and remain as inspiring as ever." He Lifeng Remarks. 

These were underscored by the three major points that were the core of the remarks.The first was Chinese opposition to the emerging America First vision, its core parameters and its operationalization through tariffs and other measures that it was suggested disrupt at least the outer forms of the formally constituted world order. Second was a defense of the formal structures of a multilateral rules based orders within which states could engage in robust inter-governmental dialogue to attempt win-win solutions to challenges. And the last was to lay out Chinese reconsideration (and perhaps the evolution) of that multilateral ordering through the framework put forward as the the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, the Global Civilization Initiative, and the Global Governance Initiative.

The Global Development Initiative was proposed in 2021. This initiative aims to accelerate the implementation of the UN's 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. It stays committed to six core principles, namely, development as a priority, a people-centered approach, benefits for all, innovation-driven development, harmony between man and nature, and results-oriented actions.* * * The Global Security Initiative was proposed in 2022. Through this initiative, China seeks to work with the international community in upholding the spirit of the UN Charter, and calls for adapting to the profound changes in the international landscape through solidarity, addressing traditional and non-traditional security risks and challenges with a win-win approach, and creating a new path to security that features dialogue over confrontation, partnership over alliance, and win-win results over zero-sum games. * * * The Global Civilization Initiative was proposed in 2023. Through this initiative, China calls for jointly advocating respect for the diversity of civilizations, jointly advocating the common values of humanity, jointly advocating the importance of continuity and evolution of civilizations, and jointly advocating closer international people-to-people exchanges and cooperation. (China’s Three Global Initiatives)

The Global Governance Initiative was proposed in 2025. "This major initiative features and advocates five core concepts: First, sovereign equality to ensure participation in global affairs by all countries; Second, international rule of law for a just and orderly global governance system; Third, multilateralism for greater solidarity and cooperation among all countries; Fourth, a people-centered approach for universally beneficial and inclusive outcomes of global governance; Fifth, real results for a pragmatic and efficient global governance process." (Implementing the Global Governance Initiative for a Community with a Shared Future for Humanity)-

Discursively, the remarks of Vice-Premier Ding Xuexiang could not be more different than those of President Trump. And indeed, to some extent that is the point. The Chinese mean to make it clear that they speak the language of vanguard elites in the United States and Europe (among other places). China aligns itself with this transnational elite and the institutional organs through which they express their world view in action. The remarks are crafted as a subtle call for a global solidarity against the disruptive forces of chaos and instability the leading force of which is the United States. 

 The 2025 remarks of Vice-Premier Ding Xuexiang follows below. 

 The Davos speeches considered for 2026 include the following:

1. Davos 2026 Part 1--Remarks of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney

2. Davos 2026 Part 2--Remarks of U.S. President Donald Trump

3. Davos 2026 Part 3--Remarks of  China's Vice Premier He Lifeng

4. Davos 2026 Part 4-- Remarks of EU President Ursula von der Leyen

5. Davos 2026 Part 5-- Remarks of Argentina President Javier Milei

6. Davos 2026 Part 6--Address by the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy

 

Thursday, January 22, 2026

Davos 2026 Part 2: Reflections on the American 整风 [Rectification Campaign] : The "Herodotus" Quality of the Text of Remarks Delivered by President Donald Trump

 

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Intellectuals of petty-bourgeois origin always stubbornly try in all sorts of ways, including literary and artistic ways, to project themselves and spread their views, and they want the Party and the world to be remoulded in their own image. In the circumstances it is our duty to jolt these "comrades" and tell them sharply, "That won't work! The proletariat cannot accommodate itself to you. . . The past epoch is gone, never to return. . . China is moving forward, not back, and it is the revolutionary base areas, not any of the backward, retrogressive areas, that are leading China forward. This is a fundamental issue that, above all, comrades must come to understand in the rectification movement. . . . I believe that in the course of the rectification movement and in the long period of study and work to come, you will surely be able to bring about a transformation in yourselves and in your works, to create many fine works which will be warmly welcomed by the masses of the people, and to advance the literature and art movement in the revolutionary base areas and throughout China to a glorious new stage. (Mao Zedong, "Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art" (2 and 23 May 1942); see also nice discussion in Bonnie McDougall, Mao Zedong's  "Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art": A Translation of the 1943 Translation With Commentary (Universoty of Michigan Center for Chinese Studies, 1980)).

Rectification [整风 (Zhěngfēng)] or better put from its original longer form--to correct a working style--has always been around the intersticies of societal relations. In a world in which religion no longer fashions the bars within which it is possible to judge the need and character of rectification, other ideological frameworks have come into their own. Especially in the context of the ordering of political/social relations 整风 (Zhěngfēng; rectification) has moved from its classical Marxist-Leninist roots to insinuate itself as a critical element of the work style of all of the great ideological cages within which express the current tastes of humanity for their self-organization and the objectification of their hopes, manners, customs, dreams, and behaviors. 

In whatever form one finds it, in whatever era of historical development of a collective, in whatever form the cognitive cages of societal rationalizations appear, 整风 (Zhěngfēng; rectification) is also there. I insist on using the term as it has come to be known in the aftermath of the template setting Yan'an rectification of the late 1940s which shaped both the disciplinary working style of vanguards (where Leninist, intellectual, techno-expert, aristocratic or what not).  

Once again President Trump has come to Davos to deliver a speech to the assembled high level cadres of the global order(ing) and make deals (for what else would the self-aware incarnation of a transactional cognitive archetype do other than make deals?). Last year, when he returned at the start of his 2nd Presidency I noted:

Mr. Trump has been no stranger to Davos--and Davos will have him even as they might fear and loathe him and what he may be thought to bring to the table. He may be a "bad" boy but in the end he is more one of them than not--just in need of socialization and disciplining. At least that was the idea in 2018 when Mr. Trump last addressed this collection of vanguard elements ("America First" Explained at the Davos World Economic Forum: Text of President Trump's Address And White House Background Briefing). Still, the fundamental wariness and the sentiments fashionable in 2018 do linger (In quotes: How leaders at Davos 2025 view Trump's comeback). It is just that this time it is clearer that Mr. Trump could care less, perhaps because he no longer needs to care, and Davos movers and shakers are far more cautious, especially when they are being quoted. . .  This is a Mr. Trump who might still be mocked, and resisted, but now also a Mr. Trump who might have to be taken more seriously --a disruptive force that either benefits or threatens the vanguard ordering represented in this body. (Davos Discourse 1--Mr. Trump's Address to the World Economic Forum 2025 and the Evolving Characteristics of America First as an Alternative to European and Chinese Models)

 Last year President Trump loomed over the assembly briefly and on screen--a virtual presence that signified both a projection into the meeting and a distance from it, and a reminder that in modernity, virtual projections and the simulacra of the material might convey as much power as the physical--perhaps more.  

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This year the President attended in person and delivered an address (Transcript: President Donald Trump Remarks @WEF Davos 2026). But this time, President Trump had 整风 (Zhěngfēng; rectification) on his mind. That was what appeared to be on his mind in the words of his own propaganda team: 

President Donald J. Trump commanded the stage this morning at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, delivering a bold address that reaffirmed America’s leadership on the global stage and charted a decisive path forward for Western nations. Highlighting the imperatives of national sovereignty, cultural preservation, and proactive security, President Trump articulated a robust strategy to promote mutual prosperity and fortify alliances against global challenges. (In Davos, President Trump Outlines Bold Vision for American Prosperity, Transatlantic Strength )

While one might argue that the discursive style of President Trump's remarks might be distinguishable from that of Mao Zedong when, in addressing  the intelligentsia in Yan'an in 1942 ("Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art"), it is hard (at least for me) to note much a a difference beyond discursive style and the primary (or at least initial) targets of a discourse in the form of a warning and ultimately sketching the boundaries of a new disciplinary framework. 

It is from the perspective of rectification, then, that one might usefully approach the President's remarks.

1.  Defeat the forces of reaction both at home and abroad! The President understood, and indeed, appeared to relish, his role as a measuring stick of rectification at the gathering if intellectuals and cadres at the global Yan'an. "It’s great to be back in beautiful Davos, Switzerland, and to address so many respected business leaders, so many friends, a few enemies." (Trump Remarks).  That stick was fashioned from out of the discursive construction of the dialectic between the old regime and his. "Under the Biden administration, America was plagued by the nightmare of stagflation, meaning low growth and high inflation, a recipe for misery, failure, and decline. But now, after just one year of my policies, we are witnessing the exact opposite " (Ibid.). At the root of the decline  were "radical-left Democrats" now taking up the role that in Yan'an had been occupied by right wing reactionaries, landlords and bourgeoisie elements. Within the liberated area that is the United States a new reality emerges and a need to appropriately lead the masses arises. The foundation of the authority for this political work is grounded in the victory of the current leadership against the reactionaries. "The USA is the economic engine on the planet. And when America booms, the entire world booms. It’s been the history. When it goes bad, it goes bad. And I hope we all — you all follow us down and you follow us up."

2. Adopting a correct working style is essential for unity around the core of leadership.  President Trump here gets to the operational heart of the matter, the proper working style of ought to be American liberal democratic praxis! "This afternoon, I want to discuss how we have achieved this economic miracle, how we intend to raise living standards for our citizens to levels never seen before, and perhaps how you too and the places where you come from could do much better by following what we’re doing because certain places in Europe are not even recognizable, frankly, anymore." (Trump Remarks). The President, echoing the thrust of the National Security Strategy 2025 and the State Department elaboration of America First, starts with the failed praxis of the ancien regime:

In recent decades, it became conventional wisdom in Washington and European capitals that the only way to grow a modern Western economy was through ever-increasing government spending, unchecked mass migration, and endless foreign imports. The consensus was that so-called dirty jobs and heavy industries should be sent elsewhere, that affordable energy should be replaced by the “Green New Scam,” and that countries could be propped up by importing new and entirely different populations from faraway lands.

This was the path that sleepy Joe Biden administration and many other Western governments very foolishly followed, turning their backs on everything that makes nations rich and powerful and strong. And there’s so much potential in so many nations. The result was record budget and trade deficits and a growing sovereign deficit, driven by the largest wave of mass migration in human history. We’ve never seen anything like it.

Quite frankly, many parts of our world are being destroyed before our very eyes, and the leaders don’t even understand what’s happening. And the ones that do understand aren’t doing anything about it. Virtually all of the so-called experts predicted my plans to end this failed model would trigger a global recession and runaway inflation. But we have proven them wrong. It’s actually just the opposite. (Trump Remarks).

 It doesn't really matter whether one believes this or not, or whether, in the blue collar style of oppositional trope one fact checks these assertions (against one's pne value measure). That is not the point here. The point is the trope, and the oppositional categories that are used to define the "defects among our comrades, such as idealism, dogmatism, empty illusions, empty talk, contempt for practice and aloofness from the masses, all of which call for an effective and serious campaign of rectification" (Mao Zedong "Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art" Section 5). The failures are magnified when set up against the dialectical successes of the current ruling ideology. These are described  in a long passage of the Remarks that use as its markers (1) the rejection of "nation-wrecking energy policies", (2) the operationalization of an anti-bureaucratism campaign to reduce the size of the American nomenklatura and its regulatory footprint, (3) tax reduction, (4) tariffs and trade deficits; (5) "historic trade deals with partners covering 40 percent of all U.S. trade;" and (6) gasoline prices and nuclear energy. As the President would summarize it, "In one year, our agenda has produced a transformation like America has not seen in over 100 years." (Trump Remarks).

3. Social Revolution (社会革命) as Self-Revolution (自我革命) Must Guide the Appropriately Direct the Spirit of Rectification.  If the United States has, through an intense if short period of self-revolution, attained a more advanced stage of social revolution, it can serve as template, guide and leading force for global social revolution.  To those ends, President Trump considers a number of objectives and expressions of leadership that are meant to highlight the American basic or fundamental political line (a cognitively transactional America First Project) in action. 

The President starts with Venezuela. His description, likely irritating to those still embedded in the cognitive premises of the ancien regime (likely including a large segment of his audience, Yan'an style) is discursively significant for its approach.  In its choices of what "facts" are important and what facts disappear into the ether of irrelevance to the fundamental political line.

Venezuela has been an amazing place for so many years, but then they went bad with their policies. Ten years ago, it was a great country, and now it’s got problems. But we’re helping them. And those 50 million barrels, we’re going to be splitting up with them, and they’ll be making more money than they’ve made in a long time. Venezuela is going to do fantastically well. We appreciate all of the cooperation we’ve been giving. We’ve been giving great cooperation. Once the attack ended, the attack ended, and they said, “let’s make a deal.” More people should do that. (Trump Remarks)

 The President moves on to artificial intelligence (AI). There AI exists in two contexts--the first is transactional--the competition with China for markets grounded in technological leadership. The second is AI as an impetus for energy consumption (one of the unintended ungreen consequences of the anti-fossil fuel green revolution). "And we’re leading the world in AI by a lot. We’re leading China by a lot. I think President Xi respects what we’ve done, in part because I’ve allowed these big companies building these massive buildings to build their own electric capacity." (Trump Remarks). And all originates within and from the core of leadership (领导核心).  "And I came up with the idea, you know, you people are brilliant, you have a lot of money. Let’s see what you can do. You can build your own electric generating plant. And they looked at me. They didn’t believe me." (Ibid.). 

The President then turns to (on) Europe. For the President Europe, perhaps more than the US "radical left" represents the core of reactionary elements ripe for rectification. 

Because of my landslide election victory, the United States avoided the catastrophic energy collapse which befell every European nation that pursued the Green New Scam, perhaps the greatest hoax in history. The Green New Scam, windmills all over the place, destroy your land, destroy your land. Every time that goes around, you lose a thousand dollars. You’re supposed to make money with energy, not lose money. Here in Europe, we’ve seen the fate that the radical left tried to impose on America. They tried very hard. Germany now generates 22 percent less electricity than it did in 2017. And it’s not the current chancellor’s fault. He’s solving the problem. He’s going to do a great job. But what they did before he got there, I guess that’s why he got there. And electricity prices are 64 percent higher. (Trump Remarks).

The UK does not fare better, at least through the lens of energy policy. 

The United Kingdom produces just one third of the total energy from all sources that it did in 1999. Think of that, one third. And they’re sitting on top of the North Sea, one of the greatest reserves anywhere in the world. But they don’t use it. And that’s one reason why their energy has reached catastrophically low levels with equally high prices. High prices, very low levels. Think of that, one third, and you’re sitting on top of the North Sea.  And they like to say, “Well, you know, that’s depleted.” It’s not depleted. It’s got 500 years. They haven’t even found the oil. The North Sea is incredible. They don’t let anybody drill. Environmentally, they don’t let them drill. They make it impossible for the oil companies to go. They take 92 percent of the revenues. So the oil companies say, we can’t do it. (Ibid.).

The President foregrounds windmills for special evocative treatment.  From a semiotic perspective windmills represent or embody, they manifest, the left error of the current techno-bureaucratic institutionalist system that is, for the President, the primary object of rectification. 

Pix Credit China Daily (China Takes the Lead in Wind Energy Revolution
 Instead of closing down energy plants, we’re opening them up. Instead of building ineffective, money-losing windmills, we’re taking them down and not approving any.* * * The Green New Scam, windmills all over the place, destroy your land, destroy your land. Every time that goes around, you lose a thousand dollars. You’re supposed to make money with energy, not lose money. * * * There are windmills all over the place. And they are losers. One thing I’ve noticed is that the more windmills a country has, the more money that country loses and the worse that country is doing. China makes almost all of the windmills, and yet I haven’t been able to find any wind farms in China. * * * They put up a couple of big wind farms, but they don’t use them. They just put them up to show people what they could look like. They don’t spin. They don’t do anything. They use the thing called coal mostly. China goes with the coal. . . They killed the birds. They ruin your landscapes. Other than that, I think they’re fabulous, by the way. Stupid people buy them.(Trump Remarks)

 And then the shaping of the European rectification under the guidance of the American vanguard:

The consequences of such destructive policies have been stark, including lower economic growth, lower standards of living, lower birth rates, more socially disruptive migration, more vulnerability to hostile foreign adversaries, and much, much smaller militaries. * * * They have to get out of the culture that they’ve created over the last 10 years. It’s horrible what they’re doing to themselves. They’re destroying themselves. These are beautiful, beautiful places. We want strong allies, not seriously weakened ones. We want Europe to be strong. Ultimately, these are matters of national security, and perhaps no current issue makes the situation more clear than what’s currently going on with Greenland. (Trump Remarks)

To those ends, of course, the blueprint is set out in the U.S. State Department "Agency Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2026-2030.

And that gets the President to the transaction of the moment--Greenland.  And of course, nothing here is ever particularly clean cut. First, there is nothing historically odd about the idea of territorial cession as a transaction, especially, it seems, involving Greenland. 

The United States has tried to acquire Greenland several times. In 1867, Secretary of State William Seward commissioned a survey of Greenland. Impressed with the abundance of natural resources on the island, he pushed to acquire Greenland and Iceland for US$5.5 million – roughly $125 million today. But Congress was still concerned about the purchase of Alaska that year, which Seward had engineered. It had seen Alaska as too cold and too distant from the rest of the U.S. to justify spending $7.2 million – roughly $164 million today – although Congress ultimately agreed to do it. There was not enough national support for another frozen land. In 1910, the U.S. ambassador to Denmark proposed a complex trade involving Germany, Denmark and the United States. Denmark would give the U.S. Greenland, and the U.S. would give Denmark islands in the Philippines. Denmark would then give those islands to Germany, and Germany would return Schleswig-Holstein – Germany’s northernmost state – to Denmark. (Fortune; a history that President Trump alluded to in his Remarks)

That is quite different from the willingness to engage in a transaction for territory. And, indeed, Denmark rejected an offer from the Truman Administration to purchase Greenland in 1946 ("Ultimately, the U.S. and Danish governments agreed on other ways to incorporate Greenland into America's defenses." Here including the 1951 Defense Treaty). Second, there is a disconnect between the rhetoric of acquisition and the objectives. The Americans have no real taste for additional burdens of governance spaces; they do have a taste for freedom to use and exploit territories as they please (even if "as they please" is defined and constrained by contract). And currently they appear to have a particular taste for national security borderlands  with respect to which some have thought Greenland spaces ought to play a role. These transactional, exploitation, and use objectives then get translated and ground up within the more ancient rituals of acquisitions--"you use it [territory] you own it" rules. These confusions appear all over the place and might be considered in the context of the President's remarks.

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Would you like me to say a few words of Greenland? I was going to leave it out of the speech, but I thought – I think I would have been reviewed very negatively. I have tremendous respect for both the people of Greenland and the people of Denmark. Tremendous respect. But every NATO ally has an obligation to be able to defend their own territory. And the fact is, no nation or group of nations is in any position to be able to secure Greenland other than the United States. We’re a great power, much greater than people even understand. I think they found that out two weeks ago in Venezuela. * ** We literally set up bases on Greenland for Denmark. . . .We were fighting to save it. For Denmark, big, beautiful piece of ice – it’s hard to call it land, it’s a big piece of ice – but we saved Greenland and successfully prevented our enemies from gaining a foothold in our hemisphere. So we did it for ourselves also. . . . After the war, we gave Greenland back to Denmark. How stupid were we to do that? But we did it. But we gave it back. But how ungrateful are they now? . .. So now our country and the world face much greater risks than it did ever before because of missiles, because of nuclear, because of weapons of warfare that I can’t even talk about. * * *

Greenland is a vast, almost entirely uninhabited and undeveloped territory. The sitting undefended in a key strategic location between the United States, Russia and China, that’s exactly where it is right smack in the middle, wasn’t important nearly when we gave it back. You know, when we gave it back, it wasn’t the same as it is now. It’s not important for any other reason. You know, that one talks about the minerals. There’s so many. There’s no rare earth. No such thing as rare earth. There’s rare processing. But there’s so much rare earth. And this to get to this rare earth, you had to go through hundreds of feet of ice. That’s not the reason we need it. We need it for strategic national security and international security. This enormous, unsecured island is actually part of North America on the northern frontier of the Western Hemisphere. That’s our territory. 

It is all here. Jumbled up of course, but for a transactional mind perfectly logically bricolaged. And that is precisely how a merchant type would want it. The Remarks are a concoction of imprecise language (I don't dare say sloppy because the imprecision is clearly deliberate cloaked in what a transactional opponent might be lulled into thinking is sloppy). It is not exactly clear what the Americans want--Greenland is worthless and it is essential for security; it is an object in commerce and held by a State incapable of exploiting it to comply with its obligations; and so on. That is a transactional not an institutional stance--and thus the rectification--the working style of transaction rather than of institutional solidarity. In the end one does not quite know what the "acquisition of Greenland" actually means other than that the Americans want to be able to do whatever it is they want to do for the protection of their interests and consequentially those of their allies within the inner core of the American territorial peripheries. That does not make it any less galling for the Danish. But it does reveal the praxis of rectification in the new era of the historical development of the United States. And indeed, almost immediately after the speech negotiations appeared to have kicked into high gear (see, e.g. here). And here it is the American version of social revolution through self-revolution .

Nonetheless, social and self-revolution, and its modalities of rectification start at home.  The President is as clear on that point as the Democratic Party and its supporters were in seeking then Mr. Trump's rectification between 2020 and 2024. The President declared: "the 2020 U.S. presidential election . . . was a rigged election. Everybody now knows that. They found out. People will soon be prosecuted for what they did. It’s probably breaking news, but it should be. It was a rigged election. You can’t have rigged elections." (Trump Remarks). And, like Mao Zedong in the 1940s (and Fidel Castro in the 1960s) rectification starts with the appropriate disciplining of the intelligentsia and their organs. 

You need strong borders, strong elections, and, ideally, a good press. I always say it. Strong borders, strong elections, free, fair elections, and a fair media. The media is terrible. It’s very crooked. It’s very biased, terrible. But someday it’ll straighten out because it’s losing all credibility. Think of it. When I went in a landslide, a giant landslide, won all seven swing states, won the popular vote, won everything. And they only get negative press. That means that it has no credibility. And if they’re going to get credibility, they’re going to have to be fair. So you need a fair press. But you also need those other elements. (Trump Remarks).

The issue isn't about "truth" but ideological stance, and from ideological stance the rationalization of approaches to vesting actions and objects with appropriate signification.  That as visible now as it was in 1942 in Yan'an as it has been in the Europe of the Brussels effect and in the America of the rules based multilateral order. 

 4. For transactions there must be peace! Like that other hegemon, but from a quite different starting (and perhaps ending) point. The new fundamental political line is focused on peace. It is not focused on the normative values around which conflict is considered and ends negotiated. It is focused on peace as an object, a state of being, a space within which it is possible to undertake the sort of translations that might enhance states of substantial non-conflict.

Pix credit BBC
 

We now understand that “President Trump is the President of Peace." (President Trump Brokers Another Historic Peace Deal). It ought to follow that the Republic is now, collectively, a Republic of Peace--self-revolution ushers in a state of social revolution. That, one might be excused for thinking, is the thrust of President Trump's message to the Republic. This is a message that has been underscored and elaborated by Secretary of State Rubio, whose discussion of the notion of peace, and states of peace brokered by a strong Republic reflects the more fundamental self-revolution of "transactional-merchant phenomenology and its understanding of peace as an essential element of something larger: "As they say in some movies--peace, like death, is not an end but a doorway. That acquires a quite interesting aspect in transactional spaces." What, then, is peace?  Perhaps Secretary Marco Rubio describes it best under conditions of transaction framing merchant realities--peace is the absence of war. War is understood as violent conflict, one that either destroys valuable objects (infrastructure, productive capacity and the like), or human the consumption of whom is the essential element of the process of production (workers, family units, consumers,  and operators of economic, social, religious, and cultural productivity) and the object (collectively) of productivity (at its extreme here) and curated. Societal self-pleasuring is the ultimate aim--however that is defined and made suitable for the times; and self-pleasuring consists of the proper interaction of objects and people agreeably arranged  and ordered in ways that permit a movement toward the maximization of their own self-and social value and that of the collective. This comes in many flavors of course (and ideology provides one of several languages for constituting these "flavors" in form suitable for both consumption and framing the human condition).  But at its heart is the fundamental postulate--that without the end of destruction there can be no movement toward. Nonetheless, peace is not its own object.  It is a state of (dis)engagement that permits the fundamental logic of the operation of self and social systems toward the realization of its apex goal and purpose--the regularization of spaces in which transactions may be undertaken for the further fulfillment of self and social revolution. It might be understood as movement toward development (or modernization, however these terms are understood) that improves (or in some systems perfects) things and conditions of life for individuals and collectives.  In other words, the object is not peace; the object is the achievement of a state of stable transactions--iterative, perhaps even purposeful beyond the value of the transaction--that then manifest desired states of being. (The Phenomenology of Peace and the Price of the Deal--Text of and Reflections on the Interview: Secretary of State Marco Rubio with Brian Kilmeade of Fox Radio). ("President Trump is the President of Peace" Reflections on the Power of Presidential Self-Revolution (自我革命), the Republic's Social Revolution (社会革命) and the Presidential Message: "President Trump Brokers Another Historic Peace Deal").

It is in this context that one can approach the language of peace in the President's remarks on Ukraine. 
"The war with Ukraine is an example. We are thousands of miles away, separated by a giant ocean. It’s a war that should have never started, and it wouldn’t have started if the 2020 U.S. presidential election weren’t rigged." (Trump Remarks). These remarks evidence the same sort of strategic ambiguity as the Greenland remarks.  The President starts with an assessment of his power of persuasion over Mr. Putin, so that the 2022 invasion would not have occurred. "It was terrible what happened. I could see it happening, too. After I left, I could see it happening." (Ibid.).  This was a transaction the financial ramifications of which drove approaches, one conflated with border control and inflation.

Biden had given Ukraine and NATO $350 billion of staggering sums, $350 billion. I came in, and just like the southern border, just like inflation, just like our economy, I said, wow, this place is in trouble, meaning our country. All of these things were out of control. But the border was out of control. We fixed it with the strongest border anywhere in the world. (Ibid.).
And thus the obectification f peace as a core element of the new  fundamental political line. Peace, not at any price, but for peace's sake in which price is negotiable  and norms are price points. 

And I’ve now been working on this war for one year, during which time I settled eight other wars, India, Pakistan. I settled other wars that were Vladimir Putin called me. Armenian, Azerbaijan, he said, “I can’t believe you settled that one.” They were going on for 35 years. I settled it in one day. And President Putin called me. He said, “You know, I can’t believe I worked on that war for 10 years trying to settle it. I couldn’t do it.” I said, “Do me a favor. Focus on settling your war. Don’t worry about that.” What does the United States get out of all of this work? All of this money other than death, destruction and massive amounts of cash going to people who don’t appreciate what we do? They don’t appreciate what we do.(Ibid.).

Pix credit here
Of course, sometimes the instruments of peace are too expensive, or the institutional elements of peace mechanisms are not worth the price as a function of the value in transactions (or transnational security) they offer. From here one meanders through a number of transactional spaces. These include (1) NATO spending; (2) Greenland (no force); (3) naval capacity augmentation; (4) NATO spending again (bad deal tropes again); (5) Greenland and its incorporation into seamless North American defenses (Golden Dome); (6) the availability of the American Golden Dome to friends; (7) ending the loss of life in the Russo-Ukraine war ("Because too many people are dying, needlessly dying. Too many souls are being lost. It’s the only reason I’m interested in doing it. But in doing it, I’m helping Europe. I’m helping NATO"); (8) back to Greenland, its lack of exploitative valueless except for national security and NATO's failure; (9) financial markets and defense spending (with another swipe at the Europeans and NATO--the essence of rectification); (10) back to Greenland (partners will come to regret intransigence on the issue); (11) from the rectification to the utilization of a "strong NATO" presumably reconstituted in ways that align with the US fundamental political-transactional line; (12) global markets in pharma and welfare state stability and the value of the transactional lens (using in part President Macron's  sunglasses as metaphor); and (13) the value and essence of tariffs in transactional spaces.  What makes them interesting is not the meander but the connections, one that might best be savored after the fact, as oral discourse they might  only produce a momentary effervescence of key words dropped in oceans of sound.  But it also reveals discursive pathways, pathways that are quite different from those of techno-institutionalists, pathways that produce values in transactional dialectics in which categories are merely transactional objects that can be shifted, aligned or abandoned to suit the transactional objective. This is a force of logic that appears completely illogical to bureaucrats and traditionally trained officials precisely because it upends the niceties of discursive categories and their integrity, that collapses the un-collapsable and that evidences a shifting aggregation and re-aggregation of value that is dynamic and malleable. 

5. The Post-Global Mass Line; people are the rulers of rectification. Like the Socialist Path, the Liberal Democratic transactional Path requires discipline, dedication. . . .and results.  To those ends resident Trump brings his global vision home in several key respects: (1) home ownership by individuals; (2) caps on credit card interest rates; (3) American crypto-currency hegemony; and (4) mortgage bonds, mortgage rates and a public criticism of the apex American central banker.

But an appropriate working style s also necessary for the American core of leadership; and there is no better example than the way in which he deals with the Davos host country. The language is critically important. And that produces probably the most important part of the speech, the part of the speech that ought to be reviewed, considered, analyzed, and internalized more than anything else that passed from or thorough the lips of the President:

I mean, I had a case with Switzerland. We happened to be in Switzerland. Maybe I’ll give you a quick story. But they were paying nothing. They make beautiful watches, great watches, Rolex, all of them. They were paying nothing to the United States when they sent their product in. And we had a forty one billion dollar deficit, 41 billion with this beautiful place flew over it, isn’t it nice?

So I said, let’s put a 30 percent tariff on them so that we get back some of it, not all of it at all. We still have a deficit, big deficit, 40, 41 million. That’s a big deficit. And I said, let’s put a tariff on. Different tariffs, different places, you’re all party to some cases, victims to them. But in the end, it’s a fair thing. And most of you realize that.

But we put a 30 percent tariff on Switzerland and all hell broke loose. They were calling. I mean, like you wouldn’t believe. And I know so many people from Switzerland. Incredible place. Incredible, brilliant place. * * *

The prime minister, I don’t think president, I think prime minister called, a woman, and she was very repetitive. She said, “No, no, no, you cannot do that. 30 percent. You cannot do that. We are a small, small country.” I said, “Yeah, but you have a big, big deficit. You may be small, but you have a bigger deficit than big countries.” She said, “No, no, no, please. You cannot do it.” Kept saying the same thing over and over. “We are a small country.” I said, “But you’re a big country in terms of…” And she just rubbed me the wrong way, I’ll be honest with you. And I said, “All right, thank you, ma’am. Appreciate it. Do not do this. Thank you very much, ma’am.” And I made it 39 percent.

And then all hell really broke out. And I was paid visits by everybody. Rolex came to see me. They all came to see me. But I realized, and I reduced it. Because I don’t want to hurt people. I don’t want to hurt them. And we brought it down to a lower level. Doesn’t mean it’s not going up, but we brought it down to a lower level. But they pay now, the tariff. (Trump Remarks).

That is the essence of the speech, of the discursive framework of the second Trump Administration and of its democratic centralism and mass line practice in the service of its fundamental political line. It is a story that plays over and over again in the remarks. It is not about the remarks bit its cadence its organization, its Herodotus style logoi structures (on Herodotus and his literary and cognitive style here)

The main theme of the work is the struggles between Greeks and Barbarians, as is explicitly stressed in the prooemium. After a short introduction to legendary times, the Histories start with the conflict between Lydians and Greeks. When the Lydian king Croesus is defeated by Cyrus the Great, the expansion of the Persian Empire becomes the backbone of the work. Herodotus develops a high literary technique of references back and forward, presenting many digressions—the so-called logoi. (Herodotus: i Introduction to the Histpories)

One is back, in a way, to a different sort of golden age of discourse; it is one that belies the structures of Pathos, Logos, and Ethos (Πάθος, Λόγος και Ήθος) in favor of sequential and non-sequential looping that represents not just discourse but policy. It is one that is transactionally conversational, one that is inductive and built on aggregations of iterative discursive performances ("Logos is the word Herodotus uses for his own long narrative. It is also his word for the discrete pieces of narrative told to him by informants; thirdly, it signifies a variety of ideas or communications that take place within the narrative, among the people whose words and deeds are described. Logoi wield a dangerous power of their own; people’s distinctive speech acts, as they often talk past and attempt to manipulate one another in the Histories, help drive forward the causal connections creating the logôn hodos that is Herodotus’ own massive nine-book work." here). For moderns this is excruciating, yet its semiotics points to a way of layering meaning in ways that manage perception that unconsciously point to the mimetic discourse of coding generative intelligence. 

6. The Democratic Centralism of the Post-Global.  The America First project promises democracy and engagement for American First Adherents (the patriots) and dictatorship for the forces of opposition and reaction. This is democratic dictatorship with liberal democratic characteristics in the new era of its historical development. (For the original Chinese Leninist conception, see Mao Zedong, On the Peoples Democratic Dictatorship (1949). But more importantly, in the global context, the essence of  America First is a public facing and inter-governmental form of democratic centralism with the United States as its core (on its Chinese early essence, Mao Zedong, Talk At An Enlarged Working Conference Convened By The Central Committee Of The Communist Party Of China (30 January 1962), a concept closely tied to rectification ("Without democracy there cannot be any correct centralism because people’s ideas differ, and if their understanding of things lacks unity then centralism cannot be established. What is centralism? First of all it is a centralization of correct ideas, on the basis of which unity of understanding, policy, planning, command and action are achieved. This is called centralized unification.").  

 President Trump says:

Many places, I could give you six, seven places just in the people in this little area. I know every one of them. They’re sort of, they’re looking down. They don’t want to see me and they don’t want to stare me in the eyes. But they’re taking advantage of, everybody took advantage of the United States. But I’ve been very fair and I gave them a tariff and it was fine. But I realized that without us, it’s not Switzerland anymore. Without us, it’s not any of the countries that are represented here.  And we want to work with the countries. We want to work with them. We’re not looking to destroy them. I could have said 39%, 40%. I could have said I want a 70% tariff, then we make money with Switzerland. But Switzerland would have been probably destroyed, financially destroyed. I don’t want to do that. (Trump Remarks)

Mao Zedong reminds us: " We must conscientiously bring questions out into the open, and let the masses speak out. Even at the risk of being cursed we should still let them speak out." (Talk At An Enlarged Working Conference).  President Trump says:  

But we should be paying the lowest interest rate of everybody. I hope Scott’s listening to this because we should be paying the lowest interest rate of everybody. Without us, without us, most of the countries don’t even work. And then you have the protection factor. Without our military, which is the greatest in the world by far, without our military, you have threats that you would never, you wouldn’t believe. You wouldn’t believe. You don’t have threats because of us. And that’s because of NATO. (Trump Remarks).

Mao Zedong reminds us: 

We should always uphold the principle of the unity of proletarian internationalism. We always advocate that the socialist countries and the world communist movement must unite firmly on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. The international revisionists are ceaselessly cursing us. Our attitude is, let them go on cursing us. When it becomes necessary we can give them some appropriate answers. Our Party has become accustomed to being cursed. Leaving aside those who attacked us in the past, what about the present? Abroad, the imperialists curse us, the reactionary nationalists curse us, the revisionists curse us; in our country Chiang Kai-shek curses us, the landlords, rich peasants, reactionaries, bad elements and rightists curse us. They had always done so in the past . . . Are we isolated? "   (Talk At An Enlarged Working Conference). 

And so on. And how does one move along the liberal democratic transactional path? President Trump sends time describing its components: (1) reindustriaization; (2) migration and crime enforcement (against bandits and reactionary elements);  (3) safety in the national capital city; (4) rectification of left and right error within institutions of lower level cadres (elected and appointed officials in sanctuary cities for example); (5) destroying transnational criminal gangs (the Somalis are mentioned); (6) eradicating piracy; and (7) dealing with undigested migrant groups and their anti-social 'assabiyah ("Situation in Minnesota reminds us that the West cannot mass import foreign cultures which have failed to ever build a successful society of their own").

What is left? 

So together, with confidence, boldness, and persistence, let us lift up our people, grow our economies, defend our shared destiny, and build a future for our citizens that is more ambitious, more exciting, more inspiring, and greater than the world has ever seen.(Trump Remarks)

 

The full text of President Trump's remarks follows and may also be accessed here in transcript form with thanks to the Singju Post.  


The Davos speeches considered for 2026 include the following:

1. Davos 2026 Part 1--Remarks of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney

2. Davos 2026 Part 2--Remarks of U.S. President Donald Trump

3. Davos 2026 Part 3--Remarks of  China's Vice Premier He Lifeng

4. Davos 2026 Part 4-- Remarks of EU President Ursula von der Leyen

 5. Davos 2026 Part 5-- Remarks of Argentina President Javier Milei

 6. Davos 2026 Part 6--Address by the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy